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. . . every form o f possible human 
perfection proves upon re fle c tio n  
to be defective and unachievable in  
re a l ity .  Therefore * Ideals serve 
well as guides. They are lik e  
beacons on a journey, but they do 
not permit us to ta rry , as though 
our goals and re s t were already 
contained in  them.
Karl Jaspers in 
Philosophy o f Existence
LIBERAL EDUCATION AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT:
AN INTEGRATED MODEL OF MORAL EDUCATION
Chapter 1: Introduction
Purpose and Rationale o f the Study
Purpose In many college and u n ive rs ity  mission statements one 
w i l l  discover a statement or paragraph dwelling upon the moral mission 
o f the In s t itu t io n  and emphasizing its  aim to imbue students w ith a 
moral conscience, a strong sense o f values, or perhaps, w ith  sound 
e th ica l character. On occasion, the promotion o f a more specfflc  moral 
code or set o f values 1s e x p l ic i t ly  id e n tif ie d ; 1n such cases, the In ­
s t i tu t io n 's  re lig io u s  or Ideological foundations usually  set the tone 
fo r  the mission statement. In th is  thes is , the general question 1s 
ra ised: At a college or u n ive rs ity  le v e l, what should be our educa­
tio n a l goals and methods 1n the realm o f moral development? I t  1s 
assumed th a t one can ra t io n a lly  formulate and defend cu rricu la r aims 
focused on m ora lity  and tha t such goals need not be t ig h t ly  linked to 
any spec ific  p o lit ic a l ideology or re lig io u s  fa ith .  A second, closely 
re la ted question fo llow s: What c u rr ic u la r or Ins truc tiona l model 1s
most lo g ic a lly  consistent and e th ic a lly  acceptable w ith  the mission 
and philosophy o f lib e ra l education? The major purpose o f th is  study 
1s to answer these two questions and develop one reasonable, c le a rly - 
defined model o f moral education, a possible approach to o ffe ring  
" in s tru c tio n  1n m ora lity " a t a college le ve l.
-8 -
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In order to  work toward these goals, several c r i t ic a l steps are 
taken. F irs t*  1n a philosophical study o f th is  nature the id e n tif ic a ­
tio n  and c la r if ic a t io n  o f several Important concepts and the setting o f 
boundaries are necessary tasks; "moral education" and I ts  re lated terms 
are p a rtic u la r ly  ambiguous, eas ily  misunderstood terms. Therefore, the 
provision o f a framework o f c lea r de fin itio n s  and ca re fu lly  delineated 
conceptual boundaries are primary and ongoing concerns. Second, the 
language and goals o f the lib e ra l education tra d itio n  are used to 
c r i t ic a l ly  evaluate ex is ting  models o f moral education and help develop 
a new approach. "Liberal education,1 an expression rooted 1n both edu­
cational philosophy and p rac tice , serves as a viable conceptual tool 1n 
the determination of the goals and methods o f moral education; also, 
the use of the re la tiv e ly  broad lib e ra l a rts  tra d it io n  provides a means 
to transcend a l l  but the most r ig id  or dogmatic Ideological frameworks 
o f educational goals, and 1t serves as an antidote to an an tisep tic , 
technique-oriented s k i l ls  approach to "va lu ing*" Third, in the process 
o f evaluating current co lleg ia te  models o f moral education a number of 
c lose ly  related Issues are examined* These include addressing such 
perplexing questions as "What exactly is a lib e ra l education?"; "Does 
moral education necessarily re s u lt in Indoctrination?"; "What is  the 
meaning of and what are the differences between process-oriented goals 
and substantive, educational goals?"; and "Is  there a connection Unk­
ing teaching about m orality w ith  teaching morality?"
I t  Is important to add touches of both tentativeness and humor to 
th is  study; tentativeness because the en tire  realm o f m ora lity  yields 
few d e f in it iv e  answers and guidelInes--humor because i t  Is a ll too easy
-10-
to become overly sanctimonious and unreal1st1cal1y invested In the ro le  
colleges can play 1n moral development. In complete earnestness, a re ­
cent report on "The In te g rity  of Higher Education" reads, "a ll univer­
s ity  and college personnel, by th e ir  practices and th e ir conduct, may 
so profoundly a ffect the in te lle c tu a l and moral development o f the 
young that even seemingly minor departures from In te g rity  cannot be 
to lera ted1* (Bonham, 1980). Over a hundred years ago, however, Presi­
dent P h ilip  Lfndsley of the University o f Nashville had th is  to say: 
"This is certa in : that parents need never look to a college fo r any 
miraculous moral regeneration or transformation of character"(1n Rudolph, 
1962, p, 90). In short, socie ty 's expectations on the re a lis t ic  role 
that colleges ^nd un ivers ities can and should play 1n the moral devel­
opment o f students have varied considerably. At th is po in t, perhaps 
only th is  can be stated w ith some ce rta in ty : Few educational Issues 
generate more heat, contradiction, and confusion than m orality and its  
instruction .
Contemporary Overview A review o f events 1n higher education 
over the past decade does reveal renewed, strong concern fo r questions 
o f ethical or moral behavior and p rinc ip le . Numerous proposals fo r 
core curricu la  and other educational schemes ca ll fo r " s k i l ls  In moral 
reasoning," "awareness o f values" or even, "ethical growth or trans­
formation." One commentator w rites, " lib e ra l education should aim to 
make values Issues central to the In te lle c tu a l l i f e  and to make f t  
clear that a college, lik e  other organizations, is a community of moral 
agents" (Murchland, 1979, p. 43). In a chapter en titled  "Values and
- l i ­
the American T ra d itio n " in  Missions of the College Curriculum (1978), 
the Carnegie Foundation fo r  the Advancement o f Teaching c ite s  several 
o f I ts  surveys Ind ica ting  a s ig n ifica n tly  sizeable concern fo r  moral 
growth and In s tru c tio n  through college education among the populace a t 
la rge , as well as among fa cu lty  and students. Also, 1n a comprehensive
survey o f the intended outcomes of higher education, "a va lid  and In te r ­
nalized but not dogmatic set o f values and moral p r in c ip le s /  "moral 
s e n s it iv ity  and courage," and "a sense of social consciousness and social 
re sp o n s ib ility "  are l is te d  as prominent goals (Bowen, 1977, p. 56).
There also have been many specific c u rr ic u la r  proposals designed 
to Implement such espoused objectives as "an examined set o f values" 
and "greater moral s e n s it iv ity . "  Area number three, "Social Analysis 
and Mora! Reasoning," o f  the recently implemented core curriculum  a t 
Harvard Is , among other th ings, Intended
to Introduce students to  Important tra d it io n s  of
thought, to make them aware o f the In tr ica c ie s  o f
e th ica l argument, and to bring them to grips w ith
p a rtic u la r questions of choice and value. They 
are to  learn th a t 1t 1s possible to th in k  systema­
t ic a l ly  about such issues as ju s tic e , o b lig a tio n , 
personal re s p o n s ib ility , c itizensh ip , and fr ie n d ­
ship. {Harvard, Faculty of Arts A Sciences, 1979)
In another core curriculum proposal, Educating fo r  Survival (1977), 
Ernest Boyer and Abraham Kaplan propose a "capstone" experience th a t 
provides
a very strong and forward look a t the moral and
-12 -
e th ica l considerations th a t guide the live s  o f 
each person, a kind o f forum 1n which personal 
b e lie fs  could be discussed. Everyone 'b e lie v e s ,1 
everyone con tinua lly  makes value-laden choices, 
and no one holds values wholly unrelated 1n 
o r ig in  and Impact to the values held by o thers.
{1977, p. 76)
Several years ago, the Hastings Center published a volume e n tit le d  
Ethics Teaching 1n Higher Education (19B0) which attempts a compre­
hensive overview o f ins truc tion  1n eth ics a t the co llege le ve l.
Researchers and commentators on moral education ty p ic a lly  develop 
one or more o f three explanations to  account fo r th is  recent, rapid 
expansion o f in te re s t In moral education. Many a ffirm  a vague social 
theory Unking contemporary events w ith  re su lta n t educational measures 
fo r  reform. Few o f the recent a r t ic le s  o r books dealing w ith the 
problems o f moral education f a l l  to mention the e ffe c t o f moral scan­
dals on our soc ie ty . M ilita ry  force and the continuing th rea t of 
nuclear d isas te r, the C .I.A . and the p ractice  of covert In te lligence  
gathering, corporate business practices and the abused r ig h ts  o f con­
sumers, the sexual philandering and questionable personal finances o f 
p o lit ic a l representatives, and the heightened awareness o f d isc rim in ­
atory practices against various groups 1s but a sampling o f the con­
temporary issues which some have chosen to view as signs o f ind iv idual 
and societal e th ica l d e te rio ra tio n . These same commentators occasion­
a l ly  point to socio logical data revealing the decreasing ro le  o f church 
and fam ily In c h ild  rearing and the Increasing ro le  o f mass media and
-13-
in s litu t lo n a l education at a l l  levels fo r socialization o f the Ind iv id ­
ua l. Others have looked upon the re -b ir th  of moral education as an 
a ffirm a tion  o f a cyc lica l view of college curriculum h is to ry . By th is  
account, the pendulum has swung back again to a concern fo r  the human­
i t ie s ,  lib e ra l a r ts , and human values —1n reaction to the continued 
growth o f the sciences, professional specialization and narrowly vo­
cational s tud ies. At the turn of the century the reaction took the 
form o f "Character Education" (Wagoner, 19B0), 1n the 1940s the Harvard 
Red Book report emphasized c itizensh ip , and 1n the 1970s and 1900s 
lib e ra l education has been examined increasingly as an eth ical enter­
prise (Botste ln , 1979a, 1979b; Conrad A Weyer, 19B0; Murchiand, 1976, 
1979;.
A th ird  "explanation" 1s more complex, steeped 1n an understand­
ing o f in te lle c tu a l h is to ry  which I t s e l f  Is open to a wide range of 
in te rp re ta tio ns . From th is  perspective the entrenched s c ie n tif ic /  
analysis paradigm, Indeed, our fa ith  in  reason and s c ie n tif ic  method, 
has come under f i r e , 1 Our Increasing willingness to seriously question 
the continuous use o f the s c ie n tif ic  method has been accompanied hy a 
serious re-evaluat1on of the meaning and role of human reason and 
ra tio n a lity - -a  re-exam1nation which has resulted in providing a level
V o r a p a rt ic u la r ly  luc id  account o f th is  viewpoint, the reader 
is  re ferred to the works o f William Barrett: Irra tiona l Man: A Study
in  E x is ten tia l Philosophy (1962) and The I11 uslon of1 Technique: A ' 
Search fo r  Meaning In a Technological C iv iliza tio n  11979]. Such works 
as Reason Awake (Dubos, 19701, Tne Function o f Reason (Whitehead, 195B), 
Where the Wasteland Ends (Rozok, 1973J, A rt and Technics (Mumford,
1952), and The Structure o f S c ie n tific  Revolutions (Kuhn, 1970) pro­
vide a representative sampling of th is  genre.
-14-
and degree o f In te lle c tu a l credence to moral language and reasoning 
lacking in the f i r s t  s ix ty  years o f th is  century. More s p e c if ic a lly , 
the philosophical views o f the log ica l p o s it iv is ts  and other ana ly tic  
thinkers who e ithe r rejected moral statements as meaningless or labeled 
them as merely emotive in  nature have now been challenged {and accord­
ing to many, undermined) 1n a series o f new attempts to establish a 
reasonable, In te llec tua l grounding fo r m ora lity  and fo r value s ta te ­
ments and be lie fs  1n general { Baler, 1968; Rawls, 1971; Taylor, 1961; 
Toulmln, 1950). This e a r lie r  ana lytic challenge had the in i t ia l  
e ffe c t o f l im it in g  most academic work 1n ethics ( in  scholarly p u b li­
cations and journals and in  college courses) to a narrow focus on the 
metaethical Issues a ris ing  from the attempt to ju s t i f y  the very e x is t-  
ence and u t i l i t y  o f e th ica l inqu iry and language. More often than not, 
th is  metaethical approach held small appeal fo r the typ ica l undergrad­
uate and the non-professional philosopher; hence "e th ics11—as a compon­
ent of philosophy departments i f  not as general subject o f concern— 
became Increasingly isolated from the college c u rr ic u la r  mainstream 
(Sloan, 1980, pp. 38-40). Today, the sustained, c r i t ic a l  reactions 
against notions o f moral values and language as e ith e r meaningless or 
merely emotional have helped lay the groundwork fo r  the most recent 
p ro life ra tio n  o f courses, research, and seminars dealing w ith sub­
s tan tive , contemporary e th ica l problems.
This increase o f a c t iv ity  1s easily documented. There are a 
s ig n ifica n t number o f ind iv idua ls and groups now examining such con­
temporary concerns as public policy-making, p ro f it  margins, abortion, 
news reporting, genetic engineering, and rac ia l Inequity using the
-15-
language and d is c ip lin a ry  methods o f e th ic s . No longer must e th ic is ts  
be p rim a rily  o r so le ly  concerned w ith va lid a tin g  the In te lle c tu a l le g i t ­
imacy o f th e ir  endeavors. { I f  nothing e lse , they can point to the works 
o f such contemporary philosophers as Stephen Toulmln* Kurt Baler, and 
R. M. Hare as providing a metaethical base fo r th is  more concrete, 
applied endeavor.) The rapid expansion and Influence o f the Hastings 
Center ( In s t itu te  o f Society, Ethics and the L ife  Sciences), the f lo u r ­
ish ing of academic centers and departments focused on value concerns
2
and u t i l iz in g  forms o f e th ica l Inqu iry , and, more genera lly, the 
numerous professional soc ie ties  and organizations encouraging the exam­
in a tio n  o f e th ica l Issues in th e ir  respective domains —1n combination, 
provides overwhelming evidence o f a dramatic s h i f t  away from metaethical 
in q u iry  on the philosopher's part and toward normative e th ica l inqu iry  
on the part o f many social sc ie n tis ts  and professional educators.
Rationale The popular demand fo r  moral education In reaction to 
national scandals, the re-examination o f lib e ra l education as an e th i­
cal enterprise* the resurgence o f e th ics as a leg itim a te  applied d is ­
c ip lin e ,  and the current p ro life ra t io n  o f varied courses and programs 
o f values and moral education are among the major social and in te l le c t ­
ual trends which shape and d ire c t th is  discussion on moral education 
and in s tru c tio n  in  m ora lity . This descrip tion  (and b r ie f  explanation) 
o f the current surge o f in te re s t in e th ics  and moral education points
2
These Include the Center fo r  the Study o f Values a t the U n ivers ity  
o f Delaware; the Center fo r Philosophy and Public Policy a t the Univer­
s ity  o f Maryland; the Kennedy In s t itu te  o f Ethics at Georgetown Univer­
s i t y ,  and the National Center fo r  Business Ethics at Bentley College* 
Massachusetts* to name a representative se lec tion .
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to a number o f compelling reasons 1n favor o f sustained philosophical 
analysts o f a lte rn a tive  goals and methods o f moral education: reducing 
semantic confusion, understanding how to use the growing body o f social 
s c ie n tif ic  research in moral development, recognizing a new focus on 
measuring educational q u a lity  through examining student outcomes, 
Identify ing the dangers Inherent in moral education w ithout clear goals 
and gu ide lines, undermining the b e lie f th a t education can be va lue-free, 
and f in a l ly ,  reasserting the important ro le  th a t the philosophy of 
libera l education can p lay.
F irs t ,  the c la r if ic a t io n  o f semantic confusion provides a major 
impetus fo r th is  study. Although there most c e rta in ly  is  room fo r  sub­
s tantia l disagreement about the need fo r  and the nature o f moral educa­
tion at any educational le v e l,  much discord and confusion has resulted 
from ambiguous, poorly defined concepts- For example, there are spon­
sors of core courses and programs In "humanities and human values" who 
conscientiously avoid the label "moral education" and c le a r ly  d is t in ­
guish themselves e ith e r from coursework 1n e th ics  or the ob jec tive  of 
"a lte ring  moral behavior;" while there are others who re a d ily  use the 
expressions "moral education," "values education ,1' and "e th ics " in te r ­
changeably- In th is  study, i t  1s maintained th a t these terms are not 
en tire ly  synonymous but ra the r have had and should continue to have 
appreciable, substantive d iffe rences.
Second, the growing body o f psychological and socio log ica l research 
attempting to define and measure moral development and thought processes 
could have increasingly important im p lica tions fo r  programs and theories 
of education a t a l l  le ve ls - Indeed, much work has been done on the
-17 -
e ffec ts  o f co llege education on the in d iv id u a l- in c lu d in g  e ffec ts  on 
moral behavior and thought (Asttn , 1971, 1977; Feldman & Newcomb, 1969; 
Hyman, Reed A Wright, 1975; Jacob, 1975; Wilson 4 G aff, 1975; Winter, 
McClelland & Stewart, 1981). Thus fa r, the find ings o f such studies 
are ambiguous and heavily dependent on the researchers' means o f mea­
surement. For example, in his c lassic study. Changing Values in College 
{1957), P h ilip  Jacob focuses on substantive changes in students' value 
positions on such sp e c ific  matters as extram arital sex, b e lie f  In a 
supernatural c rea to r, freedom of the press, and drug usage as recrea­
tio n , and he Id e n tif ie s  changes 1n p o lit ic a l party a f f i l ia t io n  and 
church membership th a t may have occurred as a re s u lt o f attending 
college. Jacob's study Is s ig n if ic a n tly  d if fe re n t from W illiam  Kerry's 
Forms o f In te lle c tu a l and Ethical Development In the College Years 
f 1970) 1n which stages o f cogn itive  growth are id e n tifie d  and described 
in d e ta il.  For Perry and his team o f psychological researchers, the 
p a rtic u la r value stands and changes in themselves were unimportant; 
ra ther, they provided access to the underlying cognitive process through 
which the student s truc tu res and evaluates knowledge o f s e lf and the 
world, Despite s ig n if ic a n t d ifferences among themselves, many develop­
mental psychologists agree tha t a t least some forms o f moral growth can 
be both defined and measured {Lickona, 1980, pp. 103-32). A lso, i f  one 
adds to  th is  surge o f psychological research a growing sense among 
those paying fo r  a co llege education that college outcomes should be 
analyzed and p u b lic ly  reported, then new and more exacting forms of 
educational measurement w i l l  in a l l  like lihood  develop out o f th is  body 
o f research. This, then provides a second reason fo r  philosophical
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ans ly s is  of moral education: w ithout such ana lys is , there is the
danger tha t unexamined goals and objectives would be il le g it im a te ly  
Introduced as the natural consequence o f descrip tive * social s c ie n t if ic  
theory and research. In other words* i t  might be possible fo r educa­
to rs  to become so enamored w ith a p a rticu la r h ie ra rch ica l theory o f 
moral development that they would begin to u n c r it ic a l ly  accept the 
moral stages as actual c u rr ic u la r  goals and fo rg e t the fundamentally 
descrip tive  (and ten ta tive ) nature o f social s c ie n t if ic  theory.
This desire to avoid u n c r it ic a l ly  tra n s la tin g  the findings o f 
descrip tive  educational research in to  c u rr ic u la r  goals and objectives 
leads to another yet broader reason fo r  th is  type o f study; the under­
mining o f the idea or ideal o f education as value n e u tra l.* C urricu la r 
ob jectives, the ends of In s tru c tio n , almost always depend on value 
judgments about what should be taught, about what is  important fo r the 
student, and u ltim a te ly , fo r  society. Rather than re tre a t behind the 
misleading mask of pure o b je c t iv ity *  each educational In s titu t io n *  each 
curriculum , must be clear and fo r th r ig h t about the moral character o f 
i t s  goals and objectives. These goals may* indeed, include in te lle c tu a l 
o b je c t iv ity ,  tolerance, and respect fo r d iv e rs ity *  ye t these too are 
value positions and th e ir  pre-eminence In a given educational system 
w i l l  stand in marked contrast to one which p rim a rily  emphasizes common
^In b r ie f, th is  1s a modern restatement o f G.E. Moore's "na tu ra l­
is t ic  fa lla cy " in which he c le a rly  exposes and lo g ic a lly  derides argu­
ments which move from " is "  to "oughtM--from a descrip tion  o f what is  
to  the contention that "what is "  Is "what should be."
^Tn The Ideal of the U n ivers ity  (1969) R. P. W olff provides an 
espec ia lly  e ffe c tive  argument in  his section e n tit le d  "The Myth o f 
Value N e u tra lity ."
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heritage, self-d1sc1p11ne and character, and competence frt basic com­
munication s k i l ls .  The examination o f c u rr ic u la r  objectives d ire c t ly  
focused on moral development serves to bring th is  point regarding the 
im p o ss ib ility  o f value n e u tra lity  to  the fo re fro n t. For example, the 
in s t itu t io n  which sets no goals whatsoever regarding moral development 
may transm it the message th a t m ora lity  is  meaningless or e n tire ly  In ­
d iv id u a lis t ic , Another college which a ffirm s respect fo r  cu ltu ra l 
pluralism  and d iv e rs ity , c r i t ic a l  development o f a set o f ideals and 
values, and moral s e n s it iv ity  and consciousness as c u rr ic u la r goals 
w ill d i f fe r  markedly from one which emphasizes personal sa lva tion , good 
c itize n sh ip , and acceptance o f and adherence to moral ru les. Value 
n e u tra lity  In determining educational and c u rricu la r goals and objec­
tives is  c le a rly  a myth.
Fourth, there is  the need to re-examine the c r it ic a l and continu­
ing ro le  tha t the philosophy o f lib e ra l education can play 1n determin­
ing educational goals and ob jectives, coupled w ith the need to  define 
and c la r i fy  the exact nature of lib e ra l education. A c lear notion of 
the h is to rica l links  between lih e ra l education and moral development 
as an educational goal is  c ruc ia l in  th is  attempt to reassert the con­
nections between undergraduate education, the lib e ra l a rts  id e a l, and 
Individual m ora lity . The moral growth and development o f the under­
graduate student has been a predominant aim o f lib e ra l education 
(Srubacher* 1978; Conrad & Wyer, 1980; McGrath,1975,1976; Wegener, L978), 
As the e a r lie s t p rac tition e rs  o f higher education in  the West, the 
ancient Greeks conceived o f education as a moral a c t iv ity  creating 
both knowledgeable and virtuous men (Jaeger, 1939; Murchland, 1976,
-2 0 -
1979), I f  anything, 1t has been th is  fundamental concern fo r  growth in 
character and in te g r ity  tha t has distinguished lib e ra l education from 
other forms o f advanced In s tru c tio n , However, the 19th century sectar­
ian entrenchment o f lib e ra l a rts  education coupled with the 20th century 
fa ilu re  to  discover a new model o f l ib e ra l education have worked to
erode the once w ell-estab lished concern fo r moral growth (ConradS Wyer, 
2980).^ Moreover, the rise  o f the graduate and professional schools
w ith th e ir  emphasis on research, spec ia liza tion , and s c ie n t if ic  objec­
t i v i t y  has been para lle led  by a decreasing emphasis on personal instruc­
tion  and encounter, general studies, and value awareness and development 
(McGrath, 1975,1976). Today* there are those who regard any form o f Instruc­
tio n  dealing d ire c t ly  w ith va1' and morals e ith e r as indoctrination 
and, hence, unacceptable or simply as inappropriate 1n an educational 
se ttin g  where the primary goals revolve around the advancement o f tru th  
and the development o f ra tio n a l-a n a ly tic  capacities and technical s k il ls  
(Codero, 1976; Gluck, 1977; Gordon, 1975; Hook, 1970; Sch le ifer, 1976), 
This study does, then, seek to con tribu te  to the reestablishment o f 
connections between higher education* the lib e ra l education ideal, and
5
In the 19th century lib e ra l education became so closely associated 
w ith the small sectarian colleges o f numerous denominations that for 
some f t  continues to bear connotations o f narrowminded pietism , overly 
p ro tec tive  paternalism, and antiquated c lassica l in s tru c tio n . In the 
2Qth century, i t  took many lib e ra l a rts  colleges s ix ty  o r seventy years 
to e lim ina te  such mandatory practices as da lly  chapel, studies in 
c lass ica l languages, and the senior course 1n moral philosophy (see 
McGrath, 1976; Rudolph, 1976; Sloan, 1980], The objectives that these 
practices attempted to meet—community bu ild ing , development o f d is c i­
p line  and moral character, and the nurturing o f a comprehensive view 
rooted in  conmon her1tage--are s t i l l  often regarded as important; ye t, 
u n t il recen tly , there has been l i t t l e  discussion regarding the contem­
porary c u rr ic u la r  means to help bring aboui. those goals.
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the goals o f moral development.
F in a lly , w ithout firm  philosophical grounding, educational objec­
tives  and goals regarding m orality and I ts  Instruction w ill be p a rt ic ­
u la r ly  susceptible to  manipulation and d is to rtio n  w ith  po ten tia lly  
devastating resu lts . For example, an objective such as "c la r if ic a t io n  
o f personal values" could conceivably by translated in to  one-sided 
individualism  {e.g. "A ll I need do is  c la r ify  my own existing values 
and not a t a l l  concern myself with anyone e lse ’ s va lues."). Or the 
ob jective , "development o f moral reasoning a b il i ty "  might in  practice 
become " id e n tify  and develop debate techniques which w il l  allow the 
student to  win moral arguments" or "discover a method which w il l  a llow 
one to solve a ll moral dilemnas." Although such examples may seem 
extreme when stated 1n th is  manner, there c lea rly  are a ll too many 
h is to r ic a l examples o f moral education or tra in ing  having gone awry. 
Furthermore, a well-developed philosophical basis to college-level In ­
s truc tion  in  m orality w ill grant such programs and courses increased 
leverage in the cu rr ic u la r competition with existing, better defined, 
tra d it io n a l areas o f study. In the words o f Daniel Callahan, w ithout 
a theoretica l framework, there w ill resu lt a "general swamp o f competing 
purposes, confused pedagogies, and muddled students" (1978, p. 141).
One could safely assume tha t the current popular In te rest in moral or 
values education would rap id ly  fade in the face of such confusion and 
ambiguity o f purpose. In sumnatlon, th is  prelim inary statement of 
purpose and overview provides both a sense of context fo r th is  study 
as well as a developed set o f reasons fo r 1n-depth analysis o f a lte r ­
native goals and models of moral education.
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Method and Scope
The Question Restated Answers to  the questions* "What should 
b^ our educational goals and methods in  the realm o f moral development?" 
and "What c u rr ic u la r or in s tru c tio n a l model 1s most lo g ic a lly  consis­
ten t and e th ic a lly  acceptable w ith the philosophy and aims o f lib e ra l 
education?" are neither e a s ily  nor d e f in it iv e ly  formulated. The former 
question 1s lo g ic a lly  p r io r  and broader In scope* while the la t te r  
question provides a s p e c ific  context: an in s truc tio n a l model and lib e ra l 
education. As stated e a r lie r*  the e x is tin g  d iv e rs ity  o f vaguely syn­
onymous expressions—"e th ica l development*" "moral reasoning*" "values 
c la r if ic a t io n * "  "applied o r normative e th 1 cs"--is  an ind ica tion  o f the 
semantic confusion that o ften  hinders the development o f a reasonable 
response from the onset* For some* the value o rie n ta tio n  o f the ques­
tions autom atically renders them meaningless and thus any attempt to  
develop a reasoned response is  f u t i le  since such "answers" would be un­
substantiated o r u n ve rffla b le . For others the task is* perhaps, not so 
much i l lo g ic a l as i t  is  e th ic a lly  suspect; 1n th is  view, although very 
broad* generic goals regarding moral character may be appropriate* th e ir  
form ulation In to  more sp e c ific  c u rr ic u la r  objectives seriously r is ks  
indoc trina tion . These foundational concerns are raised and the basis 
o f th is  thesis is  defended as at leas t reasonable, and, in a pre lim inary 
sense, 1t 1s maintained th a t i t  does make sense to ask such questions, 
Educators can reasonably choose between and assign levels o f p r io r i ty  
to such goal statements as "the creation  o f good men and women," "aware­
news o f values and moral issues," and "movement to a higher leve l o f
-2 3 -
moral reasoning"; th a t 1t 1s sensible and not necessarily une th ica l, to 
develop sp e c ific  c u rr ic u la r  objectives that can, at least 1n part* help 
f u l f i l l  broad mission statements; and tha t unless c le a r, adequately de­
fended alms are developed, the Ins truc tiona l means or methods can make 
l i t t l e  sense. As philosopher of education, Broudy has contended: 
Because i t  1s believed tha t choice among ends 1r 
education 1s possible, I t  is  f e l t  th a t such choice 
is  also necessary, fo r otherwise means* presumably, 
could not be selected fo r  relevance and fitn e s s *  
and fa ilu re  in  th is  respect would render the whole 
enterprise Irra tio n a l*  i .e ,  aimless or v a c il la t in g *
(1970, p. -1)
Without the mere e x p lic it *  tangible connections hetween broad mission 
statements* specific  cu rricu la r ob jectives* and In s tru c tio n a l methods 
and s truc tu re s , moral development may as well be abolished or relegated 
to the extracurricu lum , or one might contend tha t such aims are best 
met t a c i t ly  (perhaps through the e n tire  college experience).6
S tructu re  In order to set about answering the two major ques­
tions and developing an acceptable model o f co llege -leve l moral educa­
tio n , th is  thesis is divided into f iv e  major sections o r chapters. In 
th is  in troducto ry  chapter, purpose, ra tio n a le , and methodology are
60ne well known argument for th is  approach has been developed by 
Polaqyi 1n The Tacit Dimension (1966). Also, the humanities and whol- 
Is t ic  approaches' to  values education are, loosely speaking, educational 
examples th a t are examined and c r itiq u e d  in greater d e ta il in  chapter 
three o f th is  thesis.
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td e n ttfle d  and explained. P a rticu la r care is  taken to explain the 
c r i t ic a l  ro le  tha t the idea o f l ib e ra l education, and i ts  inherent 
c r i te r ia ,  can play in  deciding what can count as leg itim a te  cu rricu la r 
ob jectives in th is  realm o f moral growth. In the second chapter a 
working d e fin it io n  o f lib e ra l education is  developed w ith  reference to 
w idely accepted h is to r ic a l statements regarding the lib e ra l arts and 
thorough examination o f contemporary practices and p rin c ip le s . A more 
de ta iled  h is to r ic a l focus on the ro le  o f moral education in  the lib e ra l 
a rts  fo llow s including a special focus on i t s  c lass ica l Greek roots.
This leads in to  discussion on both the h is to r ic a l and log ica l lin ks  be­
tween lib e ra l education* reason, and moral development as an educational 
goal. The chapter concludes w ith  a sumnary o f the broad goals and pur­
poses o f lib e ra l education, including those aims most d ire c tly  linked 
w ith e th ica l growth.
Five contemporary models o f moral education are Id e n tifie d  and de­
scribed in  the th ird  chapter: w h o lis t lc , values c la r if ic a t io n *  human­
it ie s *  narmative-ethics* and cognitive-developmental. With the primary 
focus on the espoused goals and ob jectives o f each approach* the c r i t e r ­
ia fo r  lib e ra l educat1on--as developed in  the previous section—are then 
c r i t i c a l ly  applied In the fou rth  chapter. In th is  manner, the respec­
t iv e  strengths and weaknesses and Inadequacies o f each of these extant 
models are developed and argued; out o f th is  discussion two p a rt ic u la r ly  
complementary models o f moral education are found acceptable. The 
se lection o f the cognitive-developmental model and the normative eth ics 
model sets the stage fo r the f in a l chapter. The attempt is  made to 
In tegrate  both sets o f goals and ob jectives. This task o f combining
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ob jectives In moral education that center on careful and rigorous 
thought on e th ica l issues w ith  those that focus on personal commitment 
and e th ica l perspective 1s a challenging one. I t  1s contended* how­
ever, th a t ju s t  such an in teg ra tion  is  most in  keeping w ith  the grander 
purposes and alms o f lib e ra l education. In the U t te r  pa rt o f chapter 
f iv e  s ig n if ic a n t c u rr ic u la r  structures and pedagogical methods th a t 
lo g ic a lly  and p ra c t ic a lly  fo llo w  from these goals are developed and 
discussed. The conclusion re ite ra tes  the studyU lim its  and summarizes 
both the strengths and weaknesses o f the newly developed set o f cu rr ic u ­
la r  goals and ob jectives fo r  moral education w ith in  the context o f 
co lle g e s ' l ib e ra l education.
Methodology This study Is a philosophical in qu iry  Into those 
educational aims and goals focused on the moral development of the In ­
d iv id u a l.  There 1s no attempt to discover or systematize fac ts , de­
velop em pirica l genera liza tions, or formulate explanatory theories 
about the a c t iv i t y  or process o f moral education or ind iv idua l moral 
development. As a philosophical Inquiry, there is  analysis and c la r i ­
f ic a t io n  o f arguments and concepts--1n the same sense as John Wilson 
"breaks down" moral reasoning Into i ts  log ica l, constituent parts 1n 
h is work, Moral Thinking (1970) or as R. S, Peters analyzes Ideas and 
evaluates th e ir  log ica l and lin g u is t ic  adequacy in his book, Ethics 
and Education (1966), Important educational concepts are analyzed 
fo r  th e ir  lo g ic a l and e th ica l adequacy and Ideal standards are estab­
lished  fo r  the ends (purposes and goals) and the means (complete cur­
r ic u la r  model) o f moral education in  a libera l education context. This
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type of conceptual analysis can be essential fo r d e sc rip tive ! em piri­
cal research. Wilson claims that moral education* 1n p a rt ic u la r ,
"o ffe rs a model case where philosophical guidance 1s essentia l for 
empirical research, i f  such research 1s not to be Irre le va n t or its  
application dangerous* (p, X* 1972). Peters, however, points out a 
lim ita tio n  o f conceptual analysis:
a much c le a re r  grasp o f the fundamental 
Issues underlying current controversies is  made 
possible by mapping the area of the concepts and 
revealing the contours of the c r ite r io n  b u i l t  in to  
them. But a detached and clear-sighted view o f
the shape o f Issues and in s t itu t io n s  is a ll tha t
conceptual analysis provides. I t  cannot o f i t s e l f  
determine the lines o f practica l p o lic y ,(1970, p. 45)
As a normative philosophical inqu iry th is  thesis is  p rim arily  con­
cerned w ith the substantive issues that have d ire c t im p lica tions fo r 
shaping "practica l p o licy ," This work is  a c r i t ic a l Inqu iry  Into the 
various alms and models o f moral education a t a co lleg ia te  le ve l*  an 
inquiry that develops Into a proposal fo r  a specific  ra tio n a lly  J u s ti­
fia b le  model fo r  moral education. Wilson claims tha t much research on
education Is normative "1n the simple sense th a t i t  is ro t  ju s t  research
on what is  the case, but research on how to make what is  the case more 
lik e  what ought to be the case" (1972, p. 7 ), More s p e c if ic a lly ,  nor­
mative theories have heen characterized as "c o n s is tin g ) o f judgements 
or propositions about the ends or values a t which the a c t iv i ty  or pro­
cess o f education should aim, the p rinc ip les  they should respect or
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lirplement, the methods they should use, the curriculum to be followed" 
(Frankena, 1965, p. 3 ). A normative study, then, presents a systematic 
view o f the p rin c ip le s  o r goals hy which people ought to th ink or act.
As a normative study, th is  thesis rests on the philosophical 
grounds th a t value statements can be ra tio n a lly  understood; tha t 1s, 
value statements are ne ithe r meaningless nor merely emotive in  nature. 
There are a number o f metaethical theories supporting the v a lid ity  o f 
value statements; these range from the b e lie f  tha t values can be v e r i­
f ie d  1n the same manner as facts  (e .g ., Jeremy Bentham's d e fin it io n  o f 
happiness as "the greatest good fo r  the greatest number") to the notion 
tha t the tru th  o f value statements 1s in tu it iv e ly  perceived, fo r  ex­
ample, Rousseau regarded the laws o f nature to  be "w ritten  1n the depths 
o f h is {man's) heart by his conscience and reason," while G. E. Moore 
believed tha t "value" was a unique, non-natural property o f th ings, in ­
tu i t iv e ly  perceived by humans. Others have claimed tha t values are 
lo g ic a lly  derived from facts (e .g .,  Jacques M arlta ln ln  Education at the 
Crossroads (1943)) o r th a t moral tru th s  somehow derive from a fa c t 
gathering process (e .g . te le o lo g lca l theories, p a rtic u la r ly  A r is to t le 's  
Nlchomachean E th ics ). More recen tly , Stephen Toulmln (1965), Kurt 
Baler (1965), and others have developed a "good reasons" approach to 
the ju s t i f ic a t io n  o f moral assertions. They view m ora lity  In terms of 
function  and contend tha t value statements are ra tiona l propositions 
open to judgments o f s e n s ib il ity  and warrantable1ty. R. M. Hare 
(1964) has a d if fe re n t notion; he argues th a t the legitim acy and 
tru th  content o f value assertions He in th e ir  form, not function .
Like Kant, he believes that reasons are the basis fo r  moral assertions*
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defining property and that th is  defin ing form rests in  th e ir  "univers- 
a b i l i t y . "
There is no attempt in  th is  thesis to select one metaethical 
theory over another. By recognizing that the roetaethical dialogue on 
the meaning, in te lle c tu a l legitimacy* and v e r i f ia b i l i t y  o f value asser­
tions 1s continuous* one can perhaps more e ffe c tiv e ly  understand the 
meaning and nature o f normative inqu iry . I t  is  not a pa rticu la r school 
of philosophical thought* nor an espousal o f certain types o f moral 
values or specific methods o f moral reasoning. Normative Inquiry is *  
in a very straightforward sense! eth ica l analysis on an applied le v e l.^  
I t  may tend toward broad speculation or a more narrow analysis of 
specific  concepts or ideas, but 1t is  neither purely metaphysical nor 
a n a ly tica l. Classic examples o f normative studies in higher education­
al thought and practice are P lato 's Republic and Cardinal Newman's 
The Idea o f a University (1948); famous 20th century examples include 
A. N. Whitehead's Aims o f Education (1929), R. tt. Hutchln's The Higher 
Learning In America (1936)* and Clark Kerr’ s The Uses o f the University 
(1972), Though obviously not as sweeping in its  scope, th is  thesis 
also provides, on ra tiona l and log ica l grounds* a developed set o f ed­
ucational objectives 1n the realm o f moral development and reasoning. 
Such an approach 1s fo r th r ig h t ly  value-oriented; however, i t  Is not 
e n tire ly  subjective or fa n c ifu l. The value orienta tion  o f th is  thesis
?Kore specific pedagogical examples are provided 1n chapter 3 in 
the overview of normative ethics as a model fo r  moral education.
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ts guided t^y; an awareness o f the major find ings In the social 
sciences and educational research about moral development and educa­
tio n ; an understanding o f the h is to ry  o f lib e ra l education and moral 
education; and, p rac tica l use o f conceptual analysis o f educational 
terminology. The normative method 1s grounded In the b e lie f  that c lear 
reasoning can provide not only lin g u is t ic  analysis o f educational aims 
but also considerable guidance in the form ulation and se lection  of 
those aims.
Working Assumptions and Other L im ita tions As noted previously, 
there have been educators and philosophers who have made ra the r sweep­
ing* grandiose claims In behalf o f a p a rtic u la r educational approach 
to promoting the development o f the student. The lim ita tio n s  o f th is  
sutdy are c le a r ly  stated a t th is  po in t in order to : de-emphaslze any 
sense th a t ex traord inary , far-reaching claims are being proposed; 
c la r i fy  the scope o f the study and explain why some controversia l 
issues are le f t  unexamined; and* to provide a more complete sense o f 
the In te lle c tu a l basis upon which th is  thesis res ts . Perhaps one of 
the most s ig n if ic a n t lim ita tio n s  is  the focus on moral education w ith ­
in the formal academic program; th is  thesis is  centered around those 
arguments tha t lin k  the ideals and philosophy o f lib e ra l education 
with the teaching o f moral reasoning, or development* 1n the curricu lum . 
This somewhat exclusionary focus Is not intended to demote extra ­
c u rr ic u la r  (or non -cu rrlcu la r) methods and goals fo r  moral development 
to  a secondary o r less leg itim ate sta tus, indeed* not in frequen tly , 
proponents o f the lib e ra l a rts  point to such e ffe c tive  sources of
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e th ica l development and character bu ild ing  as student-teacher In te r­
action, in s titu t io n a l m ilieu , sports a c t iv i t ie s ,  and peer In te ra c tion  
(A stln , 1979; Heath, 1968, 1976; Trow, 1976}. Recent social s c ie n t if ic  
studies clearly po in t out the very substan tia l role that in fo rm al, 
extra -curricu la r events do play in shaping moral development--1ns1de 
or outside of a college community (Lickona, 1976). In th is  study the
emphasis on the curriculum serves as a cynosure for the unique (and,
one hopes, c lea rly  defined) ro le  tha t more formal academic study can 
play 1n the overall inoral development o f the ind iv idua l.
The concentration on developing le g itim a te  and meaningful goals 
and objectives fo r  moral education is  another boundary. Although there 
1s an examination o f the most Important c u rr ic u la r  structures and In ­
structional methods (th a t could lo g ic a lly  and p rac tica lly  fo llo w  from 
the selected goa ls), there 1s no attempt to  analyze an array o f peda­
gogical problems or delve in  depth In to  such specific problems as 
determining the appropriate academic background fo r teachers o f eth ics
(or instructors in programs o f moral education) in a higher education
se tting . Or, to provide another example, there is only b r ie f d iscus­
sion on how a proposed mode! o f moral education might " f i t "  In to  an 
ex is ting  cu rricu la r s truc tu re . Also, since th is  is a philosophical 
focus on the id e n tif ic a t io n  and analysis o f goals, there Is no attempt 
to d irec tly  address the frequently raised Issue of d ispa rity  between 
espoused Ideals and actual p ractice . For example, the apparently 
worthy ideal, or o b je c tive ,o f "developing a strong moral imagination" 
may in actual p ractice  become tainted by an incompetent teacher, poorly 
motivated students, o r inadequate learning m ateria ls. However, those
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fa ilin g s  are not In t r in s ic a l ly  related to the goal i t s e l f .  Only, then, 
to the extent tha t such fa ilin g s  are d ire c t ly  re la ted to the nature o f 
the educational ob jective  w i l l  there be extended discussion about actual 
educational practice.
C lea rly , the b e lie f  (already addressed 1n the previous section on 
methodology) that moral propositions and p rinc ip les  can be ra t io n a lly  
understood, that they can be In te lle c tu a lly  discussed and tested, is 
a major assumption. I f  th is  were not the case, any attempt a t moral 
education would be i l lo g ic a l .  For example, I f  m ora lity  is  exclusive ly 
thought o f as verbalized states o f emotion, much lik e  "OuchJ That h u rts !" 
or "Please do that again, I t  fee ls very good," then there could be no 
education in  moral reasoning, no In troduction  to moral knowledge, but 
on ly, perhaps, tra in in g  o f the emotions o r behaviors equated w ith these 
moral pronouncements. A more d i f f i c u l t  and more controversia l assumption 
than the eplstemologlcal claim that the notion o f moral education makes 
log ica l sense, is the e th ica l claim tha t moral education is  not neces­
s a r ily  a form o f in d o c trina tio n . I t  Is doubtful that anyone could 
successfully contend th a t moral education would never, in fa c t or in 
p r in c ip le , lead to In d o c trin a tio n ; indoctrina tion  ce rta in ly  might be a 
p o s s ib ility  w ith such educational ob jectives as "improved moral reason­
ing" or "development of a moral im agination," but I t  is  not a log ica l inev­
i t a b i l i t y .  The determination o f whether indoctrina tion  has occurred in 
such a course or program would depend upon an examination o f the goals 
(both formal and ta c i t ) ,  the ra t io n a lity  o f the knowledge and s k i l ls  
taught, the Ins truc tiona l methods employed, the actual ob jectives
-32-
g
o f the educator, and the re su lting  e ffec ts  on the students. With those 
points o u tlin ed , a b r ie f  d e f in it io n  fo llow s: indoctrination occurs when
an ind iv idua l or group attempts to pass on or Inculcate a b e lie f, view, 
o r idea w ithout the intended learners exercising th e ir  own Independent 
Judgment or reasoning a b i l i t y .  Does m ora lity  have a specific  content 
tha t can on ly  be passed on in  th is  u n c r itic a l manner? Can i t  only mean 
Incu lca tion  o f values and be lie fs?  Would teaching m ora lity, rather 
than teaching "about" i t ,  necessarily lead to indoctrina tion , not edu­
cation? In th is  thes is , i t  is  assumed th a t the answer to these ques­
tions 1s "no"i 1t 1s argued, however, (In  chapter 2) that a strong, 
well-defined notion o f lib e ra l education can help us develop clear 
goals and ob jectives 1n moral education, goals which In themselves 
avoid indoc trina tion  and also help us avoid any tendency to s lide  into 
Indoctrina ting  methods. Moral education, then, 1s not necessarily In­
d o c trin a tin g , but ju s t as i t  Is always possible fo r economics, for 
example, to be "d r i l le d  1n" from one Ideological point o f view, one 
must acknowledge th a t indoctrina tion  could occur in a program or course 
In moral education. I ro n ic a lly , the acknowledgement o f th is  poss ib il­
i t y  can ind ica te , in i t s e l f ,  a v ig ila n t a tt itu d e , a healthy wariness 
of overly o p tim is tic  o r ambitious claims. As Ruth Macklln points out, 
education in m ora lity  "ne ither rules In , in  p rinc ip le , nor rules out,
□
See I ,  A. Snook's Indoctrina tion  and Education (1972), fo r a 
sound philosophical analysis o f the meaning and id e n tifica tio n  of in ­
d oc trin a tion . Also see, R. S, Peter's Ethics and Education (1970), 
and H irs t & Peter's The Logic o f Education (1970).
-33-
1n p rin c ip le , espousal o f a pa rticu la r moral viewpoint" (1980, p. 82).
Is the lib e ra l education of the la te  adolescent or adult student 
a v iab le , important goal? There are those, o f course, who contend 
tha t lib e ra l education (whatever is  sxactly meant by tha t notion) is  
no longer va lid  or appropriate; such c ritic ism s  are wide ranging; 
from contentions tha t the lib e ra l arts are e l i t i s t  (Cross, 1976;
Dewey, 1974) or that the lib e ra l education Is In e ffic ie n t in meeting 
the needs of a modern technological era (Chelt, 1975; Jantsch, 1969} 
to more radical c r it iq u e s  o f American in s titu tio n a l education as 1n- 
doctrlno tlon  or mere soc ia liza tio n  ( fre lre , 1972; I lH c h , 1971) or 
higher education as oriented toward ihe past, rather than helping pre­
pare and bu ild  fo r a better fu tu re  (T o ffle r, 1971). In th is  thesis the 
adequacy o f lib e ra l education as providing worthwhile guidelines is , In 
part* assumed. There 1s no attempt to write an extended apologia for 
the lib e ra l a rts  and systematicaUy respond to critic ism s raised by 
various educational and philosophical schools o f thought. However, the 
developed description o f lib e ra l education in  the second chapter w ill 
provide a clear understanding o f what is meant by the term and the 
educational goats w ith  which 1t is  intim ately connected; th is  descrip­
tion  w i l l ,  a t least in d ire c tly , serve as a response to those who would 
define lib e ra l education d if fe re n t ly  and as a defense o f the lib e ra l 
education idea l—i f  ro t  i t s  p ractice—across a l l  times and places.
W1T1 the co lle g ia te  model o f moral education that 1s presented In 
th is  thesis be the only plausib le model or absolutely the best model? 
Nu, o f course not--1n th is  thesis alone, f iv e  possible models fo r
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moral education are Id e n tif ie d , and there have been others In the past 
and there w ill be new and d if fe re n t notions in  the fu tu re . In th is  
thesis one possible model, one especia lly appropriate fo r  meeting the 
ideals and goals o f lib e ra l education {as 1t has h is to r ic a l ly  developed 
and as i t  exlstes today) is  Id e n tif ie d  and defined. I t  1s argued tha t 
1f one accepts th a t the broader alms o f lib e ra l education are important 
then th is  new model fo r  moral education 1s a p a r t ic u la r ly  powerful way 
to help achieve some o f these goals.
Term inology
From Conceptual Confusion to C la r ity  Although an extended 
analysis o f the re levant educational terminology 1s not provided, a set 
o f c le a r d e fin itio n s  w ith  examples and references is  developed. Seman­
t ic  c la r if ic a t io n  1s necessary to avoid both ambiguity and unnecessary 
disagreement, espec ia lly  when attempting to answer such questions as:
Are "e th ica l development," "moral reasoning," and "values c la r i f ic a ­
t io n 1 synonymous? Is there any d iffe rence  between "e th ic s1 and "morals?" 
Does a "moral" education simply mean a "good" education? Besides being 
amgibuous, a number o f these concepts carry strong, emotional connota­
tio n s ; often these are negative connotations. For example, the p ivo ta l 
expression, moral education, i t s e l f  was selected with some hesitancy 
because o f i t s  a ll- to o -fre q u e n t associations w ith Sunday school pro­
p r ie ty , tu rn -o f-th e  century character education programs, and a n t i-
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in te l le c tu a l ly  1n general. C la r ity  o f language from the onset may 
help one avoid jumping to unwarranted conclusions and, perhaps, under­
mine some stereotypical notions and popular connotations about moral 
"development" and Instruction  in  m ora lity .
The important major terms are morals, values and e th ic s ; in s tru c ­
tio n  and curriculum ; alms, goa ls, and ob jec tives ; as well as growth and 
development. These concepts are frequently  used throughout th is  thes is , 
and they are centra l to most discussions of moral education. Several 
other concepts, lib e ra l education, normative e th ic s , and reason, are 
also c r i t ic a l  to th is  work, but these are defined, and then discussed, 
in  greater de ta il elsewhere. For example, l ib e ra l education 1s analyzed 
In depth in the fo llow ing chapter, A more precise and d e ta iled  notion 
o f the concept emerges by ra is in g , and answering, such questions as;
What are the s ig n ifica n t h is to r ic a l examples o f lib e ra l education? What 
are Its  de fin ing  features? What are i t s  goals and objectives? Uhat 
connection does lib e ra l education have w ith moral development and educa­
tion? Normative, another p o te n tia lly  confusing concept, l i t e r a l l y  means 
es tab lish ing , or having to do w ith , norms or standards. For the phlloso- 
p h e r-e th ic is t, normative Implies a movement away from th e o re t ic a l,  meta-
q
Sidney Hook's essay "The Barbarism of v ir tu e "  In Academic Freedom 
and Academic Anarchy (1970) Is an exce llent example of re je c tin g  any 
form o f co llege-leve l moral education as being a n t i- fn te l le c tu a l. Per* 
haps i t  is  th is  negative, t r a d it io n a l is t  connotation o f "moral education" 
tha t explains [a t least In higher education) why so many contemporary pro­
grams and research projects label themselves as e ith e r "values-education" 
or as "e th ics-in -education ." In sho rt, "values" and "e th ics" are accept­
able words while "morals" and "m o ra lity " are unacceptable.
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e th ica l Inqu iry toward an actual a pp lica tion  o f moral reasoning to con­
temporary problems or s itu a tio n s  as well as to  the actual norms and 
standards of society and the in d iv id u a l.^  Normative e th ica l Inquiry 
1s a means to c r i t ic iz e  ir ra t io n a l moral be lie fs  and develop ra tio n a lly  
J u s tif ia b le  moral p rinc ip les  and alms; w h ile , in  th is  thes is , "norma­
tiv e  e th ics" re fers to  the sp e c ific  model o f co llege-leve l moral 
education which stems from the renewed emphasis on applied moral 
reasoning.
Reason and ra t io n a lity  are to a large extent defined w ith in  the 
framework o f the ideals o f lib e ra l education and the method o f normative 
in qu iry . In th is  study, ra t io n a lity  re fers neither to "Reason" as an 
ideal metaphysical q u a lity  ( i . e . ,  P latonic forms or a Hegelian d ia le c tic )  
nor to the more modern equation o f reason w ith  s c ie n t if ic  method and 
in fe re n tia l lo g ic , ^  R a tio n a lity  embodies a t least some norms, and 
broadly conceived, 1t 1s the human a c t iv i ty  o f systematic in te lle c tu a l 
Inqu iry , a process open to public debate and questioning. Moral reason­
ing, fo r  example, Is systematic and c lea r th inking about the moral 
dimension o f a s itu a tio n , an Idea, or a person; i t  involves the give 
and take o f open-ended discussion and in q u iry—not unquestioning
^See the fo llow ing  fo r  an h is to r ic a l overview and explanation o f 
normative e th ics: A lasda ir M acIntyre’ s A Short H istory o f Ethics (1966),
Mary Warnock's Ethics Since 1900 (1960), and Paul Taylor's Normative 
Discourse (1961). ~
^R ecently , several works have appeared in  educational lite ra tu re  
that are very c r i t ic a l  o f our overly-narrow conception o f reason.
These include Murchland (1976,1979), Hearn (1975), Botstein (1979), 
M attfe ld  (1975). and McDaniel (1976).
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re liance on tra d itio n  and authority nor an exclusive appeal to person­
al re levation or mystical explanation.
Morals, Values, Ethics In order to discuss the ro le  of reason 
in  moral discourse, a c learly  established notion o f m orality is  also 
necessary. The terms values, ethics, morals are so conmonly used in a 
pe jo ra tive  sense that they have developed a pos itive , evaluative con­
notation. When someone 1s told that they are "e th ica l,"  "o f sound 
moral character," or "a man of values," we are o ffe ring  praise. In a 
s t r ic te r  philosophical sense, however, these are descriptive terms; 
"e th ic a l"  is  not an expression o f approbation but rather a means of 
distinguishing between that which is  legal, psychological, social . . . 
o r e th ic a l. E a rlie r, I t  was asked 1f a "moral" education meant a 
"good" education? Clearly In th is  descriptive sense i t  does not mean 
a "good" or "worthy" education but rather an education in m orality (in  
some sense). Ethics does not re fer to e ithe r its  popular conception 
as a general pattern or way of l i f e  nor to a set o f rules fo r conduct, 
or a spec ific  moral code. Rather, ethics is  synonymous with moral
philosophy: sustained, c r it ic a l inquiry about the nature o f moral
12b e lie fs , language, and reasoning. For example, asking, and attempt­
ing to answer, such fundamental questions as "What makes an act righ t 
o r wrong7"( "What, 1f anything, is In tr in s ic a lly  good?", or "What
12The follow ing is  a sampling of texts providing basic d e fin i­
tions o f ethics and morals: Ethics by William Frankena (1963);
Reason in Ethics by Stephen Toulmfn (19S0); GeneralIzation 1n Ethics 
by Marcus Singer (1961); and A Short History o f Ethics by Alasdair 
MacIntyre (1966).
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evidence determines whether a moral judgment is  correct?" is  an e th ica l 
enterprise. However, such questions as "Is  extram arita l sex always 
wrong?", "Should abortion be le g a lly  permitted?11, or " Is  ac tive  euthan­
asia morally r igh t? " can also lead to e th ica l inqu iry  so long as the 
Inquiry is an open-ended, ra tion a l one w ithout d o p a tic  dependence 
upon a specific  code or set o f moral values. This, o f course, is 
another example o f applied o r normative e th ics .
The concept of "values," on the other hand, does not imply an 
in te lle c tu a l process but ra ther re fers to the broad domain o f a l l  
human choice or preference. There are many types o f human values: 
matters o f taste { " I  prefer co lon ia l s ty le  over V ic to ria n ") and custom 
( " I t  is most appropriate th a t the mother assume primary re sp o n s ib ility  
fo r  ra is ing ch ild ren1’) ;  aesthetic values ("The sculptured works o f 
Michelangelo are tru ly  elegant and fa r surpass those o f Rodin"); In ­
te lle c tu a l contentions ("B ehav io ris tic  psychology 1s both Inadequate 
and dehumanizing"); and, moral values ( " I t  is  wrong to take another 
human's l i f e " ) .  Moral values, then* are a spec ific  type o f human value, 
Wellman succinctly delineates the moral dimension: "The moral sphere
encompasses acts tha t are momentous ra ther than t r i v ia l ,  tha t a ffe c t 
others as much or more than the agent, tha t subject the agent to blame 
or punishment i f  he chooses in co rre c tly , and tha t are a matter o f con­
science" (1975, p, x v i) . Moral values are guides fo r  s ig n if ic a n t 
human action and usually develop in to  a system fo r  Judging and evalu­
a ting human actions and goals tha t are of important consequence. Also, 
moral prescriptions are usually considered to be universal statements, 
prescriptions tha t lose th e ir  impact and meaning i f  they are frequently
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or ra d ic a lly  a ltered to match circumstances. In th is  sense moral 
values become moral p rin c ip le s  and are fa r  more s im ila r to laws than 
to matters o f taste  o r custom.
A f in a l important d is t in c t io n  needs to be made between substantive 
moral values and the various loose synonyms fo r the process o f  moral 
reasoning. Substantive moral values are the spec ific  values one 
happens to profess, such as " I  believe tha t abortion is  wrong" or " I 
th ink th a t colleges should teach young people to be community minded." 
That is  the "content" to values* but frequent mention 1s also made of 
the processes o f "e th ica l in q u iry ,"  "moral reasoning," and, a t least in 
one section, o f "va lu ing" and "c la r ify in g  values." Just as there are 
wide va ria tion s  in  what people profess as moral values, there exists 
d iv e rs ity  In the way ind iv idua ls  choose to go about making moral de­
cisions and judgments. In th is  th es is , there is a minimal focus on 
the substantive moral values o f the ind iv idua l or group; ra the r the 
analyzed models o f co llege-leve l moral education are those tha t are 
(w ith a p a rtia l demur on the humanities model) p rim a rily  concerned 
w ith  estab lish ing  and teaching some process o f se lecting , analyzing 
and evaluating moral values* moral character* or both,
A concise review o f the preceding paragraphs fo llow s: Ethics has
been defined as formal, ra tiona l inqu iry  in to  the nature and meaning 
o f moral values and language; the moral domain is  smaller than, and 
encompassed by, the brood realm o f human values. This thesis is  con­
cerned w ith analyzing various models o f moral education tha t are pro­
posing education in  a moral process — in some sense-- and not an a lte r ­
ation o f s p e c if ic , substantive moral values. Vet* such terms and
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phrases as m ora lity* moral reasoning, m oralizing, valuing, and ethical 
development w il l  1n a ll like lih o o d  never be e n tire ly  free from con­
fusion and ambiguity, The complexity, depth and prolongation o f p h il­
osophical debate over th is  terminology are Ind ication enough o f the 
apparent f u t i l i t y  o f providing absolute d e fin it io n s . Nevertheless, 
the discussion now proceeds in to  the Issues o f moral education equipped 
with a t least reasonable and c lea r de fin itio ns  o f these three central 
concepts.
Instruction and Curriculum As noted e a r l ie r ,  in th is  study the 
examined models o f  moral education are those which o ffe r ins truc tion  1n 
m orality (or values c la r if ic a t io n  or ethical development, depending on 
the models' emphases and terminology) w ithin the curriculum. But what 
1s the curriculum? And what is  1t to o ffe r Instruction? Curriculum 
is the structured educational experience w ith a rticu la te  goals and 
lo g ic a lly  connected means to  implement those goals. The curriculum 
can be crucia l to the educational process, yet i t  1s Important to 
remember that 1t is  not synonymous with education. Even when education 
1s taking place 1n a college se ttin g , there remain numerous potential 
sources o f learning; these are ty p ic a lly  re ferred to as e ith e r the 
extra-curriculum or the hidden curriculum, or both. D iffe ren t in s t itu ­
tions lay varying degrees o f emphasis on the nqn-curricular aspects of 
college education, depending upon th e ir tra d it io n s , size, fa c u lty , and 
student p ro file s , and educational philosophy. Vet the one component 
tha t remains common to a l l  is  the curriculum. Partic ipation in  cu rric ­
u la r a c t iv it ie s  ( ty p ic a lly  courses) is required, and even those colleges
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or u n iv e rs itie s  which have no sp ec ific  d is tr ib u t io n  o r course requ ire ­
ments s t i l l  require tha t a l l  students "pass through" th e ir  c u rr ic u la r
13structure--whatever form i t  may take.
Paul H irs t defines the curriculum as "a plan o f a c t iv it ie s  aimed 
a t achieving objectives . . . Involving two other elements* a content 
to be used and methods to be employed to bring about learning" {1974, 
p. 3 ). R.S, Peters re fers to the curriculum as presenting a "range 
o f a c t iv it ie s  tha t are thought to be w r th  passing on1* {1966, p. 144) 
and makes a "case fo r curriculum a c t iv i t ie s ” as illu m in a tin g  many areas 
o f l i f e  and contribu ting  to the q u a lity  o f l iv in g .  In a d e fin it io n  
tha t borders w ith  the notion o f an in te lle c tu a l d is c ip lin e , Peters 
w rites  about curriculum a c t iv it ie s  as having "a wide-ranging cognitive 
contentM--1n contrast to the teaching o f games, s k i l ls ,  or techniques 
(1966* p. 159). The curriculum, then, is  the embodiment o f the most 
systematic attempts to trans la te  worthwhile educational objectives 
and ways o f learning Into concrete educational programs. This d e f in i­
tio n  leaves open the p o s s ib ilit ie s  fo r an in te g ra tive  curriculum or a 
curriculum tha t 1s oriented around problem-solving or student develop­
ment; in  other words, curriculum need not be so le ly  equated w ith  the 
tra d it io n a l d is c ip lin a ry  approach. Vet such a d e fin it io n  also raises 
questions: When the subject o f moral education is  introduced, should
i t  be a special program taught by spec ia lly  trained teachers or should 
1t be integrated in to  the ex is ting  curriculum  in some crea tive ,
13Harvard U niversity a t the turn o f the century and New College 
o f the U n ivers ity  o f Alabama in 19S5 are examples o f educational In s t i ­
tu tions w ith  no cu rr ic u la r requirements other than completing a pre­
scribed number o f c red its  or hours.
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functional manner? Should moral education be part o f a problem-solv1ng 
curriculum or be regarded as another d isc ip line  with a body of knowledge 
all i t s  own? Once again, such discussion quickly leads to  areas outside 
the purview o f th is  th e s is ; however, some speculation and analysis or 
the actual c u rr ic u la r  structu res and placement Into an existing  c u rr ic u ­
lum takes place in the f in a l chapter.
Presumably, the major a c t iv it ie s  w ith in  the curriculum are In s tru c ­
tion (or teaching) and learn ing . What are these a c t iv it ie s ?  E ffec tive  
instruction has been defined as the " a b i l i t y  to bring about desirable 
modifications in  the a b i l i t ie s  and perceptions o f the learner" (Popham 
& Baker, 1970, p. 10), A "goal-referenced instructiona l model" places 
primary emphasis on the desired learner outcomes; in th is  context* a 
teacher does not ask, "What shall I do?" but rather "What do I want my 
students to  learn?" To teach means specifying ob jectives, designing 
and implementing a c t iv it ie s  which w i l l  bring about those ob jectives, 
and evaluating o r measuring students' attainment o f the objectives. 
Effective teaching means th a t students learn the desired educational 
objectives.
H irs t and Peters have pointed out tha t there Is ne ithe r a log ica l 
nor necessary connection between in s truc tion  (or teaching) and educa­
tion: 'education might go on w ithout intentional planning with objec­
tives and learn ing  a c t iv it ie s "  {1970, pp. 76-78). Also, 1t ce rta in ly  
is possible fo r  teaching to occur but fo r  no learning to occur. Thus, 
one tends to re fe r  to e ffe c tiv e  teaching to emphasize th a t the desired 
objectives have been learned. The whole point in creating  educational 
in s titu tio n s  and designing curriculum * H1s that there 1s a teacher
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whose function I t  Is to bring  about learn ing in the best possible way" 
(H irs t I  Peters, 1970, p, 78}, Of course, once attempts are made to 
give specific  examples o f "teaching m o ra lity " o r "o ffe r in g  In s tru c tio n  
1n m o ra lity ,"  then th is  enters upon the major theme o f th is  thes is .
Each model o f  moral education develops a d if fe re n t theory o f what 1t 
Is to teach m o ra lity . In a l l  o f the models, however, there 1s a c lear 
recognition th a t teaching 1s In ten tiona l and goal-d irected and moves 
the student w e ll beyond growth shaped only by d isparate unorganized 
environmental fac to rs , "na tu ra l" m aturation, or both. Also, In each 
model there is  e ith e r a t a d t  or d ire c t b e lie f th a t teaching "about" 
m ora lity  Is an Inadequate notion, th a t there is  a stronger sense o f 
teaching. For example, i f  one were to teach "about" m o ra lity , then 
moral phenomena might be studied from a psychological, so c io lo g ica l, 
anthropological, or many o ther d is c ip lin a ry  points o f  view, but there 
would be no sense whatsoever o f developing a comnltment to norms, o f 
bridging the gap between character, fac ts  and values, o f recognizing 
a moral dimension In I ts  own r ig h t. In pa rt, the extent to and manner 
In which each model o f moral education attempts to connect these e le ­
ments and define  "teaching m ora lity" serves to d if fe re n t ia te  between 
them.
Aims, Goals, and Objectives What 1s an educational goal? What 
purpose does f t  serve? Does an aim such as " ( to }  create fre e -th in k in g , 
autonomous Ind iv idua l s "re a lly  have any impact or meaning? Is there any 
d ifference between aims, goals* and objectives? Since i t  Is p r im a rily  
educational goals and objectives tha t are analyzed, evaluated, and de-
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veloped 1n th is  thes is , again conceptual precision and c la r ity  are 
necessary. Statements o f educational goals and alms have at least 
three central purposes: they can be used as slogans, or Inspirational
statements, intended to e l i c i t  public support and enthusiasm; as guides 
to the educational process; and as tests to be applied to the actual 
educational outcomes (Broudy, 1970, pp. 3-21). For example, A. N. 
Whitehead eloquently claims tha t wisdom is  the ultim ate aim of educa­
tio n : "the d e ta ils  o f knowledge which are Important w il l  be picked
up ad hoc 1n each avocation o f l i f e ,  but the habit o f active u t i l iz a ­
tio n  o f wel 1 -understood p r in c ip le *  1s the fin a l possession of wisdom” 
{1929, p. 93), Whitehead's w ritings can Inspire support and enthusiasm; 
however, when he defines wisdom as the a b i l i ty  to handle knowledge, to 
se lect facts fo r  the determination o f relevant Issues, and to employ 
knowledge in  such a way as to  "add value to our Irmedlate experience," 
then his aim also becomes a guide fo r determining eduational practices 
and, w ith  fu rth e r extrapo la tion , could be transformed into specific 
tests o f educational outcomes.
There is  also a need to c le a rly  d istinguish between such sweeping 
grand aims or purposes o f the educational enterprise as "creating people 
w ith wisdom,” from the more spec ific  goals o f a college curriculum, as 
well as from the very d e ta ile d , focused objectives o f a particu lar 
course or program. Grand aims are broad, long-term, and defy character­
iza tio n  w ith spec ific  behavioral outcomes or mental trac ts . "To create 
e th ica l men and women" is  a simple example o f an educational aim 1n the 
moral domain. Educational goals, on the other hand, are less sweeping, 
more concrete; they may be re a l is t ic a l ly  achieved in the near future
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f in  a four-year college! fo r  example) and through formal Ins truc tion . 
For example! "the student w i l l  develop strong ana ly tic  s k i l ls  1n moral 
reasoning" might be a goal o f moral education. Objectives are a t the 
most Immediate and specific  leve l. Objectives are often c lose ly corre­
lated with actual outcomes* outcomes that can be tested and measured 
in some manner; "The student w il l  be able to d is tingu ish  factual 
statements" or "the student w il l  be able to define and lo g ic a lly  apply 
four d iffe re n t s ty les o f moral reasoning." The lines  between alms* 
goals* and objectives are not d e f in it iv e ly  drawn; ra the r, 1t 1s a 
gradual progression from the " In sp ira tio n a l1 statement o f purposes 
(o ften  found a t the beginning o f college catalogues 1n a less-than- 
1nsp1rat1onal form] to the more precise* and highly pragmatic, 
objectives o f everyday Instruction  and learning. In general, the d is ­
cussion on lib e ra l education ( in  chapter 2) dwells upon alms and con­
cludes with a set o f specific  goals o f lib e ra l education. In the fin a l 
three chapters, the emphasis 1s on the goals and objectives of various 
models o f moral education.
Oftentimes, grandiose alms and purposes are seen as non contro­
ve rs ia l by th e ir  very nature (many would not object to the "creation 
o f e th ica l men and women"). Yet, when such alms are interpreted and 
as they become translated in to  goals and spec ific  ob jectives, the 
p o s s ib ilit ie s  o f c o n flic t and disagreement r ise  accordingly. This 
ana lysis, then, risks leaving the high level o f purposes and aims in 
the e f fo r t  to construct meaningful, substantive goals 1n moral educa­
tio n  tha t may serve not only as c o lo rfu l, insp ira tiona l statements but 
also as guides to the establishment of appropriate pedagogical methods
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and content, and In  some Instances as tests to be applied to actual 
human outcomes.
Develo pment and Growth Are "development" and "growth" goals 
or educational aims? Are they synonymous terms Ind ica ting  a process 
toward some ca lcu la ted , or na tu ra l, end? These, too, are words that 
are used 1n a loose co lloqu ia l sense and In a more technical manner.
Up to th is  po in t, moral development and growth have been loose ly used, 
re fe rr in g  1n a broad, inc lus ive  sense to a l l  forms of progressive, 
forward movement 1n the moral dimension o f the In d iv id u a l: s o c ia l, 
in te lle c tu a l,  psychological, s p ir i tu a l ,  emotional.
In Democracy and Education (1967) John Dewey places a strong em­
phasis on growth (development Is used synonymously) as an end i t s e l f  — 
indeed, as the c ruc ia l aim o f education. Growth, as defined by Dewey, 
1s the "cumulative movement o f action toward a la te r  re s u lt"  and a move 
away from Immaturity, r ig id i t y  o f hab its , and " s ta t ic  adjustment to a 
fixed environment." For Dewey, "L ife  is  growth" and education is  the 
enterprise which supplies the conditions which Insure growth (1967, 
p. 128), There are many, however, who d is tingu ish  between growth and 
development and are not e n tire ly  comfortable w ith  the notion o f growth- 
as-process being the education g o a l.^  They contend that Ind iv idua ls  
must be directed 1n th e ir  growth toward some worthwhile aims. In other 
words, growth must be toward an Idea l, Although there is  no d ire c t
14For examples, see the works o f R, S, Peters, R. Barrow,
P. H irs t, I ,  S che ffle r, and H. 5. Broudy, to provide a representative 
sampling,
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attempt to deal with th is  Issue, i t  has already been contended that 
there is  a strong need fo r  educational aims and goals.
Growth and development, s t r ic t ly  speaking, are not synonymous. 
Growth Implies the progressive enlargement o f a physical organ or 
mental function, while development 1s marked by the appearance of 
q u a lita tive ly  new functions or powers (Horne, 1932, p, 49 ). Also, de­
velopment is typ ica lly  associated with in terna l change, growth w ith 
external stimulus and response. Moreover, "development'1 now is  some­
times associated with "developmental psychology," a p a rtic u la r approach 
to understanding human behavior and thought. For functional purposes, 
the term ‘'development" Is used in th is  thesis to re fer to the overall 
range of goals that can be achieved through moral education. Human 
development comes about through a t least some planned e f fo r t ,  some 
overt goals, and 1t involves internal, mqre-often-thar>-not, conscious 
change. Growth, on the other hand, retains I ts  more gradual and 
n a tu ra lis tic  connotations. In summary, moral development, but not 
overall moral growth, 1s a re a lis t ic  educational aim; moral development 
is an a l l  encompassing phrase fo r many o f the worthwhile alms and goals 
of moral education.
Chapter 2: Liberal Education
Liberal Education: Its  Purposes & Aims
Introduction In th is  chapter an extended d e fin itio n  of lib e ra l 
education is developed from a varie ty  of sources (classical roots as 
well as contemporary statements o f practices and aims), and then i t  is 
argued that the lib e ra l education tra d itio n  o ffe rs a powerful, norma­
tiv e  vision o f higher education. In the search fo r a post-secondary 
model of moral education that has clear, meaningful, and ethical goals 
and objectives, an analysis o f the ideals and practices o f libe ra l 
education should be the f i r s t  step. Liberal education is an ideal 
that incorporates moral development as a central feature; moreover, 
i t  is  an h is to r ic a lly  rich  concept that reveals connections between 
the humanities, the development o f reason, and moral education. Thus, 
lib e ra l education can lend a d irec tion  and content to moral education 
that emphasizes the ro le  of in te lle c t in m ora lity and yet moves beyond 
a "valueless," neutral s k il ls  approach. More sp e c ifica lly , the phi­
losophy and goals o f lib e ra l education are used as the central measure 
fo r evaluating various models o f moral education. There are, then 
four objectives in th is  chapter: f i r s t ,  lib e ra l education is  h is to r­
ic a lly  reviewed and analyzed, iden tify ing  e th ica l or moral development 
as a central feature ; second, h is to rica l links  between the aim of 
ethical development, the Ideal o f lib e ra l education, and goals center­
ed on reason and ra tio n a lity  are examined; th ird , libe ra l education 
is defended as an Important educational concept in its  own r ig h t; and
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fou rth , specific goals for lib e ra l education are set fo r th , thus pro­
vid ing a standard fo r the selection o f an appropriate model o f moral 
education.
Classical Roots The lib e ra l a rts  were conceived by that name 
in  the f i r s t  century B.C. by the Roman scholar, Varro (116 - 27 B.C.) 
in his DiscijJl inarum l ib r l novum; four hundred years la te r  the liberal 
a rts  were divided Into the qjadurivium (arithm etic , geometry, astron­
omy, and music) and the trlv lum  (grammar, rh e to ric , and log ic ) by an 
I ta lia n  lawyer and rhetorician, Martianus Cappella {c. 424),1 
Cappella's book, De Nuptlis Fhilogiae et Mercurii et de Septem Artius 
Liberal1bus Noyem,drew heavily from Varro's encyclopedic work, and I t  
essen tia lly  set the tone fo r higher education in the medieval age (Boyd 
& King, 1900, p. 94; Schachner, 1962, pp. 13-14), During tha t harsh 
age the aims o f education were severely res tric te d : subject to scrip­
tu ra l sanction, confined to the trivium as methods of in q u iry , and 
lim ited  to preserving old knowledge. How could i t  be otherwise? A far 
c learer vision o f the liberal a rts  ideal emerges through examination 
o f Greek theory as well as of the educational thought o f the Renais­
sance.
The Greeks closely linked knowledge, reason, and moral behavior 
(Drew, 1978; Jaeger, 1939; Mumford, 1979; Murchland, 1976). The funda­
mental aim o f education was arete, to liv e  one's l i f e  w ith excellence.
^In th is  h is to rica l review the roots o f libe ra l education are 
id e n tifie d  with the liberal a rts . More generally, the term "libe ra l 
education" is  used in this thesis since 1t has a broader connotation 
than " lib e ra l a rts"--w h ich  sometimes is narrowly defined as a set of 
specific  d isc ip lines.
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Moreover, education fo r  arete was a moral a c t iv ity ;  I t  was not moral 
In a narrow sense but ra ther in the b e lie f tha t education was v i ta l ,  
that Ideas and p rinc ip les were c ru c ia l, demanding free choice and 
personal conriitnient. In te lle c tu a l and moral growth went hand-in-hand 
and could come about only through w illingness to bear grave r isks . In­
deed, i t  Is the ancient Greeks who are most frequently c ited  as having 
Integrated education w ith personal growth and with the cu ltu re  a t large 
as one united ethical enterprise (Drew, 1978; Jaeger, 1939; Mumford, 
1979; Murchland, 1976}. Such a conception o f lib e ra l education is ,  o f 
course, fa r removed from those who have c r it ic iz e d  the tra d it io n  as 
being e l i t i s t  by d e fin it io n  (tha t is ,  fo r  the "free  man" only ) o r as 
overly pedantic, concerned only w ith learning or reason as ends In 
themselves. Perhaps the current appeal 1n embracing the broad c iv ic  
values o f ancient Greek education p a r t ia l ly  lie s  in the avoidance o f 
promoting any spec ific  re lig io u s  tra d itio n s  and mor£s. The Greeks' 
secular notions o f e th ica l duty and knowing f i t  fa r  more comfortably 
with much o f contemporary American higher education—p lu ra l is t ic  in  
terms o f student make-up and social values.
What major goals o f Greek education were subsumed under th is  
quest to liv e  one's l i f e  well? The goals o f education in  classica l
2
I t  1s surpris ing how often lib e ra l education has been condemned 
because a t one time I ts  meaning p a r t ia l ly  lay 1n the h is to r ic a l prac­
tice  tha t i t  was only fo r  free men, c it iz e n s , and not fo r  slaves. As 
has been illu s tra te d , however, much broader im plica tions e x is t,  and, 
lo g ic a lly , there Is no reason why lib e ra l education should not be 
accessible to a l l  men and women o f a l l  races. Indeed, to  some extent 
th is  has occurred in  post-World War I I ,  United States.
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Greece evolved from the ideal o f man as a mentally courageous and 
p h y s fc a lly - f it  w arrio r to the responsible c it iz e n  1 innersed in d v lc  
a ffa irs  and a r t is t ic  endeavors, to tha t o f the re fle c tiv e  individual 
engaged in  eudalmonla (Jaeger, 1939, p. 6). Eudalmonla, as conceived 
by A r is to t le ,  was the highest and most uniquely human form of th ink ing , 
the most noble use of le isu re . This practice o f contemplative reason­
ing did not supplant other goals, but rather illum inated th e ir ro le  
and s ign ificance  In a broader context, Lewis Mumford perhaps expresses 
th is  view most e ffe c tiv e ly  fo r  our own times:
In fa c t,  w ithout le isu re , our expansion 1n Industry 
would be almost meaningless, fo r we need a plentltude 
o f time i f  we are to select and assim ilate a l l  the 
genuine goods th a t modern man now comnands. Scho la 
means le is u re ; and le isu re  makes possible the school,
The promise of a l i f e  economy 1s to provide schooling 
fo r the fu lle s t  kind o f human growth--not the fu rther 
expansion of the machine. (1979* p. 456)
The c la ss ica l notion o f the ra tiona l man 1s an illum inating  one 
and has been frequently  c ited  In the current re-exnm1nat1on of the 
undergraduate curriculum  and the goats o f lib e ra l education. The 
Greeks thought o f reason and In te lle c t  in  the broadest terms--well be­
yond the narrow equations o f reason w ith s c ie n t if ic  method, pure, 
abstract theory or value n e u tra lity .
(T)he c la s s ic a l conception of ra t io n a lity  has 
been stripped and impoverished fo r ra t io n a lity  in ­
cluded fo r  A r is to t le  not only the pure and applied
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sciences, but the practica l sciences o f p o lit ic s , 
e th ics , and education which deal with the princip les 
by which we should order our personal and co llec tive  
l i f e ,  and the productive sciences 1n which ra tio n a lity  
1s exhibited in  the e f fo r t  to make things which serve 
our needs o r express our sense o f the beautifu l.
(Hearn, 1975, p. 7)
C learly, to "improve reasoning" was a crucial goal o f Greek education, 
one which Included moral growth. In our own times, specific  cu rricu la r 
objectives regarding m ora lity  do occasionally focus on the development 
o f "better" people, more moral, v irtuous, or responsible.3 Typ ica lly , 
however. I f  the moral or e th ica l dimensions o f growth are mentioned 
at a l l ,  they are relegated to the emotional sphere, with the implica­
tio n  that they are void o f content or ra tio n a lity  (Bowen, 1977; 
Chlckering, 1976}. How very d iffe re n t th is  1s from the Greek emphasis 
on rational m ora lity : empowering individuals to determine and c la r ify
human needs and values. In th is  sense, the lib e ra l education o f 
an tiq u ity  was "a perfective process, a shaping of human s e n s ib ility  
toward desirable and ra tio n a lly  ju s t if ie d  patterns o f action. I t  was 
. . . an e th ica l enterprise" (Murchland, 1976, p. 22).
During the Renaissance, the reb irth  o f classical knowledge and 
education, the t ig h t g rip  of the Church was loosened and a more equ it­
able balance between Christian precepts and secular learning emerged.
Bob Jones U n ivers ity , South Carolina; Oral Roherts U n ivers ity , 
Oklahoma; and Mahareshi International U niversity, Iowa, are examples.
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Pletro Paolo Vergerlo's (1344-1420) tre a tise , "On the Manners o f a 
Gentleman and on Liberal Studies," was an early In flu e n tia l work which 
helped bring about these changes. Vergerlo Insisted on the value o f 
an all-round education, the primacy o f m ora lity  over theoretica l lea rn ­
ing, and the need to stretch the lib e ra l arts to Include lite ra tu re ,
h is to ry , and "knowledge of nature" (in  Boyd & King, 1980, pp. 163*164)-
In a s im ila r vein, the scholar and educator, Erasmus, argued tha t: 
the f i r s t  and most important part o f education is 
that the youthful mind may receive the seeds o f 
p ie ty ; next, that i t  may love and thoroughly learn 
the lib e ra l studies; th ird , that 1t may be prepared
for the duties o f l i f e ;  and fou rth , that f t  may
from the e a rlie s t days be accustomed to the ru d i­
ments o f good manners, (in  Boyd & King, 1980, p. 175)
In the 16th century Montaigne, an equally eminent Renaissance in te lle c ­
tu a l, de-empbas1zed scholarly learning as an end 1n i t s e l f  or as a 
means to a higher profession as he sought to stress wisdom over the 
conduct of our lives  as a primary educational mission (1n Boyd & King, 
1980, p. 225). Because o f these and other educators and educational 
theoris ts o f the time, the lib e ra l arts were transformed from a narrow 
epistemlc construct, allowing merely fo r survival of knowledge, back 
in to  a dynamic cu ltu ra l Ideal. In te llec tua l and cognitive s k il ls  were 
stressed; however, aims and goals that Involved the enchancement of the 
individual in  a larger personal sense took precedence. More recent 
conceptions o f the lib e ra l arts also re fle c t the values and mores o f 
th e ir  times and cu ltu re , but they, too, usually assert the broad
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classlca! Greek alms o f l iv in g  one's T ife  w e ll, o f krvowledge o f human­
ity  through self-knowledge.
Modern Conceptions What are the more modern pronouncements on 
lib e ra l education th a t have moved beyond d e fin it io n  to  give the concept 
a unique v i t a l i t y  and e x is te n tia l force? Among the exemplars are 
Cardinal Newman's Idea o f a University (1959), the Yale Report o f  1828, 
and John Stuart M i l l 's  educational theory. They, in  tu rn , have gener­
ated such recent descendants as Hutchins' The Higher Learning 1n 
America (1936), the Harvard "Redbook," formally e n t it le d  General Edu­
cation In a Free Society (1945), and Whitehead's essays on education. 
C learly there are a s ig n if ic a n t number o f other educational philosoph­
ers and documents th a t could he as read ily  c ite d , ye t those l is te d  
here are referred to most frequently in the ongoing attempt 
to both define and defend the libe ra l a rts  Idea l. Moreover, they 
fo llow  close ly on those elements of the c lass ica l tra d it io n  most 
crucia l to lib e ra l education.
Cardinal J. H. Newman (1801-1890) and Robert M. Hutchins (1899- 
1977) are often linked together in  th e ir  s im ila r emphasis on the tra in ­
ing of ra tiona l fa c u lt ie s , the acquis ition of universal tru th s , and 
the fundamentally-comnon cha rac te ris tics  o f a l l  human beings. Essen­
t ia l l y ,  in th is  characte riza tion . I t  1s "Reason" i t s e l f  which serves as 
the common denominator un iting  a ll humans across time and place. 
Newman's ideal education p rim arily  emphasizes the tra in in g  of reason 
and the "apprehension o f the great ou tlines o f knowledge,1' as acquired 
through immersion in a "cotimmity o f scholars." He believes th a t:
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the tru ly  great in te lle c t  is  one which takes a
connected view o f the old and the new, past and
present* fa r  and near, and which has an in s ig h t 
In to  the influence o f a ll these on one another 
w ithout which there Is no whole, no center* The 
tru ly  great In te lle c ts  possess knowledge* not 
only of th ings, but also o f th e ir  mutual re la ­
t i o n s ^ ^ ! ! ,  p, 143)
Cardinal Newman close ly links  the ra tiona l and moral aims o f educa­
tio n ; the important consequence o f a lib e ra l education is  to become
a gentleman—to possess "a cu ltiva te d  in te l le c t ,  a de lica te  tas te ,
a candid* equitable* dispassionate mind, a noble and courteous bear­
ing in the conduct o f l i f e "  (1959, p, 144). In te l le c t  and knowledge, 
in th e ir  h ighest, most abstract form, become almost synonymous with 
moral worthiness:
I f  then in te lle c t  1s so exce llen t a portion  o f us* 
and Its  c u lt iv a tio n  so exce lle n t, i t  is  not only 
b e a u tifu l, pe rfec t, admirable, and noble in I t s e l f ,  
but in a true and high sense i t  must be useful to 
the possessor and to a l l  around him; not useful in  
any low, mechanical* m ercantile sense, but as d i f ­
fusing good, o r as a b lessinq, a g i f t ,  or power, or
a treasure, f i r s t  to the owner, then through him 
to the w o rld ,(1959, p*145)
In a s im ila r ve in , Robert Hutchins claimed th a t the mission o f the 
u n ive rs ity  is  "the pursu it o f tru th  fo r  I ts  own sake" (1936, p. 33); in
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h is l i fe t im e ,  he vehemently c r it iq u e d  higher education as being fa r  too 
u t i l i t a r ia n ,  p ro fess iona l* and specialized. He proposed a lib e ra l arts 
curricu lum  which would u t i l iz e  the great c la ss ic  works and emphasize 
"the a rts  o f reading, w r it in g , th ink ing  and speaking together w ith 
mathematics, the best example o f the process o f human reason" [1967, 
p. B5). Hutchins was aghast a t both the smorgasboard va rie ty  o f an 
e le c tiv e  c u r r ic u la r  system and the increasing distance between h igh ly  
specia lized In s tru c to rs  and th e ir  respective d isc ip lin e s . His pro­
posals fo r  change center on the development o f a required c u rr ic u ­
lum emphasizing our common human nature, the great thought o f the 
past, and the a cq u is it io n  o f a "common stock o f ideas and common 
methods o f dealing w ith  them" (1967, p. 85), St. John's College o f 
Annapolis, Maryland is  pointed to as the s ing le  example o f a contem­
porary American in s t i tu t io n  th a t operates exclusive ly on such p r in ­
c ip le s .^  Newman and Hutchins are both cited favorably fo r th e ir  power­
fu l v is ions o f l ib e ra l education as providing a common focus fo r  a l l  
persons through the tra in in g  o f reason, free  from the constra in ts o f 
such p o te n tia lly  narrow or r ig id  notions as "socie ta l relevancy," 
"vocationa l preparedness," or "academic sp e c ia liza tio n ." On the other 
hand, these two and those who th in k  s im ila r ly  are frequently c r i t i ­
cized (d ire c t ly  o r In d ire c t ly }  fo r  th e ir authoritarian ism , e lit is m , 
lack o f contemporary relevance, overemphasis on reason, and neglect 
o f  in d iv id u a l d iffe rences [Cross, 1976; Dewey, 1967, 1975; F re ire ,
^ ln  1964 St, John's opened a new college operated on the same 
c u r r ic u la r  basis In Sante Fe, New Mexico.
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1972* H. Ta ilo r* 1969* 1971 ) .
The Vale Report and the Harvard "Redbook" are somewhat 
less controversial than the educational philosopiy o f  Newman and 
Hutchins* but certa in ly c ited no less frequently by both proponents 
and detractors of libera l education in the United States, Each of 
these college curriculum reports portrays a basic view of knowledge 
and learning as s ta tic  and universal. The emphasis l ie s  on an 
essential or prescribed body of knowledge usually dealing w ith our 
Western c iv i l iz a t io n  heritage.^ The curriculum 1s organized by d is c i ­
pline* the pedagogy 1s centered on the authorita tive  dissemination 
of knowledge* and there 1s an im p lic it  view that learning is d i f f i c u l t
work; thus, mental d isc ip line  is a key Ingredient. To quote the Yale
Report;
The two great points to be gained in in te llec tua l 
cu lture, are the d isc ip line  and the fu rn itu re  of 
the mind; expanding i ts  powers* and storing with 
knowledge. . . . Those branches of study should be 
prescribed, and those modes of instruction adopted* 
which are best calculated to teach the a rt o f f i x ­
ing the a ttention, directing the t ra in  of thought,
analyzing a subject proposed fo r Investigation. . . .
The habits of thinking are to be formed by long 
continued and close appl Ication* ( in  Hofstadter &
Smith* 1961, p. 278)
^See Levine (1978, p, 8) for his characterization of th is  position 
which he labels "essential 1sm,"
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The report claims tha t a proper symmetry and balance o f  character is 
a fundamental goal o f  a l ib e ra l  education:
The great object o f  a co lleg ia te  education, pre­
paratory to the study o f  a profession, is to give 
that expansion and balance o f  the mental powers, 
those l ib e ra l  and comprehensive views, and those 
f ine  proportions o f character, which are not to 
be found in  him whose ideas are always confined 
to one p a r t ic u la r  channel.(in  Hofstadter ft Smith,
1961, p. 262)
Also stressed are the practice of Hin loco parentis"*’ and the class­
room methods of re c i ta t io n  and lecture*, most s ig n i f ic a n t ly ,  Yale 
fa cu lty  maintained tha t i t  is  c lassica l l i te ra tu re  and learning that 
should form the substantive foundation of the l ib e ra l a rts  curriculum: 
[Classical learning] may be defended not only as 
a necessary branch o f  education, In the present 
state o f  the world, but on the ground o f  I ts  
d is t in c t  and independent m erits . F a m il ia r i ty  
w ith the Greek and Roman w r ite rs  is especia lly 
adapted to form the taste , and to d is c ip l in e  the 
tnind, both in thought and d ic t io n ,  to the re l is h  
of what is  elevated, chaste, and simple.(1n 
Hofstadter ft Smith, 1961, p. 289 )
^The college shall serve as an on*location parent as long as the 
adolescent resides on campus.
-59 -
I f  the Yale Report o f  1828 is  to be considered a vigorous attempt 
at holding back the encroaching methodologies and d isc ip l in e s  of the 
natural sciences, academic sp ec ia liza t ion , e le c t ive  freedom, and s tu ­
dent respo n s ib i l i ty *  the Harvard report on general education 1s a 
systematic attempt to preserve and in tegra te  the Ideals o f  l ib e ra l 
education In an academic se tt ing  where a l l  the aforementioned are 
accomplished fa c t .  In actual practice the c u r r ic u la r  proposals o f 
the Harvard "Redbook1' o f 1945 were successively watered down* and 
by 1971 the general education c u r r ic u la r  s tructure  and requirements 
resembled the Harvard curriculum o f the ea r ly  1940's; nevertheless, 
the report was In f lu e n t ia l  and served as a ready-made ra tiona le  fo r  
relnvigorating l ib e ra l  or general education programs across the 
country. Although the Harvard committee shied away from the e l i t i s t  
label of " l ib e ra l education," the report reads: "the task o f modern
democracy Is to preserve the ancient Ideal o f  l ib e ra l  education and to 
extend i t  as fa r  as possible to a l l  the members o f the community" ( in  
Levine, 1978* p. 604). In the report the need fo r  some element o f 
unity In education in the face o f  both c u r r ic u la r  and societa l f ra g ­
mentation and d iv e rs i ty  Is stressed, and a strong appeal Is made to 
our sense of heritage. However, the "Redbook" is  w r it ten  with ac­
knowledgement* and at leas t some acceptance* o f the tru ths and methods 
o f science, of John Dewey and the progressive t ra d it io n *  and with a 
recognition o f the need fo r  spec ia liza t ion  1n modern in d u s tr ia l so­
c ie ty . Occasionally, I t  moves beyond i t s  usual stance ( tha t Is , an 
apologia to study common heritage) and o f fe rs  an understanding o f 
libe ra l education as developing the broad c r i t i c a l  sense necessary
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for dealing with specia lization and specialists outside one's chosen 
area. In th is  view, l ibe ra l education 1s to be
distinguished from special education* not by 
subject matter* but in terms of method and out­
look, no matter what the f ie ld ,  , , , Specialism 
1s Interchangeable, not with natural science* hut 
with the method o f science* the method which 
abstracts material from i ts  context and handles 
i t  In complete Isolation, (In Levine, 1978, 
p. 606)
The Implication, then* is clear: A student engaged In a l ibera l 
education does examine context and the general relationships of ideas 
and circumstances, the concrete as well as the abstract. Vet, in the 
report i t  1s also argued that there are "tru ths which none can be free 
to ignore, i f  one is to have that wisdom through which l i f e  can be 
useful. These are the truths concerning the structure o f the good 
l i f e  and concerning the factual conditions by which I t  may be achieved, 
truths comprising the goals o f a free society" ( in  Levine* 1978, 
p. 607). This tension between emphasizing what essentially amounts 
to the "process" goals o f l ibe ra l education with "substantive" or 
"content" goals is resolved neither in the report nor in our current 
mission statements and cu rr icu la r  practices. In other words, should 
our most s ign if ican t educational aims and goals be iden tif iab le *  in­
te llec tua l s k i l ls ,  or instead understanding or specific principles 
and areas o f knowledge? Whatever the case, the characterization of 
e ither the Vale Report or the Harvard "Redbook" as educational
philosophies fixated so le ly  on content--the " fu rn itu re '1 of classical 
l i te ra tu re  and the un ify ing study o f our Western heritage--1s a false 
one, Both visions of l ib e ra l  education also specify the p a rt icu la r ly  
unique ro le  played In developing s k i l ls  in reasoning across a wide 
range o f d iscip lines and l i f e  experiences generally.
In the late 19th century, John Stuart M i l l ,  who viewed himself 
and his u t i l i t a r ia n  philosophy as eminently p rac t ica l,  contended that 
the "whole person" should be educated. He would have been very 
pleased w ith the Harvard "Redbook1sM emphasis on Integration o f In­
te llec tua l s k i l ls .  H i l l  w r ite s ,
Universities are not intended to teach knowledge 
required to f i t  man fo r  some special mode o f mak­
ing their l ive l ih o o d . Their object is not to make 
s k i l l f u l  lawyers, o r  physicians, or engineers, but 
capable and cu lt iva te d  human beings, . . . Men are 
men before they are lawyers, or physicians. . . . 
and I f  you make them capable and sensible men, they 
w i l l  make themselves capable and sensible lawyers 
or physicians. What professional men should carry 
w ith  them from a Univers ity  Is not professional 
knowledge, but that which should d irec t the use of 
th e i r  professional knowledge* and bring the l ig h t  
o f  general cu ltu re  to Illum inate the techn ica lit ies  
o f  a special pu rsu it ,  ( in  Bowen* 1977* pp. 40-41)
With such phrases as the " l ig h t  o f general cu ltu re ,"  the "apprehending 
of p r in c ip les "  and "I l lum ina te  the te chn ica lit ies  o f a special pursu it,
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Mtll provides a c o lo r fu l,  imaginative vocabulary fo r  the advocates o f 
a l ibe ra l arts education. Although he believes in  the Importance o f  
educating the whole man, John Stuart M i l l  places primary emphasis on 
educating the in te l le c t  In the most general types o f  foundational 
theories and concepts, an education tha t would provide In te llec tua l 
and moral d irection.
In a s im ila r vein, A lfred North Whitehead refers to undergraduate 
studies as "the great period of general Izatlons" (1957, p, 25)’, he 
contends that;
The function o f  a University 1s to enable you to 
shed deta ils  in  favor of p r inc ip les  . . .  A p r in ­
c ip le  which has thoroughly soaked Into you is 
rather a mental habit than a formal statement.
I t  becomes the way the mind reacts to the appro­
pria te stimulus In the form o f  I l lu s t r a t iv e  c i r ­
cumstances. (1957, p. 26)
Although a mathematician and philosopher by tra in ing , Whitehead 1s one 
of the f i r s t  20th century educators to stress the In tegration of in ­
dividual development w ith educational practice and theory. In his 
theory of rhythms, he id e n t i f ie s  "romance," "p rec is ion ," and "general­
ization" as three basic developmental periods.^ Each stage has
^Contemporary educational and psychological research and l i t e r ­
ature Is replete with developmental schemes--usual ly  elaborated in fa r  
greater de ta il and sometimes incompatible with Whitehead's general 
proposition. Nevertheless, 1t is In te resting  to note tha t these 
empirically-based schemes were preceded by the astute observations and 
ethical reasoning o f  a philosopher-mathematician turned educational 
theoris t.
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implfcatlons fo r  design o f  curriculum and pedagogical methodology; 
fo r  example, the stage of romance is a time o f  In te llec tua l explora­
t ion  and dreaming, when a student I n i t i a l l y  examines Ideas and rela­
tionships, Although Whitehead views these stages as c y c l ic a l,  he 
contends tha t from b ir th  to age 13 or 14 l i f e  1s basically a period 
of romance; while fo r  the tra d it io n a l college-aged student, 16 to 22 
years of age, i t  1s a period of generalization. This concern fo r the 
indiv idual and attempt to connect indiv idual developmental stages of 
growth w ith appropriate cu rr icu la r  structures and strategies has been 
most en thus ias tica l ly  advocated by those Involved In the teaching of 
l ib e ra l  education, Whitehead f e l t  tha t the s c ie n t i f ic ,  technical, 
and professional c u rr ic u la r  areas have been so concerned with mastery 
of both substantive and procedural material tha t any focus on the in ­
dividual a c tu a lly  acquiring and using the information has been near- 
absent. However, Whitehead does not denigrate factual knowledge; 
ra the r, his claim is  that "Education 1s the acquis ition o f  the a rt of 
the u t i l i z a t io n  o f  knowledge" (1957, p, 4) and that a true and v ita l 
education studies " l i f e  1n a l l  I ts  manifestations" (1957, p. 7). He 
emphasizes zest fo r  l iv in g ,  the adventure o f  l i f e ,  and the development 
of Imaginative and creative powers,
Obviously, Whitehead presents a v is ion  o f  undergraduate education 
that is somewhat d if fe re n t  from the aforementioned thinkers. He cau­
t ions that the tra in ing  of reason is not the ultimate function of
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colleges and un ive rs it ies . He does not claim tha t there is one par­
t ic u la r  body o f  knowledge or d isc ip linary  method w ith which a l l  should 
be fa m il ia r.  Whitehead argues that there should be no serious breach 
between technical and l ib e ra l studies, between general and specialized 
education:
There is not one course of study which merely gives 
special knowledge. The subjects pursued fo r  the 
sake of general education are special subjects 
specia lly  studied; and, on the other hand, one of 
the ways o f encouraging mental a c t iv i ty  Is to foster 
a special devotion. You may not divide the 'seamless 
coat of learn ing*.{1957, p. LI)
Also, although he was c r i t i c a l  o f attempts to maintain a s ty lized , 
ancient form o f  the l ib e ra l a r ts , Whitehead did not favor such 
approaches as technical t ra in ing , I1 fe -sk1 lls  development, experientia l 
learning, or s c ie n t i f ic  studies as alternatives to a libera l education 
focused on general princip les and on imaginative and c r i t ic a l  reason­
ing. Rather, his 1s a case "to weld together Imagination and exper­
ience"; fo r Whitehead, a college must allow for the imaginative con­
sideration o f  knowledge, investing each particu lar fa c t with innumer­
able p o s s ib i l i t ie s  and a broad context. The Imagination "enables man 
to construct an in te llec tua l vision of a new world, and I t  preserves
ft
A careful reading o f  al l  these educational philosophies would, 
however, show tha t although each heavily emphasizes the development 
of reason, none claims that i t  is the ultimate aim o f  education.
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the zest o f l i f e  by the suggestion o f  sa t is fy ing  purposes" (1957, 
p. 93).
With his emphasis on in te l le c tu a l and eth ica l v is ion , the short­
coming o f  a narrowly technical education, and the need to understand 
de ta ils  and facts inthe l i g h t  o f p r inc ip les  and theories, Whitehead is 
well w ith in  the l ib e ra l  studies tradition. In his focus on the rhythms 
o f  learning, the c ruc ia l ro le  of Imagination, and the l in k in g  together 
o f  theory and practice, the abstract and the concrete, Whitehead brings 
s ig n if ica n t new emphases to l ib e ra l  education. In a sense, White­
head's philosophy introduces progressive, Dewey-like concepts to the 
l ib e ra l arts Ideal and practice and helps set the tone fo r  the con­
temporary standards fo r  l ib e ra l  education.
A Contemporary Overview "The Carnegie Council defined i t  [gen­
eral or l ib e ra l education! as education rooted in  the concerns of 
c iv i l iz a t io n  and our common heritage, and others define 1t even more 
broadly to include any form o f  education that l ibe ra tes  students in 
body, mind, or soul" (Levine, 1978, p. 4), Such broad d e f in it io n s  are 
not unusual; they allow fo r  much overlap between those goals that we 
have selected—or have h is to r ic a l ly  developed—as appropriate fo r the 
higher education in I ts  e n t ire ty  w ith those more e x p l ic i t ly  linked with 
the undergraduate curriculum. In Investment In Learning Howard Bowen 
cautions us tha t, "The catalogue has a utopian qua lity  about I t .  I t  
appears to be a compendium o f a l l  possible human v irtues and hopes" 
(1977, p. 54}. Indeed, as one surveys th is  comprehensive l is t in g  of 
the espoused goals of higher education, the e n t ire  a f fa i r  assumes a
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d is tu rb in g ly  q u ixo t ic  flavor. Bowen discriminates between socie ta l and 
Ind iv idual outcomes, and then divides Individual goals into three c a t­
egories: cogn itive  learning, emotional and moral development, and
practica l competence. Unfortunately, l i t t l e  attempt has been made 
to l in k  these goals with the components of higher education ( c u r r ic ­
ulum, In s t i tu t io n a l  environment, peer in te rac tion , and facu lty -s tudent 
in te rac tion ) which may be most l ik e ly  or responsible fo r  bringing 
them about.
Undoubtedly the goals encompassed by "cogn it ive  learning" have 
been most c a re fu l ly  articu lated and pedagoqlcally Implemented In the 
l ib e ra l a rts  curriculum. The objectives centered on verbal and quan­
t i t a t i v e  s k i l l s ,  substantive areas o f knowledge, reasoning s k i l l s ,  
In te l le c tu a l In te g r i ty  and freedom have been dealt w ith  fa r  more 
conscientiously and adeptly than such goals as psychological w e ll-be ing , 
personal se lf-d iscovery , moral s e n s it iv i ty  and values awareness or 
humane outlook. Even these la t te r ,  so-called "a f fe c t iv e "  goals, how­
ever, have been fa r  more readily embraced by the contemporary propon­
ents and designers o f  liberal education curricu la  than such u t i l i t a r ­
ian, applied alms as good c it izensh ip , economic p ro d u c t iv i ty ,  consumer 
awareness, f r u i t f u l  le isure, or sound family l i f e .  The spokesmen of 
l ih e ra l  education have disregarded the use of pragmatic ends as 
specified educational objectives and, instead, tended to  view them as 
possible or even probable outcomes o f  the primary co g n it ive  and 
a ffe c t ive  aims. Paul Hirst succinctly summarizes th is  analysis in  his 
re jec tion  o f  a vocational or an exclusively s c ie n t i f ic  education, o r 
any specialized form of education. He contends th a t :
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l ibe ra l education is concerned w ith the compre­
hensive development of the mind 1n acquiring 
knowledge, i t  1s aimed a t  achieving an understand­
ing of experience in many d i f fe re n t  ways. This 
means the acquis it ion by c r i t i c a l  tra in ing  and 
d isc ip l in e  not only o f fac ts  but also o f  complex 
conceptual schemes and o f  the arts and techniques 
o f  d i f fe re n t  types o f reasoning and judgment,
(H irs t ,  1974, p. 47}
Wegener also emphasizes th is  notion o f  l ib e ra l education as ce n tra l ly  
concerned with in te l le c t  and in te l le c tu a l processes:
we seek 1n a l ib e ra l curriculum only the in s t i t u ­
t iona liza t ions  o f  those in te l le c tu a l circumstances 
under which 1t is  maximally probable tha t the 
re f le c t iv e  moment of In te l le c tu a l a c t iv i t y  w i l l  
serve the purpose of permanently transforming the 
re la tionsh ip  of an Individual mind to the in te l ­
lectual world so that persons may become free ly  
functioning partic ipants 1n In te l le c tu a l a c t iv i t y  
and autonomous members o f  the in te l le c tu a l 
comnunity. A l ib e ra l curriculum 1s at best the 
in i t ia t io n  in a process, a development, not the 
achievement o f  the end to which I t  is  d irected.
(1978 ,  p.  126}
Despite th is  focus on in te l le c t  a t  a more removed, philosophical 
distance, the actual mission statements fo r  contemporary American
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undergraduate education have espoused (more often than not) the devel­
opment of the whole person. In reference to this most ambitious of 
alms-developing in te llec tua l and practical competence, moral and 
esthetic  dispositions, emotional and social s k i l ls  and att1tudes--1n 
short, the to ta l person—Bowen contends, "No theme runs more consis­
te n t ly  through the goal l i te ra tu re "  (1977, p. 33), Nevertheless, the 
primary goals of l ibe ra l education as manifested 1n the curriculum 
have rare ly included physical or affective development, A more 
spec if ic  assessment of curricu la r goals in  today's l ibe ra l a rts  
colleges (as presented in college catalogues) 1s provided 1n a study 
by Derek Bok (1974, pp. 159-172), He Iden tif ies  f ive  very basic goals 
which keep recurring with varying phraseologies and emphases: acquir­
ing information and knowledge, acquiring s k i l ls  and mental habits of 
thought, developing qua lit ies  o f mind, acquiring understanding and 
competence in the arts, and developing judgment and values. Obviously, 
there remains ample room fo r interpretation (and ambiguity) with each 
of these goals. For example, what type of knowledge Is the most 
Important to acquire: humanities or sciences, specialized or general?
What are worthy qualities of mind: open-mindedness, respect fo r facts,
tolerance of ambiguity, capacity for commitment? On the goal o f de­
veloping judgment and values, Bok writes,
We are a ll aware that few important decisions In 
l i f e  can be made by logic or reason alone. . . .
There 1s continuing debate, however, about the
need to make a more deliberate attempt to deal 
with certain areas of value and choice.(1974, pp. 167-168)
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The f ina l three goals In p a rt icu la r  serve to d istinguish l ib e ra l
education from other forms o f  education as well as from undergraduate
g
progroms that fo llow  from specific  p o l i t ic a l  or re lig ious tenets.
They fa l l  into the libe ra l t ra d it io n  o f A. N. Whitehead, the Yale Re­
port* Cardinal Newman, and the Greek emphasis on arete, k i l l  lam Bennett, 
the recently appointed head o f  the federal Department of Education, 
argues that
the descriptions o f  l ib e ra l education have 
stressed the in te l le c tu a l or cognitive s k i l ls  
to be Important, Enhancement o f  the Individual 
in  some personal sense* larger or at least other 
than cognitive, forms the remaining area of family 
resemblance prominent in sketches of l ib e ra l  ed­
ucation. At stake here is the exposure o f  the 
individual to the problematics of human existence
q
As noted in the f i r s t  chapter, th is  is a problematic point in  I t ­
se lf .  When attempting to indicate in  fact those colleges which are 
Immersed in a specific p o l i t ic a l  or relfgfous system of be lie fs  and 
social structures—and, thus, undercutting the essential nature o f 
l ibe ra l educat1on--confllets and varied in terpreta tions inev itab ly  
arise. In p r inc ip le , however, most would agree tha t a t ru ly  l ib e ra l  
education could occur only 1n a se tt ing  where academic study and re ­
search is subject to neither re lig ious  nor p o l i t ic a l  dogma, R, S, 
Peters mentions th is  aspect of l ib e ra l education: "those who ag ita te
about education being * l ib e r a l '  are often protesting against the 
I l l ib e ra l  tendency to constrain people's be lie fs along narrowly con­
ceived or doctrlnnalre l in e s , thus emphasizing procedural p r inc ip les 
to do with l ib e r ty "  (1966, p. 411).
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and the requirement that he grapple In some fashion 
w ith the meaning of the human experience and thereby 
w ith the s ignificance o f  his own l i f e . {1977, p, 69)
I t  now may seem as though the notion o f  a l io e ra l  education has 
been stretched to an unrecognizable shape; however* even a b r ie f  com­
parison w ith a lte rna te  philosophies of higher education proves o ther­
wise. For example* the visions o f  Thorstein Veblen (1857-1929) and 
Abraham Flexner (1866-1959) project a s t r i c t  research orienta tion  with 
Increased academic spec ia liza tion . They, too, wished to eradicate pro­
fessionalism and narrowly u t i l i t a r ia n  elements in  higher education; 
however, they despised the co lle g ia l aspects of undergraduate colleges 
—which each tended to disparagingly view as a continuation of the 
secondary school system. Their ideal ca lled fo r pure d is interested 
research and scholarship, ce r ta in ly  free from vocational and societal 
concerns, but also free from such diversions as character bu ild ing, 
acquaintance with corroon heritage, and focus on indiv idual development.
John Dewey's (1859-1952) philosophy o f  education also provides a 
helpful con tra d is t in c t io n , Many o f  Dewey's p rinc ip les and methods have 
been, and continue to be, Implemented and integrated in to  an under­
graduate, l ib e ra l a rts  se tt ing . For example, Dewey's qu in tessentia lly  
American b e l ie f  that education's u ltim ate purpose 1s "to set free and 
develop the capacities of human ind iv idua ls  without respect to race, 
sex, class or economic s ta tu s " (1974); his firm commitment to and emphases 
on problem-solving and experientia l learning as pedagogical methods; 
and his focus on the in d iv id u a l ’ s growth w ith in  a democratic community 
have each found th e ir  way Into the practices and goals o f  l ibe ra l
education. Yet, to the extent that Dewey’ s thought 1s Interpreted as 
primarily experience*based, with re la t iv e ly  l i t t l e  emphasis an theoret­
ical learning and as centered exclusively on the Ind iv idua l's  "needs" 
fo r the present and fu tu re—with minimal focus on in te llec tua l d is c i­
pline, the moral development o f the in d iv idua l,  common knowledge or 
heritage--then, 1t does l i e  outside the l ib e ra l education t ra d it io n .
Yet another category o f  college and university mission statements 
emphasizes many d if fe ren t purposes, fo r  example, in The Uses of the 
University (1972), Clark Kerr presents not so much a vision of what 
higher education should be as a pragmatic statement on what 1t is .  
Nevertheless, In his acceptance of the large multi-purposed in s t i tu ­
tion , Kerr conveys a sense o f  mission and set of goals. He embraces 
research, coamunity service, and teaching as equally worthwhile and 
claims that there is room enough fo r  programs that are theoretical and 
applied, professional and l ib e ra l,  specialized and who lls t lc . Such a 
view of or v is ion fo r higher education tends to overlook the established 
undergraduate goals and methods o f l ib e ra l  education as they become 
lost In a plethora of goals and practices, More p rac t ica l ly ,  th is  
eclectic ’ philosophy" may have contributed to a sense that higher 
education should have no comprehensive alms. In summation, then, 
these alternative approaches to the meaning and purposes of under­
graduate education help set the l ibe ra l studies Ideal d is t in c t ly  apart: 
Liberal education primarily  emphasizes educational goals focused on 
in te llectual and theoretical understanding-- integrated with ethical 
growth, while placing l i t t l e  or no emphasis on the generation of 
scholarship (or scholars) or on Immediate social and vocational outcomes.
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L1 bera 1 Education: I ts  Meaning and Uti l i t y
"L ibe ra l"  vs,, "General" Educati on Because there Is general 
confusion on whether or not t?ie expressions are synonymous, several 
c r i t i c a l  differences between 'general" and " l ib e ra l "  education need to 
be Id e n t if ie d  before proceeding with the analysis. Liberal education 
Is sometimes considered to be closely related to the expressions 
"general education" and "unde'■graduate education," and the terms are 
often used interchangeably. Undoubtedly* there is l i t t l e  d is t in c t io n  
between the three In th e i r  popular usage. Vet l ib e ra l education as an 
idea (or ideal) and as an educational practice has a level o f  h is to r ­
ical depth and t ra d i t io n  lacking in marry o f  i t s  modern day descendants. 
Typ ica lly , undergraduate education and general education are descrip­
t iv e ly  defined and are,therefore, f a i r l y  precise. Undergraduate edu­
cation simply re fers to tha t segment o f  one’ s education tha t occurs 
between the completion o f  high school and the beginning o f  graduate 
school. General education Is a term given f u l l  legitimacy by the 
Harvard Committee of 1945 with i t s  well-public ized version o f  curr icu­
la r  analysis and recommendations. As Brubacher contends, the expres­
sion undoubtedly came in to  popular usage in order to "ensure the 
f l e x i b i l i t y  needed fo r  rethinking l ibe ra l education, and was adopted 
by 'progressive' elements on lj too happy to surrender the t i t l e  
' l ib e r a l  education' to the ' e l i t i s t  t r a d i t io n a l is ts ’ " (1978* p. 80).
The semantic a lte ra t io n  was viewed as necessary in order to "prevent 
th is  important channel o f  social m obility  ( I . e . ,  higher education) 
from becoming clogged with upperclass p red lH ctions l i k e ly  to
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allenate the greatly  enlarged new 'democratic* c lien te le  o f higher 
education" (Brubacher, 1978* p. 8 0 ) . ^
Whatever the Impetus fo r  adopting the adjective "general," 1t has 
not taken on a strong value connotation, be i t  democratic, e g a lita r ian , 
p lu ra l is t ic ,  or any other. Rather, i t  is the simple, factual referent 
to that part of the undergraduate curriculum that 1s neither the major 
nor the e lec tive  component, but 1s some type o f curricu la r mechanism 
operating in the le ftove r space meant to ensure breadth o f education. 
For example, "General Education Is a d isaster area" has become the 
catch-phrase of contemporary cu rr icu la r  re fo rm .^  The term " l ib e ra l  
education," however, commands both an h is to r ic a l t ra d it io n  and a body 
o f imaginative, and a t times insp ir ing , aims and objectives to which 
"general education" can lay no equivalent claim. And, although some 
proponents o f  l ib e ra l education have emphasized aspects tha t seemed 
e l i t i s t  or unduly ra t io n a l is t ic  to c r i t i c s ,  the proponents have re ­
mained untied in th e ir  understanding o f l ib e ra l  education as a broad 
wholistlc enterprise* and they have a c t iv e ly  promulgated a concept of 
education which is proactive and inclusive and not merely a referent
Russell Thomas devotes the in troduction to his book, The Search 
fo r a Common Learning: General Education 1BQQ-1963 (1962), to  th is
problem o f general or l ib e ra l education, lie, Too,1 views the difference 
as more than merely semantic.
^5ee the Carnegie Commission Report, Missions o f the College 
Curriculum (1978), Chapter 8, "General Education: An Idea in  D istress."
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12to that component o f  the curriculum " le f t  over" through defau lt*
The id e n t i f ic a t io n  of a sp e c if ic ,  enduring v is ion o f  l ib e ra l  edu­
cation 1s, o f  course, a d i f f i c u l t  task; numerous educators have already 
attempted some form o f  a comprehensive survey o f  the meanings and pur­
poses of l ib e ra l (and general) education,13 A fa r  smaller number have 
attempted to c r i t i c a l l y  analyze the concept i t s e l f . ^  The v a r ie ty ,  
ambiguity, and sheer quantity o f  conceptions o f  l ib e ra l  education w i l l  
not, however, be used as an excuse to avoid any d e f in i t io n ,  but, ra ther, 
w i l l  serve as f a i r  warning. Liberal education cart be, and has been, 
defined 1n terms of i t s  c u rr ic u la r  o ffe r ings , in s t i tu t io n a l  type ( i . e . ,  
private or public , 2 year or 4 year), the socioeconomic status o f 
facu lty  and students, i ts  h is to ry  and t ra d it io n s ,  the espoused goals 
and alms, as well as the actual social and Individual outcomes. This 
philosophical analysis centers upon educational alms and goals, on
12I t  should be pointed ou t, however, tha t there are those who do 
use the expressions Interchangeably and tha t ''general education'1 does 
occasionally re fer to the more ambitious educational endeavor with 
a l l  o f I ts  h is to r ic a l roots and connotations. Therefore, there is no 
hesita tion in  th is  work to re fe r  to w rit ings on general education" 
so long as th is  connotes something more than a c u r r ic u la r  mechanism 
fo r  breadth or d ive rs ity .
13P articu la rly  noteworthy in th is  vein are Freeman B u tt 's  The 
College Charts Its  Course (1939), R. Thomas' The Search fo r  A Corwon 
Learnings General Education, 1800-1960 (1962), E, J. McGrath's Gen­
eral Educated n and the P light o f  Modern Han (197fi), and, w ith a slTght- 
ly  d if fe re n t format, The Carnegie TToTnmi VsTon1 s W1 ssi ono  f  the Col 1 ege 
Curriculum (1978), and Conrad & Myers' Liberal Education in T rans it ion
(W ao7.
14Most recently, J, S. Brubacher* On the Philosophy o f  Higher 
Educat1on (1978) and C. Wegener, L1beraT~Education and the Modern-  
University (1978), have attempted such oSJectTve philosophical 
ahalyses.
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statements of mission and purpose, but not without some regard for 
those other components tha t help shape and define our popular notions 
about l ibe ra l education. This extended h istorica l review provides con­
te x t and serves as a basis fo r  drawing out the specific  c r i te r ia  of 
l ib e ra l  education, c r i te r ia  used to evaluate and select an appropriate 
model of moral education. Three categories have been examined: f i r s t *  
the classical roots extending back to the zenith of Greek culture; 
second, well-known h is to r ica l statements, or apologias, written in 
the past two hundred years; and th ird ,  contemporary proposals and 
c u rr icu la r  statements on the mission and goals o f l ib e ra l education. 
Each serves as a balance supporting the other—with the older documents 
providing a sense o f  h is to r ica l depth and continu ity and those more 
recent providing both contemporary relevance as well as a set of 
spec if ic  goals.
The Value o f  Liberal Education Why 1s libera l education a 
worthy educational ideal? And why should the model o f  moral education 
w ith which i t  1s most consistent be the most acceptable? First, both 
the ideal and the practice o f  l ib e ra l education have a depth of 
h is to r ic a l analysis and a breadth o f  popular appeal unmatched by any 
other single post-secondary educational norm; also {as indicated] the 
l ib e ra l a rts  t ra d it io n  embodies a strong conception of education as 
fundamentally an ethical enterprise. As an educational Ideal largely 
defined 1n e th ica l terms, 1t provides p a rt icu la r ly  relevant c r ite r ia  
fo r  examination o f  the more spec if ic  cu rr icu la r  goals and objectives 
o f  various models of moral education. Moreover, l ibe ra l education is 
a f le x ib le  educational norm, one that is not locked into the notion
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that very spec if ic , fixed areas or types of knowledge must be taught, 
nor Is 1t dogmatically fixated on a s k i l ls  approach, void of specified 
content. Thus, l ib e ra l education can serve as a basis fo r  a model of 
moral education tha t does not teach particu lar moral values (which 
could easily lead to indoctrina tion), as well as fo r  a model tha t is 
not to ta l ly  neutral, naively claiming that no moral values are passed 
on.
Liberal education is  also a concept with logically-connected 
c r i t e r ia ,  c r i te r ia  which help provide parameters and guidelines fo r  
the practice of moral education. For example, R. 5. Peters argues 
that "education" lo g ic a l ly  imposes the transmission of what is worth­
while to those who become committed to i t ;  1t must involve knowledge 
and understanding and some sort of cognitive perspective which 1s not 
in e r t ;  and education must ru le out at least some methods of trans­
mission on the grounds that they fa i l  to provide fo r free choice, 
minimal rational awareness and voluntary cooperation on the part of 
the learner and the teacher {Peters, 1970, p. 45). The ad jective  
" l ib e ra l"  introduces another set o f logically-connected concepts. At 
the very leas t, " l ib e ra l"  education implies a perspective tha t e ither 
re jects or goes beyond a narrowly u t i l i t a r ia n  view of education- Ed­
ucation solely in service of such ex tr ins ic  ends as professional or 
job tra in in g ,  s k i l l  development, or social conformity cannot be con­
sidered l ib e ra l .  Also, l ibe ra l education d i f fe rs  from many other 
forms of education In that i t  is ty p ica l ly  thought of as an a c t iv i t y  
that can fu l l y  take place with adolescents and adults--not ch ild ren. 
The point is  that some minimal level o f  rational a b i l i t y  and s e lf -
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id e n t i ty  serve as prerequis ites.
In a preliminary sense* then, the concept o f  a l ib e ra l education 
provides basic c r i t e r ia  fo r  evaluating models o f  moral education.
For example* moral education involving indoctr ina tion , lacking d irec­
tion  or purpose, or void o f  some elements of in te l le c tu a l understand­
ing cannot be considered t ru ly  educational. Or, a program of moral 
Ins truc tion  which teaches only interpersonal s k i l l s  or one which has 
narrowly u t i l i t a r ia n  aims or goals (such as good c it izensh ip  or en­
hanced professional id e n t i ty )  cannot be considered an appropriate 
l ib e ra l education enterprise. This chapter concludes with a working 
d e f in i t io n  o f  l ib e ra l education, focused on the major goals, thus 
providing a sound basis fo r  the selection of a model o f  moral educa­
t ion  fo r  an undergraduate curriculum se tt ing .
The Defining C r i te r ia  Liberal education is ,  then* at the very 
least a worthwhile educational ideal. At i t s  very best* Its  p ra c t i ­
tioners draw upon the r ich  cu ltu ra l heritage o f  western education to 
create an educational experience tha t has a powerful impact on the 
in d iv id u a l 's  development. In American higher education today the 
undergraduate l ib e ra l a rts  curriculum l ie s  between several extremes: 
"pure" d is interested research; "p ra c t ica l"  social relevance; and 
s t r i c t  professional spec ia liza tion . Training fo r  Jobs, serving com­
munity needs, so c ia l iza t io n , professional t ra in ing , consumer education* 
highly specialized scholarship--none plays a primary or d irec t ro le  in
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15shaping the Ideals and goats o f  l ibera l education. Instead, the 
emphasis l ie s  on the In d iv id u a l ’ s acqu is it ion  o f ce rta in  in te l le c tu a l 
s k i l l s  and q u a lit ie s ,  fa m i l ia r i t y  with key areas o f knowledge, and to 
paraphrase John Stuart M i l l ,  on the education o f  the person qua person 
—and not In any assumed socially-Imposed ro le . Educational goals 1n 
l ib e ra l education revolve around learning ra tiona l habits and s k i l ls  
th a t  lead to  broad patterns o f  comprehension and an a b i l i t y  to  make 
in te l le c tu a l connections; acquiring a knowledgeable sense o f  comnon 
humanity and diverse cu ltu ra l t ra d it io n s ;  becoming more aware o f the 
e th ica l realm; and, in general, learning to grow and develop 1n mapy 
d i f fe re n t  ways, "educating the whole person."
"Ethical development" has been one o f the pervasive themes in the 
l i te ra tu re  o f l ibe ra l education. Today in the United States many pub­
l i c  and p r iva te  colleges and un ivers it ies  are united 1n th e i r  concern 
to structure a curriculum tha t d ire c t ly  addresses i ts e l  f  In some way 
to ethical issues, moral reasoning, and, in  some cases, to the moral 
development o f the Individual student. In an even more sweeping sense, 
J. Qrubacher refers to the contemporary u n ive rs ity  as a secular church 
serving as society 's  conscience and operating as an e th ica l forum fo r  
ttla y  society” :
Whereas piety and v ir tu e  once defined what the in ­
s t i tu t io n s  of higher education should teach, today 
the clergy has lo s t  much of i t s  a u th o r ity  to f i l l
15Although one must re ad ily  acknowledge that 1n the actual p o l i ­
t ic a l  turmoil o f  educational practice and p o licy  making, these goals 
o ften have a s ign if ican t impact.
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these words with content. Consequently the univer­
s ity ,  as a secular church, now f i l l s  them with such 
e lastic values as 1 social concern,1 'democratic or 
humanistic values,1 or even more f le x ib le ,  's o c ia l i ­
zation' ,(1978, p. 123}
This double context-h igher education as a fundamentally ethical enter­
prise and libera l education as u ltimately aiming fo r  the moral devel­
opment o f the Ind iv idual—can be a powerful combination, but the double 
significance can also cause confusion. In th is  study, the meaning 
and goals o f l ibe ra l education provide a means to select, evaluate, 
and develop an appropriate model o f moral education. There is no 
analysis o f higher education as an ethical enterprise in society nor 
as a social Inculcator of human values.
What, then, are libe ra l education's defining c r ite r ia?  Two 
d iffe ren t but complementary sets o f c r i te r ia  emerge from this chapter: 
f i r s t ,  the positive, primary goals o f contemporary l ibe ra l education, 
and, second, minimal, logical c r i te r ia  which c learly  exclude certain 
forms of tra ining and education. Although perhaps less Inspirational 
than some mission or goal statements, the 1979 Harvard Core Curriculum 
report is a clear, concise statement o f goals, one that sumnarlzes the 
major points elaborated upon throughout th is  chapter by focusing on 
the characteristics o f the l ib e ra l ly  educated individual:
1, An educated person must be able to think and write clearly 
and e f fe c t iv e ly .
2. An educated person should have achieved depth in some f ie ld
o f knowledge. Cumulative learning is an effective way to
develop a student's powers of reasoning and analysis, and 
fo r  our undergraduates th is  Is the princ ipa l ro le  o f con­
centrations.
An educated person should have a c r i t i c a l  appreciation o f  
the ways In  which we gain and apply knowledge and under­
standing o f the universe, o f society, and o f ourselves. 
S p e c if ic a l ly ,  he or she should have an informed acquain­
tance w ith  the aesthetic and in te llec tua l experience of 
l i te ra tu re  and the a rts ; with history as a mode o f under­
standing present problems and the processes o f  human 
a f fa i r s ;  w ith  the concepts and analy tic  techniques o f 
modern social science; and with the mathematical and 
experimental methods o f the physical and b io log ica l 
sciences.
An educated Person is expected to have some understanding 
of ,  and experience in th inking about, moral and ethical 
problems. I t  may well be that the most s ig n if ic a n t  qual­
i t y  in educated persons is  the Informed judgment which 
enables them to make discriminating moral choices.
F in a l ly ,  an educated American, In the la s t th ird  o f  th is  
century, cannot be provincial in the sense o f being ignorant 
o f other cu ltures and other times. I t  1s no longer possible 
to conduct our lives without reference to the wider world 
w ith in  which we l ive . A crucial d ifference between the 
educated and the uneducated Is the extent to which one's 
l i f e  experience 1s viewed in wider contexts {1979, p, 40).
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The f i r s t  goal deals with the widely applicable s k i l ls  o f th ink ing  
and w rit ing  e ffe c t ive ly  (presumably at a more advanced level fo r  the 
college student). The second involves developing in-depth knowledge in 
some f ie ld  of knowledge, tha t Is , the t ra d it io n a l major or concentra­
t io n ,16 The th i rd  1s yet another restatement of the need for acquain­
tance with a l l  or most o f  the major " w a y s -o f - k n o w in g .T h is  goal 
has typ ica lly  been implemented with some form of d is tr ib u t io n  requ ire ­
ment. The fourth and f i f t h  goals are somewhat d i f fe re n t  from the 
previous three 1n that each moves beyond a s t r i c t l y  cognitive base. 
Certainly, the focus s t i l l  l ie s  on in te l le c tu a l development rather 
than a ffec tive  or a t t i tu d ln a l change; however, the l in e  is less d is ­
t in c t  when one requires that the educated person be able to make 
"discrim inating moral choices with Informed judgment" and to "avoid" 
provincialism through knowledge about other cu ltu res ."  "Viewing l i f e  
in  a wider context" Involves both knowledge and a degree of e th ical 
maturity, as does the a b i l i t y  to make sound moral judgments. An 
appropriate and effective  model of college-level moral education w i l l  
a t least complement most or perhaps a l l  o f  these goals. An inappro­
pria te model may be en t ire ly  experiential with an emphasis on con­
temporary soda! interaction and l i t t l e  stress on the exercise o f 
moral judgment, analysis o f  e th ica l princ ip les* or examination of
16I t  is  Interesting and relevant to note that the Harvard Report 
does not specify that the area of in-depth study must be a t ra d it io n a l 
d isc ip line , Specialization 1n ethics or moral knowledge may be a 
p o s s ib i l i ty .
1?Here, the report remains fa i r l y  t ra d it io n a l w ith an alignment of 
ways-of-knowlng much l ike  those put fo rth  by Daniel Bell in the Reform­
ing of General Education (1968) and unlike those proposed by PhiTTp 
Phenlx In his "Realms of Meaning (1964).
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cu ltu ra l d iv e rs i ty  o f  values.
The major log ica l features of l ib e ra l education also set clear 
conceptual l im i ts  fo r a model o f  moral education:
—most importantly, there can be no indoctr ina tion . Any objective 
or pedagogical method which subverts the In d iv id u a l’ s autonomy and 
a b i l i t y  to make free, ra tiona l decisions must be discarded.
—lib e ra l  education does not d ire c t ly  aim to change behavior. 
Although the long term and in d ire c t results  o f l ib e ra l education may 
(some claim, usually do) re s u l t  in  behavioral change* the specific 
goals and objectives 1n the l ib e ra l  a rts  curriculum focus on in te l ­
lectual change and growth. The indiv idual is l e f t  free to  make his or 
her own l i f e  decisions.
- - l ib e ra l  education has an in te l le c tu a l o r ien ta t ion  in the broad 
sense o f th ink ing  ra t io n a l ly ,  g iving good reasons, comprehending spe­
c i f i c  facts and general p r inc ip les . This does not e n t ire ly  rule out 
the a ffe c t ive  or emotional realm, but f t  does exclude therapeutic or 
educational models that place primary, or s ig n if ica n t*  emphasis on 
a ffe c t ive  adjustment or growth.
— l ib e ra l  education is not p r im arily  concerned w ith vocational 
or social ends. Moral education in a l ib e ra l a rts  se tt ing , then, must 
avoid the narrowness o f e th ica l tra in ing  fo r good c it izensh ip  (alone) 
or the l im ited  examination o f  e th ica l issues and a tt itudes  in selected 
professions or professional ro les. This analysis now turns to the 
examination o f  several extant models o f  moral eduuatlon, each with 
i t s  own set o f  ob jectives and pedagogical methods. The effectiveness 
o f  each model as a po tentia l component of the undergraduate curriculum
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is  evaluated 1n l ig h t  o f th is  developed discussion on l ib e ra l education 
and i t s  specified goals.
Chapter 3: Contemporary Models o f  Moral Education
Introduction
In the f i r s t  chapter reasons were presented tha t Indicated the 
need fo r  continuing analysis o f the alms and objectives of moral ed­
ucation In a co lleg ia te  setting. In the preceding chapter, the con­
cept o f  l ib e ra l  education was examined in some depth; I ts  meaning and 
charac te r is t ics  were specified as was Its  h is to r ic a l  emphasis on the 
In d iv id u a l ’ s moral growth and development. Cut o f  th is  ana lys is , 
the ongoing, s ig n if ica n t role o f  moral education 1n the undergraduate 
program was affirmed, and a spec if ic  set o f c r i t e r ia ,  with which to 
evaluate the incorporation of a program or model o f moral education 
in  a l ib e ra l  a r ts ,  undergraduate curriculum was developed. In  th is 
th ird  chapter, f iv e  extant models o f  moral education are described 
p r im a r i ly  in  terms o f  th e ir  goals and objectives w ith some examination 
of the teaching methods and resources which fo l lo w . In keeping with 
the overa ll focus o f  th is  study, the selected models are those that 
concentrate on college-aged students, or more generally, those 
seventeen years of age or older; 1n addition, the selected models 
are those that emphasize the undergraduate co llege curriculum as a 
potentia l forum fo r  moral education. Thus, th is  excludes an examina­
tion  o f  models which involve moral development or education which 
are exc lus ive ly  psychological or sociological in  nature as well as 
strategies fo r Implementation which f a l l  e n t i re ly  outside the purview 
of co llege curriculum.
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Natura lly , each o f these models o f moral education has specified 
objectives and pedagogical methods to Implement those ob jectives. In 
none o f the models can one discover a proposal fo r the u n c r i t ic a l  
transm itta l o r  unconscious Inculcation o f moral values or behaviors. 
Proponents o f the values c la r i f ic a t io n  approach; the t ra d i t io n a l ,  
broad-based humanities model; the whollstlc  model; cognitive-develop­
mental approaches; and the normative ethics model1 are un ited  in  the 
recognition o f  two fundamental points: F i rs t ,  whether o r  not i t  is
a planned or conscious enterprise , the experience o f higher education 
w i l l  contribute to , or in some way a f fe c t ,  moral development; and 
second, the tendency to separate ethical or moral development from 
the acqu is it ion  o f c r i t i c a l  in te llec tua l s k i l ls  1s educationally In­
e f fe c t iv e ,  and perhaps, unethical In i t s e l f  (since I t  may lead to 
Indoctr ina t ion ). In th is  sense a l l  of the models are v iab le  options 
and deserving o f  c r i t i c a l  examination. Moreover, these approaches to 
co lleg ia te  moral education are selected because, at leas t upon 
inmedlate examination, none advocates uncrit ica l Immersion Into a 
spec if ic  set o f  moral values, and each emphasizes respect f o r  the 
Ind iv idua l's  values while o ffe r in g  Instruction In the s k i l l s  and pro­
cesses o f moral reasoning and development. Again, these are educa­
t iona l models that are generally focused on college-level teaching 
and learning.
*5ee Values Pedagogy 1n Higher Education (Donellan & Ebben, eds., 
1970) and Teaching Values 1n College (M o r r i l l ,  1930) and Values and 
Moral Development In Higher Education (C o l l ie r ,  Wilson, and TomlInson, eds. 
1974) fo r  a lte rnate  categorization- schemes,
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Nevertheless, as shall become evident, there are s ig n if ic a n t 
differences* Some approaches are decidedly more abstract and con­
ceptual than others. One draws heavily from psychological studies on 
human growth and development. Several seem to f i t  more eas ily  into 
ex is t ing  curriculums; others may place demands on ex is t ing  cu rr icu la r  
structures and require planned in teg ra tion . Some emphasize s tructure 
o f  knowledge, others the ind iv idua l student's development. A fte r 
systematically describing these models, the c r i t i c a l  question is 
raised: Which one, or combination, o f these ex is ting  models is most
su itab le  for incorporation Into the undergraduate l ib e ra l  education 
curriculum? In the fo llowing chapter the developed set o f c r i te r ia  
drown from the l ib e ra l  arts t ra d i t io n  is used to evaluate each con­
temporary approach. In th is  chapter, each model is  systematically 
described, f i r s t  providing a basic d e f in i t io n  with some h is to r ic a l 
context (where appropriate); then moving on to Id e n t i fy  ( in  th is  o r ­
der) the underlying theoretica l base, major goals, and Instructiona l 
methods. In add it ion , a s p e c if ic ,  continuing case of "applied moral 
educat1onH w i l l  be hypothesized. How would the topic " t ru th - te l l in g  
and ly in g "  be handled w ith in the framework o f  each model?
Values C la r i f ic a t io n
The values c la r i f ic a t io n  model of moral education is based upon 
a very broad d e f in i t io n  o f values and "va lu ing ,"  Values include 
everything from personal preference to a set o f  established ideals to 
a social system o f p r io r i t ie s .  In practice, values c la r i f ic a t io n  is
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a method of discovery through which the Individual f i r s t  iden tif ies  
and then " c la r i f ie s "  his or her own values. This model o f moral educa­
tion 1s perhaps most widely noted for Its  large selection of individual 
and group exercises; these are experiential in nature, requiring 
personal engagement and emphasizing respect fo r each Indiv idual's 
values. The basic scheme, i t s  theoretical basis, and the pedagogical 
methods that fo l low  from 1t (as well as the psychological research 
c ited to substantiate I ts  effectiveness} are to be found In the works 
of M e rr i l l  Harmln, Sidney Simon, Howard Klrschenbaum, Jack Frankel, 
and Lei and Howe--this model's creators and leading advocates (Frankel, 
1977; Raths, Hannon, and Simon, 1966; Simon, Howe, and Klrschenbaum, 
1978), Of a l l  the recent educational models focused on morals or 
value development, values c la r i f ic a t io n  has received the most public­
i t y  and controversy--with advocates claiming to be teaching a "valuing 
process" that 1s ( in  a very general sense) humanistic and non dogmatic 
and detractors c r i t ic iz in g  the approach fo r  being everything from 
superfic ia l and hedonistic to wantonly relat1v1st1c and devoid of any 
cogent theoretical base.
What is the theory behind values c la r i f ic a t io n ,  and what are its 
goals and objectives? F irs t ,  values c la r i f ic a t io n  proponents eschew 
contextual or substantive goals as automatically indoctrinating 
(Stewart in Purpel & Ryan, 1976, p. 138}. Since no substantive set of
values is taught, they (at least in i t ia l l y )  claimed to have developed
a neutral process fo r examining personal values. Nevertheless, ob­
jec t ives  do ex is t i f  in no other sense than that the "valuing process"
i t s e l f  has become an educational objective (M o rr i l l ,  1980, p. 16).
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The values c la r i f ic a t io n  l i te ra tu re  however, replete with other 
values: the values o f openness, honesty, c re a t iv i ty ,  acceptance, and
respect fo r  Ind iv idua lity , The specific set o f  steps describing the 
"process o f  valuing" also serves as an outline  o f  the model's educa­
tional objectives:
Choosing - 1) choosing freely
2) choosing from among alternatives
3) choosing a fte r  thoughtful consideration 
of each a lternative
Prizing - 4) priz ing and cherishing your chosen values
5) pub lic ly  affirm ing 
Acting - 6) acting upon choices
7) acting with pattern and consistency. 
Klrschenbaum la te r  reformulated these objectives Into f iv e  crucial 
"dimensions": thinking, fee ling , choosing, communicating, and acting
(In Purpel fl Hyan, 1976, pp. 119-122), For each he (and others) offers 
very broad descriptions. "Thinking" means reasoning more e f fe c t iv e ly ,  
being able to analyze advertising, propaganda, and Information. "Feel­
ing" is c r i t i c a l  to valuing In the sense that ind iv idua ls who are 
aware o f the ir  feelings are "psychologically more mature and able to 
achieve goals more rapidly" (Rogers, 1969). Awareness and acceptance 
of feelings and emotions moves beyond "priz ing" or "cherishing" one's
2
Later, H. Klrschenbaum free ly  admitted th is  himself ( in  Purpel & 
Ryan, 1976, p. 122).
- 89 -
values to a strengthened self-concept and an a b i l i t y  to understand and 
use fee lings . "Choosing" includes choosing from a lte rna tives , consid­
ering consequences and choosing f re e ly ,  that 1s, d is tingu ish ing  between 
pressures or forces pushing us toward certa in  chofces and one's own in ­
dividual sense of what choice is  best. "Communicating11 Vs' the a b i l i t y  
to send c lear messages; empathy, ac tive  l is te n in g , and understanding 
another's frame of reference are a l l  emphasized as Important components 
in  the e f fe c t iv e  conmunlcation of values. F in a l ly ,  "acting" means to 
act upon our chosen be lie fs  and values and to act consistently  toward 
one's goals and In accordance with one's values.
The approach does not have a strong philosophical or theoretical 
foundation w ith a systematic analysis o f  values, moral reasoning, or 
ins truc t ion  1n m ora lity , Klrschenbaum1s c learest d e f in i t io n  o f  values 
c la r i f ic a t io n  emphasizes technique and app lica tion : "an approach tha t
u t i l iz e s  questions and a c t iv i t ie s  designed to  teach the valuing process 
and to help people s k i l l f u l l y  apply the valuing process to va lue-rich 
areas in th e i r  l ives"  (In Purpel a Ryan* 1976, p, 122), The techniques 
have been especia lly  popular w ith elementary and secondary school 
teachers as an occasional a lte rn a t ive  to  an impersonal structured 
curriculum; w ith values c la r i f ic a t io n  they can ra ise and d ire c t ly  d is ­
cuss such important social and e th ica l issues as racism or violence, 
sexual mores* o r  l i f e  goals. More recen tly , i t  has been used a t a 
college level where the numerous pedagogical exercises (including 
questionnaires, games, group discussions, ro le  playing, simulations, 
and interviews) are used by both classroom ins truc to rs  and by student 
personnel counselors in ex tracu rr icu la r  programing (DeLattre &
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Bennett, 1979, p, 38), The in s tru c t !o ra l  methods are usua lly  non- 
d idactic , expe rien tia l,  and dependent on group in te ra c t io n .
Lying is  a universal moral Issue with both social and ind iv idua l 
dimensions, as well as psychological, re l ig io u s ,  le g a l,  and ethical 
implications. Used as a spec if ic  example o f moral education, i t  w i l l  
lend fu rther shape and substance to th is  model and serve as a con­
s is ten t point o f  comparison with the other models. How might an In ­
structor using values c la r i f i c a t io n  teach about ly ing? Obviously, 
the major goal Is fo r the ind iv idua l student to become aware and 
clear o f h is /her own value stand(s) on ly ing . An in s tru c to r  might 
begin with a group exercise e n t i t le d  "Personal Coat o f Arms" 1n which
•k
the students share several Important aspects o f  th e i r  s e l f - id e n t i ty  
with others in the group. The ob ject is  to create an atmosphere o f 
sharing and t ru s t  as well as to encourage a simple acquaintance with 
each other. The in s tru c to r  then announces the spec if ic  top ic  and gives 
a "mini-presentation" 1n which several d e f in i t io n s  and examples of 
ly ing  would be introduced, A structured questionnaire fo llows in 
which students respond to such questions as "Have you ever l ied?";
" Is  te l l in g  the tru th  your most important value?"; " Is  I t  a l l  r ig h t 
to te l l  white l ie s  that help people feel b e tte r  about themselves?"
The results a r t  qu ick ly  tabulated {anonymously) and serve as a basis 
fo r  a general group discussion. The ob jective  is  to stim ulate th ink­
ing about ly in g . At a l l  times the Ins truc to r  is  cautious not be 
become a m ora lis t, not to allow him /herself to dominate the discussion 
with h is/her own values about ly in g .  This Is e sp e c ia lly  true  when 
the group moves on to share ind iv idua l fee lings about ly in g .  (Group
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exercises involv ing ro le playing and simulation might be used to gener­
ate emotional responses. At th is  point students may be asked to pre f­
ace a l l  th e ir  comments with " I  feel , , The clear Implication is
tha t feelings are e n t ire ly  Ind iv idua l,  subjective, and should not be 
judged or evaluated. Presumably, students experience some degree o f 
d iv e rs i ty ,  I f  r o t  c o n f l ic t ,  with th e ir  peers; some lay claim to the 
value o f  absolute honesty, others believe in t r u th - t e l11ng to a large 
extent but not in  an absolute sense, and s t i l l  others express a great 
deal o f  cynicism about the a b i l i t y  or need to " t e l l  the tru th "  a t  any 
time. Again, throughout 1t a l l  the teacher/leader remains "neutral 
Instead, he/she stresses the objective o f  c lear conrnunication between 
a l l  pa rt ic ipan ts . Such well-used counseling phrases as "What 1 hear 
you saying . . o r  " I t  sounds l ik e  you're fee ling . . . "  are used 
to promote e f fe c t iv e  l is te n in g  and a nonjudgmental stance. Teaching 
each student to be able to choose h is/her own values is  another ob­
je c t iv e .  The exercise "Strongly Agree/Strongly Disagree" is used to 
encourage students to  th ink about a lte rna tives  between tota l honesty 
and constant ly in g .  The Ins truc to r wishes to ensure tha t students are 
"choosing f re e ly , "  that they are not simply acquiescing to peer pressure 
or to  unexamined fam ily  or re lig ious  t ra d it io n s .  To conclude, there is 
an emphasis on a c t ion ; now th a t the students have thought about ly ing  
and t ru th  te l l in g  1n more depth, expressed th e ir  fee lings on the top ic ,  
shared Ideas w ith  each o ther, and selected (to some degree) th e ir  own 
stands, are they prepared to ac tua lly  act 1n accordance with those 
" c la r i f ie d  and communicated" values? A contract agreement Is w rit ten  
- - in  which two or more students pledge to each other that they w i l l
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actlve ly  ca rry o u t the ir  values; fo r  example, one student pledges to 
stop ly ing to his parents about his whereabouts during weekends; 
another may pledge to jo in  or help the co llege 's  honor council; yet 
another may agree to somehow confront a local businessman who Is highly 
exaggerating the powers o f his product.
Values c la r i f ic a t io n  1s c le a r ly  a departure from very trad it iona l 
notions o f curriculum and pedagogical methods in many ways. There is 
no hesita tion to explore human emotions; i t  1s h igh ly experientia l; 
obviously 1nterd1scipl 1nary (or perhaps, nondiscipl 1nary); and to a 
large degree i t  is nondidactlc and group-oriented.
H h o l i s t i c
The values c la r i f ic a t io n  approach to moral education 1s re la t iv e ly  
easily defined, certa in ly  In comparison to w h o lls t ic  methods o f moral 
education. Those who adhere to a wholis tlc  approach to the teaching 
of values are usually advocates o f a comprehensive education fo r a l l  
dimensions o f human development. They believe that planning fo r educa­
tion in mora lity must occur w ith in  the wider context o f in s t i tu t io n a l 
environment including such elements as facu lty  role-modeling, physical 
plant design, student body composition and admission policy, peer 
in te raction , and the curriculum 1n I t s  e n t ire ty .  In the past decade 
there have been a number o f smaller, private co lleges, especially, 
that have attempted th is  approach—among them St. 01 a f College, 
Minnesota, Kars H il l  College, north Carolina, and Alverno College, 
Wisconsin (Donnelian & Ebben, eds,, 1978). (One can assume that the
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size of these colleges allows fo r  a degree of dramatic restructuring  
as well as coordinated planning between d if fe re n t d isc ip lines  and 
administrative and student a f fa irs  o ff ices  hardly manageable at larger 
in s t i tu t io n s . )  Such colleges (or programs), d ire c t ly  or in d ire c t ly ,  
draw much from the research and theory o f  Douglas Heath and Arthur 
Chlckering (M o r r i l l ,  1980, p. 42). Although both college researchers 
recognize the ce n tra l i ty  o f  e th ica l growth, each advocates the develop­
ment of In te g r i ty  and moral values ^  combination with many other 
realms of human growth.
Through his studies on the effects o f  a l ibe ra l a rts  under­
graduate experience Douglas Heath, especia lly , presents a strong case 
for a wholfs tic  approach. His findings led him to believe that the 
total environmental impact o f the small res identia l co llege has an 
especially powerful e f fe c t  on the student's eth ica l development.
Heath writes:
As an example o f  th is  coherence, this ce n tra l iz a ­
t io n ,  both students and alumni reported that a 
principal e f fe c t  of th e i r  college experience was 
the development of a more In tegrative value system.
This effect was most succinctly stated by the 
alumnus who described his education to have been 
a 'process o f In te llec tua l and sp ir i tu a l in tegra­
t io n . '  The co llege 's  in te l le c t iv e  effects were 
prim arily  ana ly t ic  and c r i t ic a l  and i t s  personal 
and moral (s p i r i tu a l )  effects pr im arily  synthetic 
and reconstructive. The power o f  the college was
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that i t  ins is ted  i t s  students integrate both the 
in te l le c tu a l and the moral. . , , The Integration 
of the in te l le c tu a l and moral in the men's experience 
resulted in  a meaningful Iden tity  centered 1n a core 
o f  values tha t synthesized, on the one hand, the 
values o f  excellence, in te g r i ty ,  and s e lf- re a liza ­
t ion  w ith , on the other hand, the development of a 
genuine concern* respect, and f e l t  respons ib il i ty  fo r 
others and th e ir  welfare. These values defined the 
substance of the enduring effects o f  the ir  college 
experience and made clear i t s  fundamentally moral 
character, (1968, pp. 243-44)
Heath's observations on changing value patterns among college students 
(using his method o f  "d isc ip lined case study") are sim ilar to findings 
from e a r l ie r  studies: increase in l ibe ra lism , less adherence to con­
ventional norms or b e l ie fs ,  and a move away from formal, trad it iona l 
re lig ious  be lie fs  and values toward a more immediate, personal morality 
(which Heath labels "e th ica l humanism").3 Heath concludes that, " I f  
a college wishes to educate l ib e ra l ly  the consciences and values of Its 
students, 1t must have a genuine t ra d it io n  and atmosphere that prizes 
the unfettered development o f  a personally wrought mature value system." 
His focus is on overarching " t ra d it io n "  and "atmosphere," the effects
3See Eddy (1959); Feldman & Newcomb (1969); Jacob (1957); and 
Sanford, ed. (1964).
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o f  the who lis tic  college experience.
Arthur Chickering, an especially well-known name in higher educa­
t ion  research generally, has conducted numerous studies on the in te r ­
relationships between various forms of college experience and resu lt ing  
student change and growth (1974; 1976; 1980}; and he* too, is  convinced 
that moral development must be integrated with other soc ia l■ personal, 
and in te llec tua l forms of development, Chickering has consistently 
attempted to draw out the educational implications from the findings 
o f  developmental psychology. In this vein he w r ites .
The basic point . . .  is  that motives fo r  learning* 
learning styles, and orientations toward knowledge 
are linked to levels of ego development, moral de­
velopment, and in te llec tua l development. These 
motives and orienta tions, backed by the broader 
reinforcements o f  developmental levels, In turn 
define appropriate in s t i tu t io n a l functions or 
roles. I f  learning processes and educational 
practices consistent with them are developed to 
carry out those Ins t itu t iona l functions, systematic 
in s t i tu t io n a l responses can be created tha t best 
serve students at particu la r levels o f develop­
ment. (1976* pp. 89, 92)
In short, Chickering, l ike  Heath* believes that a who lis tic  approach 
must mean both a comprehensive approach to education using many tools 
fo r  change, tools that go well beyond classroom instruc tion  and t r a ­
d it iona l curriculum, as well as a comprehensive understanding o f
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human development i t s e l f ,  an understanding encompassing change and 
growth In areas beyond the s t r i c t l y  "cogn itive" or "a n a ly t ic ."
There are, of course, others who have advocated w ho lis t ic  educa­
t io n  and development, most notably Carl Rogers (1969) and John Dewey.^
In the United Kingdom John Wilson adopts a d if fe re n t  approach--an 
approach tha t isolates moral reasoning as a specific  cognitive and 
a ffec t ive  s k i l l  lo g ic a l ly  (and p ra c t ic a l ly )  composed of such elements 
as "s e n s i t iv i ty  to others," " s e l f - c o n t ro l , "  "emotional awareness," 
"factual knowledge," and "p rescr ip t ive  th in k ing ."  Wilson believes 
that these are a l l  elements o f  moral reasoning that can, and should* 
be developed through c a re fu l ly  structured education (Wilson, 1970;
Wilson, Williams Si Sugarman, 1967). Although philosophical discussion 
and controversy over Wilson's scheme has occurred on both sides o f  the 
A t la n t ic ,  r e la t iv e ly  l i t t l e  pedagogical app lica tion has occurred In 
the United States. For purposes o f  th is  study, however, the goals and 
methods drawn from Chickering1s and Heath's theoretica l underpinning 
w i l l  be examined, since th is  has been the contemporary w ho lis t ic  
approach most focused on the college-aged student as well as the 
approach most frequently considered ( i f  not f u l l y  implemented) a t  a
4
In the sense tha t Dewey ins is ted  tha t schools be transformed in to  
democratic cormunit1es-in-in1n1ature and tha t otherwise moral education 
would be too fo rm a lis t ic ,  1f not pathological (see Moral Principles i n 
Education, 1975 and Democracy & Education, 1967).
5
For examples of concrete app lica tions , the reader is referred to 
The Assessment o f M ora lity  (Wllscn, 1973). Also, see Values & floral 
Development in  Higher Education (C o l l ie r ,  Wilson & Tomlinson* eds.T974).
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college or un ive rs ity  le ve l,  Also, since the primary focus o f th is  
thesis rests on college cu rr icu lu m , th is  description w i l l  focus on 
the cu rr icu la r  aspects o f  the w h o lis t ic  approach.
Again, the w h o lis t ic  approach rests  on the assumption that 
e ffe c t ive  learning occurs when students are challenged to Integrate 
the in te l le c tu a l and eth ica l dimensions of growth. In Heath's own 
words, "moral synthesis and reconstruction1' are to be melded with the 
development of ana ly t ic  and c r i t ic a l  th inking s k i l l s .  More specif­
ic a l ly ,  th is  approach o ften assumes tha t the teaching o f moral values 
can be Integrated w ith  the content and methodology o f  most academic 
d isc ip l in e s . Also, w ith  most w ho lis t ic  models there Is the assumption 
that learning 1s a developmental process, that there Is a log ica l and 
psychological progression 1n the evolution o f increasing ly advanced 
forms o f  judtpnent and understanding. Using Alverno College's exemplary 
w ho lis t ic  l ibe ra l a rts  curriculum, what are the spec if ic  value- 
oriented goals and ins tructiona l methods? The general goal (one o f 
eight c r i t i c a l  a b i l i t i e s  o f a l ib e r a l ly  educated person) 1s “ f a c i l i t y  
fo r forming value Judgments w ithin the decision-making process" (Earley 
in Donnellen S Ebben, 1978, p. 48). These are broken down into six 
progressively more advanced objectives: f i r s t ,  understanding one's
own values, Iden tify ing  those be lie fs  and attitudes by which one per­
sonally organizes experience and knowledge; second, understanding the 
impact o f  Individual and group value choices upon the human community; 
th ird ,  understanding the re lationship o f values to s c ie n t i f ic  theory 
and i t s  technological applications; fourth , learning how to apply one's 
own values to the process o f decision-making; f i f t h ,  recognizing and
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empathlzlng with the values o f  d if fe re n t  and diverse human groups; and 
s ix th ,  a r t ic u la t in g  and expounding upon one's own value judgments a t an 
advanced le v e l .6 The means fo r implementing these objectives are struc­
tured at both an ins t i tu t io n -w id e  and tra d it io n a l currfculum-classroom 
level. At an In s t i tu t io n a l leve l, the college has taken four steps: 
i t  has created "competence d iv is ion  1n valuing" consisting o f facu lty  
from a number of d if fe re n t  d isc ip l in e s . Among other tasks these 
faculty  develop and re-evaluate the theore tica l framework fo r valuing, 
help design and conduct teaching and evaluation methods, and co-assess 
in-course evaluation o f  student performance. There is  close coordina­
tion with the Student Development o f f ic e ,  where counselors and advis­
ors use models of valuing and decision making in th e ir  da lly  In te r ­
actions w ith students. Also* the college administers an In s t i tu t io n a l 
se lf-eva luation program, consisting o f  long itud ina l and cross-sectional 
studies, in order to va lida te  or re-assess th e ir  unusual approach. 
F ina lly , there are continuing facu lty  in s t i tu te s  and workshops intend­
ed to bring in  experts-1n-the-f1eld and develop fa cu lty  cohesiveness 
and cooperation (Earley 1n Donnellan & Ebben, 1978, pp. 53-54). Across 
the curriculum Instructors are encouraged to use "re levant content” as 
a means fo r  motivating and encouraging students to "incorporate the 
behavioral and a ffec tive  components o f  valuing ” (Earley 1n Donnellan 
& Ebben* 1978, p. 51). Students are provided many d i f fe re n t  types of 
learning opportunities to develop " f a c i l i t y  in  va lu in g ,” including
6In the Alverno model, levels 1-4 are required outcomes, 5 and 6 
are usually selected by Humanities majors.
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courses in d i f fe re n t  d isc ip l in e s , In te rd isc ip l in a ry  courses, o f f -  
campus externships and independent study. Faculty are fa m il ia r  with 
various modes of valuing and learn to match teaching strategies with 
intended learning outcomes. Thus, they ideally use a wide varie ty 
o f  teaching methods. Including intensive log w r i t in g ,  simulation and 
ro le  p lay ing , structured Interviews, small group discussions* s truc­
tured moral-dllemna discussion, and experiential learning.
What could be done w ith in  such a structure to teach about the 
moral Issue o f ly ing? Keeping In mind the overall goal o f  "forming a 
value judgment in the decision-making process," the f i r s t  step might 
well be taken by the facu lty  serving in the "Competence Division In 
Valu ing." In a manner resembling po licy  making, they designate " ly in g "  
as one p a r t ic u la r ly  re levant, both public and personal, moral issue on 
which the co llege places s ig n if ica n t emphasis. These comnittee members 
work to develop a broadbased approach u t i l iz in g  facu lty  workshops and 
student a f fa i r s  programming, A facu lty  workshop (perhaps led by 
Sissela Bok, author o f the recent book Ly1ng) focuses on the In te l le c ­
tual and philosophical categories o f ly ing . The student a f fa irs  
counselors lead ro le -p lay ing  or simulation workshops on ly in g  to one's 
roommate, the opposite sex, or teachers and may also d ire c t  students' 
energies in to  a re-examination or recommitment to the co llege 's honor 
code. The college consciously monitors and evaluates these a c t iv i t ie s  
to assess th e ir  Impact on individual students and the in s t i tu t io n  in  
the aggregate. In the academic classes Instructors introduce the top ic  
In a v a r ie ty  o f d is c ip l in e s . The psychologist lectures on Rokeach's 
study, The Nature o f Human Values (1973), and requires students to keep
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a personally-oriented journal with several entries focused on one's 
own feelings and reasoning about veracity  and falsehood. The sociolo­
g is t and p o li t ica l sc ien tis t team together to compare and contrast 
governmental structures and organizational hierarchies tha t e ither 
promote or discourage Impersonality and deception. In a health class, 
students debate pros and cons o f  the "p ro tec tive " ly ing sometimes done 
by health professionals. An anthropologist Introduces a section on 
d if fe ren t cultural a ttitudes and practices on various forms of decep­
tion in  his/her cultural anthropology courses. Students are asked to 
survey a varie ty of ethnic urban groups, suburbanites, and a rural 
population to develop a sense o f  varying b e lie fs  and a tt itudes  about 
lying. And, to conclude th is  d isc ip l in a ry  barrage, the philosopher 
teaches an applied ethics course in which students are asked to under­
stand a varie ty  of forms of moral reasoning and relate each to public 
issues focused on deception and t ru th te l l ln g  as well as to the ir  own 
personal attitudes and b e lie fs .  Individual students are expected to 
integrate these learning experiences and share (verbally and in w r i t ­
ing) th e ir  thinking and development w ith  the facu lty  competency com­
mittee on "valuing." These fa cu lty  w i l l  then assess the " leve l"  of 
valuing which the student has attained and o f fe r  recomnendations and 
advice i f  necessary.
Humanities
. . .  I feel l i t t l e  t ru s t  In the educational
efficacy o f any merely ra tional moral teaching
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abstrac tly  detached from i t s  re lig ious  environment .) 
Normally, the moral teaching o f  which 1 ju s t  spoke as 
contradistinguished from eth ica l and p o l i t ic a l  ph i­
losophy* and which 1s to be given a l l  through the 
period o f  the humanities, should, in  my opinion, be 
embodied in  re lig ious  t ra in in g . What* however* is 
to be done about natural morality? Natural morality 
and the great e th ica l Ideas conveyed by c iv i l iz a t io n  
should be taught during these years. They are the 
very treasure o f  c lassica l humanism, they must be 
communicated to  the youth, but not as a subject of 
special courses, They should be embodied in the 
humanities and l ib e ra l  a r ts ,  espec ia lly  as an In te­
gral part o f the teaching of l i t e r a tu r e ,  poetry, 
f in e  a r ts ,  and h is to ry . This teaching should be 
permeated w ith the fee ling  fo r  such values. (1943,
p, 68)
This passage from Jacques Haritain's Education at the Crossroads. 
1n which he presents his v is ion  o f  the ideal l ib e ra l arts curriculum, 
is  examplary, Mari ta in 's  fa i th  1n the study o f  the humanities as the 
means fo r  conveying great e th ica l Ideas and "natural mora lity" 1s sur­
passed only by his b e l ie f  in a higher m ora lity  accessible only in a 
re l ig io u s  environment and w ith theological study. In our own genera­
t ion  there are s t i l l  many who believe th a t i t  is  the role of the 
humanities o r, even more broadly, o f the l ib e ra l  arts course of study 
to promote the moral education o f  the student. Today there are those
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who contend that the curricu la r status quo Is adequate fo r  this end 
as well as those who believe that there 1s a need fo r an in te rd isc i­
plinary curriculum. The former position is ,  perhaps, most e ffective ly  
captured in the remark that, "The pursuit o f knowledge and truth is 
i t s e l f  the parent o f moral v irtues" (Livingston, n-d.* p. 16), a 
position closely paralleled by Jacob Bronowskl, the world famous
physicist arvd science educator (1965). In th is  vein, Livingston
denies that there 1s any need for e x p l ic i t  moral education, claiming 
that, "The moral goal o f the Ideal observer ( i .e .  disinterestedness) 
requires an educational program that expressly combats ethnocentrism" 
(n .d ., p. 17). Those who claim that the values Im p l ic i t  in scholar­
ship and the search fo r Truth are the most potent form of moral educa­
t io n , see no need fo r the ^ In tro d u c t io n  of a set o f objectives and 
curricu lar methods meant to promote moral growth. Indeed, Sydney Hook, 
well-known Dewey scholar and philosopher* claims that the introduction 
of e x p l ic i t  moral goals to remake or change society or the individual 
is po tentia l ly  devastating and a "barbaric" act. In a more positive 
sense, Hook claims that
an educational and university system that enshrines 
the principles o f academic freedom can r ise  higher 
than Its  source. I t  can generate the in te llec tua l
power and visions that gradually l i f t  the level of
social existence and social consciousness, , . .
(1970, p. 182)
Thus, the princ ip le  of academic freedom and the methods o f  In te llec ­
tual inquiry become the only legitimate means of morally educating
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the student.
Earl McGrath, on the other hand* takes a more active and d irect 
role in promoting the cause o f liberal education and i ts  role in 
moral development. McGrath asks,
What steps have ins titu tions o f higher education 
consciously taken to ameliorate the present social 
malaise? What have they done to help students to 
understand i ts  causes or to consider various means 
fo r  i ts  cure? The large* complex universities with 
the ir  dozens o f specialized schools and departments, 
with the ir  single minded dedication to the advance­
ment o f knowledge, with their wide d ive rs ity  o f 
goals and services* with the ir preoccupation with 
Ideas rather than the total lives o f individual 
human beings, have largely abandoned any e f fo r t  to 
deal with value problems. (1974, p. 13)
McGrath is acutely aware o f what he perceives to be the moral deterior­
ation o f society and the Inte llectual sp lin tering of the university 
and college. His despair of overspecialization is coupled with his 
adamant re jection of the value-free teaching and learning promoted by 
scientism. According to McGrath* the current in terest in social 
sc ie n t i f ic  models of moral development, including Lawrence Kohlberg 
and William Perry's schemes as well as numerous other psychological 
typologies, stems from the decline of the humanities as important* 
legitimate ways of knowing and learning, Hope, then, l ie s  not in 
handing the educational areas of values analysis and moral development
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over to developmental psychologists and counselors but rather in re ­
v i ta l iz in g  the general education program and the humanities, espec ia lly . 
In a s im ilar vein, John Morris (among many others^),stresses the con­
tinu ing  significance o f  the humanities as areas o f  study which can 
e x p l ic i t ly  deal with value concerns. Morris w r ite s ,
What then is  l e f t  fo r the humanities to  explain?
--the l i f e  o f  culture i t s e l f ,  that which forms the 
very fab ric  o f  our l ives*  a l l  that is  sunned up in 
our t ra d it io n *  and the form o f existence which binds 
us together. . . .  We need to restore the relevance 
of reason to the realm o f  values by recognizing 
that the s ig n if ic a n t  features o f our t ra d it io n  can 
help us understand our condition. T rad it ion  pro­
vides the context w ith in  which we understand the 
relevance and Importance o f the values by which 
we judge our decisions. Orly insofar as we discern 
this content w ithin the l i te ra tu re *  the philosophy, 
the theologies o f the past can we understand our­
selves. (197S, pp. 51 -  53}
7
The " re v ita l iz a t io n  o f the humanities," as pointed out In chapter 
2, has been a frequent academic theme In the past decade. The concern 
fo r  values awareness and moral education are often linked with th is  
irore general concern. The most recent 1984-85 reports on the under­
graduate curriculum ("To Reclaim a Legacy" report written by W illiam 
J. Bennett, chairman o f  the National Endowment fo r  the Humanities; 
" In te g r i ty  In the College Curriculum," Association o f American Colleges 
CoTTmittee on Redefining The Meaning and Purpose o f Baccalaureate De­
grees; "Involvement 1n Learning: Realizing The Potential of American 
Higher Education," the report o f  the Study Group on the Conditions o f  
Excellence in American Higher Education) are a pa rt of this continuing 
trend .
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McGrath proposes in te rd isc ip l in a ry  courses focusing on contempor­
ary problems o f  our timer soc ia l, ra c ia l ,  economic, etc. He empha­
sizes the eth ica l foundation to such a course of studies and the 
pedagogical effectiveness o f  practice in concrete, problem-solving 
s k i l ls  and focus away from an overly abstract* discipline-based approach. 
The relevance and meaning o f  such a curriculum " would be found
not in the in ternal log ic  o f  each subject but rather in  the re a l i t ie s  
o f  existence in a complex society" (1975, p. 36). McGrath also be­
lieves tha t the general education curriculum must push students to 
understand and c la r i f y  th e ir  personal views and develop the a b i l i t y  
to determine the ethical consequences o f various actions (1975). The 
actual pedagogical schemes devised with the intention to  re v i ta l iz e  
the humanities and thereby bring "value concerns" back into the c u r r ic ­
ulum have varied. Some have la id  more emphasis on the examination o f 
personal moral values and growth; others on the in te l le c tu a l examina­
tion  o f  values in society and l i te ra tu re .  Borne have remained focused 
on the t ra d it io n a l humanities d isc ip l in e s ; others have re lied  more on 
an in te rd isc ip l in a ry  approach and included the sciences and examined 
ethical Implications in s c ie n t i f ic  research and technological innova­
tion. Typ ica lly* cu rr ic u la r  reform has meant the development of 
In te rd isc ip l in a ry  courses or programs, the requirement of a core o f 
humanities courses, or occasionally, an externship focused on human 
c o n f l ic t  and values. Among a l l ,  however, there Is abiding fa i th  tha t 
a sustained encounter with the t ru ly  great works and methods of a r t ,  
l i te ra tu re ,  philosophy, h is to ry ,  and re l ig ion  w i l l  produce people 
who are sensit ive  to and aware o f value concerns. Harry Etroudy
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con tends tha t such ind iv idua ls know—w ith  a point o f view or with a 
value scheme {1979, p. 643). While Walter Kaufman, a particu larly 
vocal advocate o f humanities education, claims that a vigorous en­
counter with the humanities w i l l  give the student "moral vision"
(1977, pp. 154-83).
Rather than examine in greater d e ta i l  the "Sidney Hook-Jacob 
Bronowski" humanities approach--which is  essentia lly a case for main­
ta in ing the status quo-- le t us turn to the more proactive model pre­
sented by Earl McGrath and Walter Kaufmann, Kaufmann conventionally 
id e n t i f ie s  the humanities as "the study of re lig ion  and philosophy, 
a r t  and music, l i te ra tu re  and poetry" and then proposes four major 
goals. The f i r s t  is  "the conservation and cu lt iva tion  of the greatest 
works of humanity;" the second is to teach students to focus on "the 
possible goals o f human existence, . . .  on ultimate purposes;" the 
th ird ,  to teach v is ion ; and fou rth , to "foster a c r i t ic a l  s p i r i t1 
(1977, pp. x v i i - x x i ) .  Kaufmann's strong regard fo r what are essen­
t i a l l y  moral aims of education emerges 1n his discussion on "teaching 
v is io n ."  Vision 1s defined as seeing a lte rnatives, gaining perspective 
by obtaining standards o f comparison form our past and present. I t  is 
also related to the o r ig in a l i t y  o f the visionary, and i t  Is brought 
about through a judicious blending of c re a t iv i ty  with d iscip line and 
rigorous d iscr im ination  (1977, pp, 181-83), Kaufmann believes that 
the humanities and th is  primary goal are " v i ta l ly  important for human­
i t y  In both senses of that word--humane attitudes and mankind—that the 
humanities be taught well" (1977, p. 183).
For Kaufman these goals can be met through a variety of
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humanities courses taught by instructors who are themselves l ib e ra l ly  
educated, sk il led  at in te rd isc ip l ina ry  approaches to learning, and 
possessed with v is ion. Among the courses and programs he recommends 
are comparative re l ig io n , an intensive study o f  the Book o f  Genesis, 
studies of three or four great a r t is ts ,  courses focused on several 
l i te ra ry  figures in both Western and non-Western cu lture, a course on 
Plato, and a two-term sequence in the history of philosophy* Kaufmann 
writes,
The central aim of a ll those courses would never 
be to make the student feel that now they know 
what there is to be known about the subject. I t  
would always be to lead them to examine the ir  own 
fa ith  and morals and assumptions, as well as the 
consensus by which they are surrounded. (1977, 
pp. 199-200)
In addition to th is  f a i r ly  trad it iona l approach, Kaufmann advocates 
in te rd isc ip l ina ry  studies as an especially e ffec tive  tool fo r teaching 
vision. He provides examples for programs on "punishment" and "dying" 
using re lig ion  and l i te ra tu re ,  as well as perspectives from outside 
the trad it iona l humanities--psychology, sociology, anthropology, and 
the applied health sciences. Although Kaufmann and McGrath d i f f e r  In 
the ir  in te rd isc lp l ina ry  focus—wlth Kaufmann concentrating on universal, 
ex is ten tia l aspects of human l i f e  and McGrath on contemporary social 
and individual problems--they are quite s im ila r in the ir  alarm over 
the d isc ip linary  overspecialization and the resulting lack of d is ­
cussion and learning about society and l i f e ' s  crucial dimensions.
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They both believe that a so lid  inmersion In an integrated program of 
humanities courses w i l l  allow students to grapple with l i f e ' s  funda­
mental value questions and eventually make Individuals more humane.
Returning to the ongoing comparative focus on " ly ing "  as a topic 
in moral education, what might occur in a humanities program? F i rs t ,  
1t 1s understood by the humanities-model advocate that th is  is a moral 
dllemna faced by countless people and organizations on a dally basis 
which is rare ly, i f  ever, d ire c t ly  addressed in a trad it iona l general 
education program. Perhaps a semester-long program is developed on 
the broader theme o f "Lying, Deception, and Inau then tic ity ."  5uch 
analytic questions as "What exactly 'counts' as ly ing?", moral ques­
tions as "Under what conditions Is I t  morally r igh t to t e l l  a He?" 
and philosophical questions as "What does i t  mean to lead an authentic 
existence?" blend together 1n an integrated program o f re lig ion , 
philosophy, l i te ra tu re ,  a r t ,  and perhaps history courses and Instruc­
tors.
In a l i te ra tu re  class students are required to read Richard 
Wright's Notlve Son, Dostoevski's Notes from the Underground, and 
Adrienne Rich's On Lies, Secrets, and Silence. In discussions or 
Native Son, the class i n i t i a l l y  focuses on Beggar Thomas's crimes and 
the lies he te l ls  to cover up his crimes; they then examine the deeper 
themes in the work: the social l ie  of racism and the v o la t i le  mixture
of in jus tice , fear, and poverty which makes deception and lying a way 
o f l i f e .  In a s im ilar manner, students write  about and discuss "The 
Narrator" In Dostoevski's work. They analyze the Narrator's perver­
s ity  and l ife - lo n g  self-deception and study Dostoevski's philosophical
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qualms about Truth and Perfection as worthy human Ideals. Adrienne 
Rich's work, a contemporary co lle c t io n  o f  fem in ist prose* would 
serve to bring out issues revolving around authentic existence fo r  
women and the forms o f  deception that have kept women in subservient 
and inhumane roles.
A h is to ry  Instructor focuses on Nazi propaganda as a form o f 
mass deception that a l l  too e ffe c t iv e ly  uses modern technology.
Students read Hein Kampf, and case studies are used to i l lu s t r a te  
the complexities of ethical decision-making and the nature o f s e l f -  
deception and blind obedience. Students attend Shakespeare's"Macbeth" 
and analyze how a mar o f in te g r i ty  and honor Is undone by h is lu s t  fo r  
power and then u t te r ly  degraded by h is attempts a t concealment. An 
a r t  professor Introduces his class to Escher's p r in ts  and poses such 
questions as "What Is deception 1n art? " and "Can a r t  l ie ? "  Students 
read Koestler's Darkness at Moon and Kafka's The T r ia l  * Orwell's 
Animal. Farm and then attend a c iv ic  ju ry  t r i a l .  Readings and exper­
iences are structured 1n a manner to provoke concern about the ro le  
o f  t ru th  and deception in the machinations of our court and ju d ic ia l  
systems. Throughout a l l ,  the cornerstone to th is  approach l ie s  in 
the materials serving as course content: They are* by and large* books,
great l i t e r a r y  works, and more genera lly , seminal works in the human­
i t i e s .  Exposure to* and In te l l ig e n t  study and discussion o f such 
works w i l l  Illum inate and add depth to the moral character o f the 
subject a t hand (be i t  " ly in g , '1 the in te g r i ty  o f  human l i f e ,  or mass 
In d u s tr ia l iza t io n )  and, eventually, contribute to the moral character 
o f the student, That is the fundamental premise o f  the humanities
model of moral education.
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Wpffliative Ethics
The normative ethics model* sometimes referred to  applied 
e th ics , introduces students both to e th ica l theories and to concrete 
eth ica l dilennfls often using case studies. The debates and analyses 
tha t fe llow allow students the opportunity to develop s M lls  in  Ident­
i fy in g  and defin ing moral Issues and 1n making moral judgments.
R. Hancock (1974) and F. Olafson (1973) have developed h is to r ica l 
accounts o f  the b ir th  and development o f  normative ethics In th is  
century, each o u t l in in g  the f’over-absorpt1on" with neta-ethlcal ques­
tions during the f i r s t  h a lf  o f  th is  century and the current Increasing 
w illingness to "deal with normative e th ics in  a trad it iona l philosophic 
way with the new factor o f  a recognition o f  the existence o f  meta- 
ethlcal questions as to a degree separable or a t least distinguishable 
from the normative questions" (Hancock, 1974, p. 165), Olafson, par­
t ic u la r ly ,  o f fe rs  a lucid overview o f  the In terre la tionsh ip  between 
ethics and other twentieth century d is c ip l in e s :
What I have ca lled the 'o ld e r ' social sclences-- 
p o l l t ic a l  science, economics, and jurisprudenoe-- 
were widely regarded during the nineteenth century 
and e a r l ie r  as forms o f  applied e th ics , proceeding 
under very general e th ica l assumptions and respon­
s ib le  to eventual e th ica l appra isa l. They are in 
fa c t s t i l l  so regarded in some quarters, and It 
may even be that in  certa in  ways there Is more
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awareness now o f  the ethical dimension o f these 
d is c ip l in e s  than there was at the beginning o f 
the century.
There preva ils  a t the present time, in place o f the 
o ld  dogmatic assurance, a general re ce p t iv i ty  to the 
idea o f resuming a c loser re lationship with e th ics , 
combined with anxiety about how th is  would be con­
s is te n t  with the in te g r i ty  of d isc ip lines that are
understandably proud o f the advances they have made
—advances tha t many believe were made possible by 
the adoption o f value neu tra lity  as a prime p r in c i ­
p le o f method. (1973, p. 39)
Unlike other models o f moral education* the normative ethics 
approach arises out o f a fundamental re-examination o f ethics I t s e l f ,
w ith in  the d is c ip l in e  o f philosophy, and i t s  in te rre la t io n sh ip  with
other branches o f knowledge, I ts  roots, then, remain most f i rm ly  im­
planted In the t ra d it io n  o f c r i t i c a l ,  re f lec t ive  thought cormon to
a l l  philosophic inqu iry . Advocates of normative e th ica l Inquiry
stand apart from tha t t ra d it io n  in th e ir  unwillingness to r e s t r ic t  
c r i t i c a l  inqu iry  so le ly to highly abstract, metaethlcal issues. Paul 
Taylor e f fe c t iv e ly  makes th is  point and provides a succinct statement 
o f  the broader, more "applied" concerns of ethics teaching:
The u ltimate purpose of , , . ethics is  to enable 
us to a rr ive  a t a1 c r i t i c a l  re f lec t ive  m ora lity  o f
our own , . . Moral growth occurs* then, as the
ind iv idua l develops his capacity to reason about 
his moral b e lie fs .  Instead of b lin d ly  adopting
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Ms soc ie ty 's  moral code or being eas ily  shocked 
by the moral systems o f  other cu ltu res , he 1s able 
to th ink c lea r ly ,  calmly, and coherently about any 
set o f moral norms, He learns how to give good 
reasons fo r  accepting and re jecting  such norms . .  . 
conclusions . , . are arrived at on the basis o f 
his own re f le c t io n . He can then decide fo r himself 
what standards of evaluation and ru les of conduct 
to commit himself to . I t  1s th is  so r t  o f person 
, . . who is the true in d iv id u a l is t  * . „ The 
process of c r i t ic a l  re f le c t io n  . . . w i l l  often 
lead a man to disagree with his society. In th is  
case i t  Is his c r i t ic a l  re f le c t io n ,  not his d is ­
agreement, that makes him an In d iv id u a l is t .
(1963, p, 2B0)
In his approach to college teaching in moral values, Michael 
Scrlven claims tha t morality does hove o s ig n i f ic a n t ,  ra tiona l basis 
and that the best way to achieve e ffec tive  change (in personal moral­
i t y )  is through the use of the so-called "cogn it ive  curriculum" (1976, 
p. 323), For him, moral education should include a knowledge about 
and understanding o f  relevant facts Involved in  moral Issues; study 
on the nature, o r ig in ,  and foundations o f ethics ( i .e .  metaethics); 
and instruction "In  the cognitive s k i l l s  o f  moral reasoning, developed 
to the level o f confidence where they can be exercised In social argu­
mentation" (1976, p. 324). Scrlven believes th a t students are almost 
to ta l ly  I l l i t e r a te  1n this area--that they w i l l  en thus ias tica l ly  accept
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some abstract moral t ru th  but then f a l l  to re la te  that abstract moral 
t ru th  to a spec if ic  decision or s itu a t io n . In his view, the dangers 
of naive, unguided moral passion are very rea l.  In s im ila r  manner 
(but with much greater focus on Scriven's f in a l goal)* Daniel Callahan 
has outlined an approach to normative ethics In his essay en tit led  
"Goals 1n the Teaching o f  Ethics'* (1980). At a very minimum, he con­
tends that courses In ethics should "help students develop a means and 
a process fo r achieving th e ir  own moral judgments" (1980, p. 71), and 
that such courses "should make i t  clear tha t there are eth ica l problems 
in personal and c iv ic  l i f e ,  tha t how they are understood and responded 
to can make a d iffe rence to tha t l i f e ,  and that there are better and 
worse ways of try ing  to  deal w ith them" (1980* p. 62).
As with each of the other models* Callahan and other proponents 
o f  the normative ethics approach condemn moral education which 1s a
C
tra in ing  1n spec if ic  moral values or spec if ic  t r a i t s  of character. 
Callahan e x p l ic i t ly  re jec ts  goals centered on behavioral change, con­
tending that these . . .
are, however, doubtful goals 1n the undergraduate 
or graduate classroom. No teacher of ethics can 
assume that he or she has such a solid grasp on the 
nature o f m ora lity  as to pretend to know what f i n ­
a l ly  counts as good moral conduct. No society can
SSee The Teaching of Ethics in Higher Education (1980) and Ethics 
1n the Undergraduate Curriculum (1980)7
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assume that I t  has any better grasp of what so 
counts as to empower teachers to propogate 1t in 
colleges and un ive rs it ies . Perhaps most importantly, 
the premise o f  higher education is that students are 
a t an age where they have to begin coming to th e ir  
own conclusions and shaping th e ir  own view of the 
world, r t  Is the time and place to teach them in ­
te llectua l Independence* and to I n s t i l l  1n them 
a s p i r i t  o f c r i t ic a l  inquiry, (19B0, p. 71)
Callahan outlines f ive  specific  objectives in  the teaching of 
ethics: "Stimulating the moral imagination" Involves provoking the
student to see that there is a moral dimension to l i f e *  a moral point 
o f view, "Recognizing ethical issues" requires the examination of 
concepts, o f prescrip tive  moral statements, and o f  ethical principles 
and moral rules. These are the tools o f  ra t io n a l i ty  and ethics, the 
means whereby some order Is given to the re la t iv e ly  untutored de live r­
ance o f  experience and previous conditioning (1980* pp. 65-66). Calla­
han also believes tha t we must seek to e l i c i t  a sense of moral o b l i ­
gation, that students must be encouraged to examine the connections 
between th e ir  moral perceptions and princ ip les and the ir  resultant 
actions. Even more broadly the questions should be raised, "Why ought 
I be moral?" A fourth goal 1s the development of analytical or lo g i­
cal s k i l l s .  "Coherence and consistency are minimal goals both In the 
analysis o f ethical propositions and In th e ir  ju s t i f ic a t io n "  (198G, 
p. 67). The to le ra t ion—and reduct1on--of both ambiguity and disagree­
ment in  the moral realm is the f in a l specified goal. From the normative
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ethics point o f view, we must work to reduce disagreement in an area 
in which c o n f l ic t  and ambiguity are notoriously widespread, while also 
developing an a tt itude  fo r tolerance of d if fe r in g  or opposing moral 
points o f view. In te llectual (and personal) to lera tion are considered 
especially Important in an area that frequently lacks c lea r ly  defined 
concepts and certain in te llec tua l foundations.
Through focus on methods o f moral reasoning and applied moral 
problems, both social and ind iv idua l, the normative ethics approach 
is meant to leave students with an understanding that humans are 
moral agents with responsib il i ty  and consequences to th e ir  actions.
This approach has, more often than not, taken the form o f a special 
philosophy or in te rd isc ip l ina ry  course or courses introduced either as 
requirements or electives Into a t ra d it io n a l ly  discipline-based cu rr ic ­
ulum. Once again returning to the specific focus on " ly in g ,"  th is  
topic could be introduced as one predominant moral problem. Besides 
imparting a basic awareness o f an ethical dimension to l i f e  and de­
cision making, the ins truc to r 's  objectives would include developing 
c r i t ic a l  and evaluative s k i l ls  in moral reasoning and an understanding 
of a lte rnative  modes of moral reasoning, and helping students to select, 
" f ine-tune ," or create the ir own normative theory on moral decision­
making. How does one decide whether or not to lie? How does one de­
velop principles or guidelines which w i l l  help make that decision? In 
order to help each student In te l l ig e n t ly  answer these kinds of ques­
tions (not in a d e f in it ive  sense but rather in the sense o f providing 
directions and concepts), the instructor has students examine the 
various means o f arriv ing at normative judgments, Students compare
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and contrast hedonistic and non-hedonistic forms o f J u s t i f ic a t io n ;
q
they examine both te leo log ica l and deontological forms of reasoning. 
Undoubtedly! students would debate the pros and cons o f  a s t r i c t l y  
"ru le-oriented" approach w ith  an "ac t-o r len ta tlon" along with a l l  the 
shades o f va r ia t ion  between these two positions; and. they examine 
" ly ing" w ith in  the framework o f such established e th ica l theories as 
u t i l i ta r ia n is m ,  egoism, and the "good reasons" method o f Stephen 
Toulmin and Kurt Baler. Such process-oriented works as Wilson's 
Moral Thinking and Rosen's Strategies o f Ethics could p lay a pivotal ro le  
in such a course; although there are now many availab le texts and an­
thologies which blend together metaethical theory and normative moral 
decision-making s k i l ls  w ith  a selection o f contemporary problems,***
The normative ethics approach focuses both on the s k i l l  and process 
o f moral reasoning as well as on sp e c if ic  application (such as ly in g ) .
Pedagogical methods include the tra d it io n a l lec tu re , readings, 
and open-ended discussion. Actua lly , a wide variety o f  less t r a d i ­
tional methods (ranging from intensive journals to ro le  playing) are 
perfectly  compatible with the objectives o f the normative ethics model; 
however, the case-study approach has been a frequently used technique.
g
In simple terms. Is the end goal or consequence the most c ruc ia l 
determinant in  moral decision-making (te leo log ica l)?  Or, is some com­
bination o f both pr inc ip les or rules w ith  the end re su lts  the more 
appropriate method (deonto log lca l)?
^Among some of these tex ts  are Abel son & Friquegnon^s Ethics fo r  
Modern L ife  (1975); P u r t i l l ' s  Thinking About Ethics (19761; Rachel1 s 
Moral Problems (1975); Rosen's Strategies o f  Ethics (197B); and 
Wellman'VTfcraIs and Ethics (1975).
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Using the selected example, students read (or view) three examples o f 
ly ing or deception. Perhaps one involves a doctor not immediately 
te l l in g  a cancer patient tha t his i l lness  is te rm ina l; another is an 
Individual ly ing 1n order to prevent a murder or massacre; and a th ird  
is  focused on the advertis ing messages and techniques of a major 
business firm . Students f i r s t  read the cases on a factual basis, free 
from an evaluative comnentary, then  In d iv id u a lly  and in  groups 
attempt to come to some sort o f  reasoned, defensible moral judgment 
on each s itua t ion .
F ina lly , advocates o f  the normative model do have more to say 
about evaluation than others. How does the in s tru c to r  tes t the student 
a f te r  the completion o f  an assignment or section on " ly ing"?  Behav­
iora l measures or psychometric tests o f  a tt i tudes  or judgments are 
deemed e n t ire ly  Inappropriate (Caplan in Callahan & Bok, 1980, pp. 
133-50), More t ra d it io n a l forms of evaluation--such as w r it in g  assign­
ments, discussion and p a rt ic ip a t io n ,  interviews, and tests o f the in ­
te lle c tu a l content--should be used in f le x ib le  ways, using su itab le  
means o f  evaluation to match the learning ob jective  and re in force  i t s  
attainment. Arthur Caplan, a research fe llow  at the Hastings Center, 
l i s t s  four major c r i t e r ia  fo r  evaluation: qua lity  o f  argumentation to
support moral views, mastery o f  theories and p r inc ip les  o f  e th ics , 
a b i l i t y  to id e n t i fy  moral Issues, and a b i l i t y  to argue many d i f fe re n t  
sides to a position ( in  Callahan & Bok, 1980, p. 147). In short, the 
students ce r ta in ly  are not tested on th e i r  own personal in te g r i ty  nor 
on the v a l id i t y  o f  th e ir  personal decision-making process, but rather 
on th e ir  a b i l i t ie s  to cogently argue fo r  or against ly ing  in various
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clrcumstances, to id e n t ify  ly in g  as a moral Issue, and to re la te  
ethical theories and concepts to a dec1si on-making process Involving 
ly ing  or deception.
Cogni tIve-Developm ental
There is  no dearth o f psychological th e o r is ts  attempting to ident­
i f y  and analyze moral be lie fs  and actions in order to s c ie n t i f i c a l ly  
understand and pred ic t human behavior and b e l ie f .  In the past decade 
at least f ive  major psychological theories examining the moral develop­
ment o f college students, alone, have been proposed (Knefelkamp, 1980, 
p. 7 ).*^  One, fa r  more than the others, however, has d i r e c t ly  dealt 
with patterns o f moral growth and thought: the cognitive-developmental
approach. A l l  o f  the major cognitive-developmental theo ris ts --P e rry , 
Kohl berg, and Piaget—have devoted a great deal o f  study to the moral 
component, re jec ting  the notion tha t the moral realm belongs e n t ire ly  
In an a ffec t ive  or emotional domain. Tt 1s th is  very emphasis on l in k ­
ing ethical and in te l le c tu a l growth that renders th is  model pa rt icu ­
la r ly  appropriate fo r  examination as a model fo r  moral education. The 
other psychological models o f co llege student growth e ith e r  are too 
purely descrip tive  to be of any use in helping formulate goals or they 
are too broad ( fo r  purposes o f th is  study) 1n th e i r  examination of the 
many in teractions both w ith in  and out o f  the formal education process,
^These are ego id e n t i ty ,  person-environment, h o l i s t i c ,  typo­
lo g ica l,  and cognitive-developmental.
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W1lT1am Perry's scheme describes the q u a l i ta t iv e ly  d i f fe re n t  ways that
students view knowledge and th e ir  ethical re la tionsh ip  to themselves
and the world around. I t  1s, as Is Kohlberg’ s construct, sequential
and h ierarch ica l w ith each position a necessary "bu ild ing  block'1 fo r
the subsequent one. Unlike Kohlberg, however, Perry 's scheme 1s fa r
more concerned with the ind iv idua l's  approach to the learning task and
how each person makes meaning in the t ra d it io n a l educational se tt ing .
Kohlberg is  not concerned with the elements o f  in te rac t ion  with the
college curriculum and learning environment. His theory is a t  once
more general in i t s  broad categorization o f  moral judgment in  any
context and more re s tr ic te d  in i t s  primary research-grounding on ch ild  
12development. Perry's model, on the other hand, has provided specif ic  
d irec tions  and methods fo r fostering moral development in  a college con­
te x t.
In general, the cognitive-developmental model e f fe c t iv e ly  lends 
i t s e l f  to educational approaches fo r  two reasons: a ra tiona l and
planned dimension to human growth and development is s trongly recog­
nized, and the notion of human nature as e n t ire ly  shaped by e ithe r  
environment or hered ity  (factors outside human con tro l)  is  re jected. 
This perspective is  c le a r ly  expressed by Graham in his overview on 
cognitive-developmental theories:
Although one may take a purely empirical view o f 
stages of development, regarding them simply as a
12Recently, i t  has also (unlike Perry's scheme) been strongly 
c r i t ic iz e d  fo r  embodying a male perspective at the expense o f  uniquely 
female approaches to moral reasoning. The philosophical debate on th is  
issue continues today(see Carol G il l igan 's  In a D iffe ren t Voice, 1982).
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corwenlent way In which to divide up the sequential 
process o f change which takes place in  characteris­
t ic  patterns o f moral behavior and orientation with 
increasing age, there is  an underlying implication 
of developmental theory tha t the process of devel­
opment fo llows the course i t  does at least in part 
because o f tendencies 'b u i l t  into* the human being.
This Is p a r t ic u la r ly  so, perhaps, in the case of the 
cognitive-developmental theory associated mainly 
with the names of Piaget and Kohlberg, As compared 
with psychoanalytic theory, cognitive developmental 
theory emphasizes cognitive aspects o r  factors, I t  
Is not implied that a f fe c t iv e  or emotional aspects 
or purely behavioral aspects are not Important, but 
that In man* to a very large extent, those aspects 
are mediated by cognitive, organizing factors. In 
other words, our 'd e f in i t io n  o f the moral s itua tion '
1s c ru c ia l,  although Indeed th is  cognitive d e f in i­
tion o f the s ituation may be influenced to a greater 
or lesser extent by a f fe c t iv e  and motivational 
factors* ju s t  as our fee lings depend In part upon 
our d e f in i t io n  of the s itu a t io n .  (Graham, 1972,
P .  2 7 7 }
In th is  manner. Perry focuses on how we "define our s ituation" In both
In te llec tua l and e th ica l terms. His nine stages are revealed through
the student's perceptions of the teacher's ro le  and one's own ro le  1n
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learning. These stages can be collapsed Into four basic categories: 
"dualism" and " m u l t ip l ic i t y , "  which are characterized by cognitive 
s im p lic ity ,  absolute and concrete th ink ing , ex te rna lly  guided behavior, 
dependence upon authority  f igures and egocentrism In viewing others 
and s e lf ,  and "re la t iv ism " and "commitment in re la tiv ism ,"  which are 
characterized by cognitive complexity, r e la t i v is t i c  and abstract 
thought, in ternally-guided behavior, awareness o f context and in terde­
pendency in re la tionsh ip  as well as increasingly a l lo ce n tr ic  and em- 
pathetic ways o f  viewing others. The crucia l assumption o f  a l l  the 
stage theoris ts  is the necessity o f in te ra c t io n  with a stimulus that 
demands a change in the way o f  thinking to a "h igher," more functional 
stage o f  in te l le c tu a l and eth ica l reasoning*
In Forms o f  In te l le c tu a l and Ethical Development in the College 
fears (1970} William Perry o ffe rs  an analysis o f  lengthy, systematic 
Interviews with Harvard students* He provides a description o f  how 
students view th e ir  world and think about issues and dllenmas as well 
as how students come to define and conceptualize "knowledge" and 
"morality" in  the college learning process. He has developed a frame­
work fo r assessing levels o f  complexity o f  learning tasks which has 
allowed p ractit ioners  to create deliberate developmental designs o f 
challenge and support ( fo r  example see U ltilck , Knefelkamp & Parker,
1975). The practica l p o s s ib i l i t ie s  fo r c u r r ic u la r  design and method 
have been most heralded by Lee Knefelkamp, professor o f  Counselor 
Education at the University o f  Maryland. She claims th a t:
The design of learning environments around the 
charac te r is t ics  o f  challenge and support i l lu m l-
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nated by research w ith the Perry scheme allows 
facu lty  to make the learning accessible to the 
student, allows fa cu lty  members to speak the 
students’ language, to demonstrate that they know 
and care who the student is ,  and may well foster 
increased sa t is fa c t io n  and subject matter mas­
te ry .  1 believe i t  is  the pragmatic poss ib il­
i t ie s  tha t come from greater ins igh t into how 
the student approaches learning tha t has made 
Perry's model so he lp fu l.  (I960, p. 8)
Perry*s scheme has been applied in a co lleg ia te  setting and continues 
to be applied at an increasing rate, and I t s  implementation has had
effec ts  on curriculum content and course objectives, in addition to
13pedagogical methods.
The question as to whether or not Perry's scheme for any psycho­
lo g ic a l ,  developmental model) is purely descriptive, based on empirical
research (perhaps, suggestive o f  an "1 n -b u i l tM biological-based struc­
ture o f  knowing),or is a normative construct, embodying goals and 
methods of in s truc t ion  (or development) which can be evaluated with 
log ica l and eth ica l c r i t e r ia ,  has been raised (Codd, 1977; Fraenkel 
in  Scharf, ed., 1978; P h i l l ip s  & Kelly in Harvard Educational Review,
1978; Su llivan, 1977). Perry himself was at f i r s t  reluctant to bridge
13 For examples, see the "Network Newsletter: Perry's Develop­
mental Scheme," availab le from the In s t i tu te  fo r  Studies in Education­
al Mathematics, St. Paul, Minnesota.
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the gap between his scheme and the actual curriculum or classroom.
He “ f e l t  a deep aversion to 'app lica t ion ' in  the sense o f  transforming 
a purely descrip tive  formulation o f  students1 experience in to  a pre­
sc r ip t ive  program intended to 'get* students to develop" (Perry, 1977). 
For purposes o f  th is  analysis, Perry's scheme is considered an educa­
t iona l model fo r  moral development and as such Is open to philosophical 
c r i t ic is m .  Its  developmental stages are in  th is  sense, then, cu rr icu ­
la r  goals. The educational challenge is to  create an environment, to 
promote classroom learning which w i l l  move the student from s im p lis t ic  
dualism to , u lt im a te ly ,  the a b i l i t y  to make personal commit/rent with 
f u l l  awareness of contextual re la tiv ism . Instructors use a Judicious 
mix of challenging s itua tions  and materials (pushing the student f o r ­
ward) with a supportive, personal environment (providing an atmosphere 
in  which r is k - ta k in g  is possible) to bring about these changes 
(Kneflekamp* 1974). In keeping with the focus o f  Perry 's scheme th is  
progress is  evaluated in such terms as "the student's view of knowledge" 
and "the student's view o f  evaluation and fairness in  the learning/ 
evaluation process." Specific cu rr icu la r  strategies grow from the 
In s tru c to r 's  assessment o f  the student's developmental stage; the 
quantity and type of s tructure  fo r learning; the d iv e rs i ty  o f  a l te r ­
natives or perspective encouraged or presented in  a course; the degree 
and amount o f  concrete experientia l learning and abstract, theoretica l 
learning; and the degree of "personalism" (an open classroom setting  
in  which discussion, In te rac tion , and r1sk-taking-1n-learnfng are 
encouraged). Each of these pedagogical options is organized and imple­
mented in  the manner most l ik e ly  to promote indiv idual development.
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Those who have applied Perry 's scheme (see AAHE Monograph #5, 
1980; Knefelkamp & Cornfeld, 1978; Touchton, Wertheimer, Cornfeld & 
Harrison, 1977; Hidlck, Knefelkamp A Parker* 1975; W1d1ck Hi Simpson,
1976) ty p ic a l ly  have not Ins t itu ted  indiv idual courses focused on 
moral development or reasoning; ra th e r ,  they have incorporated the 
stages and methods in to  existing courses. Thus, there has been l i t t l e  
discussion about fundamental a l te ra t io n  of curriculum per se, but 
rather of restructuring pedagogical methods as well as expanding 
instructional goals to Include the more personal, ind iv idua l-or ien ted 
stages o f Perry’ s scheme. In a sense, the goals and process centered 
on mastery of subject matter become o f secondary importance. Of 
greater import is the development o f the individual student who is 
attempting to learn the material a t  hand.
How might the moral issue o f  " ly in g  and deception" be handled 
In th is  model o f moral education? Drawing from Lee Knefelkamp’s and 
others' work in th is  area, the In s tru c to r  (perhaps in a philosophy, 
l i te ra tu re ,  or In te rd isc ip l in a ry  course) must f i r s t  determine whether 
students were 1n e ither a dua lis ttc  or r e la t i v ls t ic  stage of develop­
ment. Although both groups of students share the same subject matter 
content, the ins truc t iona l approaches vary In the attempt to match 
Instruction to developmental status. For a l l  students the course 1s 
designed along four major variables: d iv e rs ity  in content, form o f 
learning experience, degree of s tru c tu re , and type and degree o f  per­
sonalism in the classroom. How might the theme o f ly ing  be presented 
to students at a d u a l is t ic  stage?
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In order to focus on "d iv e rs i ty , "  the in s tru c to r  selects a 
l i te ra ry  work presenting c o n f l ic t in g  or paradoxical themes on " ly in g . "  
For example, The Color Purple Is read in th is  regard. Walker's book 
1s, in tu rn , compared and contrasted with a nonfic t ion  work such as 
Vance Packard's The Hidden Persuaders. In terms of ins truc tiona l 
approach the prevailing emphasis is  on re la tiv ism —asking, "Are there 
any other ways to j u s t i f y ,  or describe, or condemn ly ing  and deception?" 
In-class a c t iv i t ie s  are designed to foster understanding and empathy 
w ith a wide varie ty  o f  positions and persona lit ies . Discussion em­
phasizes the value of one's own experiences and judgments in  s itua tions 
Involving honesty, t ru th te l l1 n g , and deception. An out-o f-c lass exper­
ience Includes students conducting a series o f  Interviews w ith selected 
Individuals on th e ir  personal views and experiences with "honesty and 
ly ing" while assuming d i f fe re n t  ro les : psychologist, jo u rn a l is t ,
e th ic is t .  Structure 1s high with the Ins truc to r assuming f u l l  respon­
s ib i l i t y  fo r  course organization and providing c lea r-cu t expectations 
fo r  student performance. As fo r "personalism," ins truc t iona l methods 
which help bu ild  a high level o f t ru s t  between a l l  course partic ipants 
{including the teacher(s)) w i l l  be put Into e f fe c t .  For example, the 
class is frequently divided into small groups and students are en­
couraged to share personal reactions and experiences.
For students at the r e la t l v l s t l c  stage the major Ins truc tiona l 
objective is no longer focused on promoting a sense of d iv e rs i ty ,  on 
moving the student beyond an unexamined, s im p l is t ic ,  d u a l is t ic  view 
{such as " ly in g  1s ju s t  always wrong" and "complete honesty is always 
r ig h t " ) ,  but rather on commitment-making and the process o f  choosing.
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Course "d iv e rs ity "  emphasizes moving from the seemingly contradictory 
(such as "Lying is  morally wrong; yet some l ie s  are Justif ied"—and, 
"There Is wide va r ia tion  between re lig ious cultures and time periods 
on the issue o f  t r u th - te l l in g  " )  to resolution. Rather than examine 
the d iv e rs i ty  of opinions and characters, students are asked to under­
stand th e ir  complementarity and the Interconnectedness between d i f fe r ­
ing perspectives. Instructiona l approaches emphasize conmltment, and 
the central question is ,  "What is  ^ the stand or position that V  takes 
on t r u th - te l l in g  and lying?" Instructors reinforce commitment state­
ments from students. As an 1n-class experience, students are asked to 
id e n t i fy  and describe t r u th - te l l  Ing dilerrmas they are facing in their 
own lives  and to describe how they imagine several of the novel's 
characters would resolve those dilerrmas. An out-of-class a c t iv ity  
might Involve an independent pro ject on some aspect o f the topics at 
hand. Structure is moderate to low, allowing fo r fa r more independence 
than students at the d u a l is t ic  stage are capable o f; students must 
assume greater re spo n s ib i l i ty  fo r class objectives, content, and evalu­
a t ion . Thus, as the term progresses, students introduce some elements 
o f  course content and objectives focused on tru th - te l 11 ng that the 
In s tru c to r  had e ithe r not considered, was unaware of, or had disregard­
ed, "Personalism," a sense o f  cornnunity and tru s t ,  1s s t i l l  a key 
element In the course design; however, students at this stage possess 
a stronger sense o f  th e ir  s e l f  and values and are personally and pub­
l i c l y  challenged In a manner fa r too threatening to students at earl ie r 
stages o f  development.
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Sunmary
The characteristics of f ive  d is t in c t  models o f  college-level 
moral education have been iden tif ied  and described in some deta il in 
th is  chapter. Although, 1n some Instances, the advocates and prac­
t i t io n e rs  o f a particu lar model may not self-consciously o r  d ire c t ly  
label the ir  approach to moral education as a "model," I t  is  possible 
In each case to iden t ify  an underlying body of theory or assumptions* 
to specify the major goals and objectives, and to describe the in ­
structional methods. These models draw upon s ig n if ic a n t ly  d if fe re n t 
d isc ip lines and encompass a diverse varie ty of assumptions about 
human nature and morality. The cognitive-developmental model is 
rooted in developmental psychological theory and research—postulating 
a progressive, hierarchical set o f natural, human stages. The human­
i t ie s  model draws upon those trad it iona l libera l arts d isc ip lines  
that focus upon human culture and values; Its p ractit ioners  l e g i t i ­
mately lay claim to a special status: the approach with greatest
h is to r ica l depth and longest actual practice. The normative ethics 
model o f moral education most c learly  fa l ls  w ith in  the d isc ip l in e  o f 
philosophy, yet moves beyond a concern with ethical met a-theory and 
h is to ry  to a twentieth-century application of moral judgment to con­
crete moral questions and situations. The social s c ie n t i f ic  research 
on college student growth and development as well as the l ib e ra l a rts  
aim o f  "education of the whole person" serve as underpinnings fo r  the 
who lls tlc  model. Advocates o f  th is model either assume or argue tha t 
an integrated, autonomous Individual most e ffec tive ly  benefits from a
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broad, integrated education. The focus l ie s  away from d isc ip lines  o f 
knowledge and on patterns o f  indiv idual student development. The 
values c la r i f ic a t io n  model neither draws upon nor uses any o f  the 
t ra d it io n a l d isc ip l in e s ;  i t  has no d e f in i t iv e  theoretica l basis. In­
stead, advocates emphasize I ts  practica l teaching techniques. (This 
model's hidden assumptions are id e n t i f ie d  1n greater deta il in  the 
fo llow ing chapter.)
The goals and objectives o f  each model do overlap, but when 
each approach 1s viewed as a whole and understood in theoretica l 
context, there are, again, substantial va r ia tions . Adherents to the 
values c la r i f ic a t io n  model set fo rth  the in d iv id u a l 's  id e n t i f ic a t io n  
and selection o f  h is /he r values, the "p r iz ing " or emotional and public 
a ff irm a tion  of one's chosen values, and the consistent acting upon 
one's values as major goals. The normative ethics approach is  
markedly d i f fe re n t ;  i t s  p rac t it ione rs  advocate s tim u la ting  the moral 
imagination, learning to Iden tify  e th ical issues, developing ana ly t ic  
s k i l l s ,  e l i c i t in g  a sense of moral ob liga tion  and learning to to le r ­
ate—and reduce—both moral ambiguity and moral disagreement as the 
Important goals and objectives. Helping Indiv iduals develop the 
a b i l i t y  to make value judpen ts  1n the decision-making process is  an 
over-arching goal in  the w ho lis t lc  model. Specific objectives Include: 
understanding one* 5 own values and the Impact o f  both Individual and 
social values upon the coranunity, understanding the re la tionsh ip  be­
tween human values and science and technology, knowing how to apply 
one's own values 1r decision-making, and recognizing and empathizing 
w ith the values o f  many d i f fe re n t  societies and peoples. Proponents 
o f  the humanities model o f  moral education set fo r th  (with some minor
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va r ia tions) these four major goals: teaching moral v is ion ; requ ir ing
students to grapple with the major, enduring questions o f human e x is ­
tence, purposes and goals; developing a c r i t i c a l ,  in te l le c tu a l s p i r i t ;
and, preserving and 11luminatlng the greatest, c lass ica l works o f 
IShumanity. The cultivated and planned progression through c le a r ly  
defined developmental stages is the major goal o f the cogn itive - 
developmental approach* Moving students from d u a l is t ic  and m u lt i-  
pi 1st1c forms o f knowing Into a f u l l  recognition o f  re la t iv ism , teach­
ing students to think re la t iv e ly  and contingently and to c r i t i c a l l y  
re f le c t  on th e ir  own mode o f moral reasoning, encouraging the In te l ­
lectual r isk-tak ing  and courage necessary to move on to the next 
highest stage 1n the scheme—these are among the major objectives o f  
th ls  model,
In general, the actual Instructiona l methods do not vary w idely; 
instead, there are d if fe re n t  emphases between the models. The values 
c la r i f ic a t io n  approach 1s easiest to d is tingu ish  w ith  i t s  heavy re ­
liance on such nundidactic and experientia l teaching techniques as 
group in te rac t ion , sharlng-discussion a c t iv i t ie s ,  and value "exerc ises," 
The w ho lls t ic  model is ,  perhaps, most d i f f i c u l t  to de lineate since i t  
appears to draw upon maqy d i f fe re n t  Instructiona l and learning methods, 
everything from classroom lecture  and sustained, c r i t i c a l  reading and 
w r it ing  to value-oriented externships and informal debate. Whereas
These goals are c losest in  l in e  w ith the philosophical premises 
and assumptions o f the 1984 undergraduate curriculum report issued by 
William Sennet, "To Reclaim a Legacy."
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teachers using the values c la r i f ic a t io n  model ty p ic a l ly  select or 
create structured, group value exercises, those drawing upon w ho lls t ic  
theory feel free to use many, varied teaching resources: hooks,
teachers from many d is c ip l in e s ,  other students, values exercises, and 
so on. Traditional lec tu re , structured discussion, and the use o f 
seminal, c lassica l w r it in g s  and works o f  a r t  are the mainstay o f 
humanities Ins truc t ion . Advocates o f  th is  approach also emphasize 
the q u a lit ie s  o f the in s tru c to r :  ind iv idua ls who themselves are
l ib e r a l ly  educated, possess moral v is ion , and are imbued with an 
appreciation fo r in te rd is c ip l in a ry  learning. The normative ethics 
model o ffe rs  ins truc t iona l methods s im ila r  to those used in the 
humanities approach to moral education: lec tu re , c r i t i c a l  reading
and w r it in g  and structured discussion. I t  is distinguished by i t s  
creators and advocates through the use o f  a case-study approach to 
learnlng—presentlng the spec if ics  o f r e a l - l i f e  moral dilerrmas, d is ­
cussing, and then moving on to learn the underlying norms, moral 
p r inc ip les  and reasoning tha t are pert inen t. Teachers drawing upon 
cognitive-developmental theory use th e i r  assessment o f  the individual 
student's developmental stage to determine the degree o f  teacher Im­
plemented structure , amount o f warmth and personalism, and varying 
emphases from spec if ic  and concrete to general and abstract learning 
strategies and resources. Again, as w ith the w ho lls t ic  model, there 
are few spec if ic  guidelines on actual learning resources or methods 
used w ith in  th is  developmental context.
As pointed out e a r l ie r ,  although each of these models are d e a r ly  
d is tingu ishab le , they are s im ila r  In three important ways: the pro­
ponents o f  these models s trong ly  advocate the important ro le o f  moral
education at an advanced college leve l; a l l  recognize that moral 
values are being imparted to students, whether or not there 1s a 
s truc tu red , cu r r ic u la r  approach to moral education; arid, each model 
(or some var ia tion  thereof) Is in actual, current use In American 
colleges and u n ive rs it ie s . In th is  chapter, descriptions o f each 
mode! have been developed drawing upon like-minded groups o f educa­
t io n a l theoris ts and actual contemporary practices 1n the l ib e ra l 
education curriculum. In the f i r s t  three chapters a groundwork 
has been la id  fo r  the analysis in the fo llowing chapters. The concept 
o f l ib e ra l  education--!ts  h is to rica l aims as well as I ts  contemporary 
c u r r ic u la r  goals— is  used to evaluate these f ive  contemporary models 
o f co llege-leve l moral education. Which one, or what combination of 
these models, is  most suitable fo r Incorporation in to  the l ib e ra l 
stud ies curriculum?
Chapter 4: C r it iq u e  o f  Models
The c r i te r ia  used to evaluate the f iv e  contemporary models o f 
moral education have been explained and developed 1n the second chap­
ter, In a negative sense, a legitimate college or un ive rs ity  model 
must not Involve any form o f  indoctrination nor any d ire c t  emphasis on 
behavioral goals and objectives. In a positive sense, any acceptable 
curricu la r approach to moral education fo r colleqe-aged youth and 
adults must emphasize In te l le c tu a l development and a " c r i t i c a l  appre­
c ia tion of the ways we gain and apply knowledge," There need also be 
a strong connection with the tra d it iona l l ibe ra l a rts  focus on develop­
ing an "Informed Judgment'* and an " a b i l i t y  to make d iscrim inating moral 
choices" as well as on the more elusive cu rr icu la r  goal: teaching In ­
dividuals to understand l i f e  in a wide context, to have "vision,**
Which model or models o f  moral education could contribute most e f fe c t ­
ive ly  to the overall l ib e ra l education o f  the student? More spec if­
ic a l ly ,  which model f i t s  in to  such h is to r ica l aims o f  l ibe ra l educa­
tion as "Integrating e th ica l and in te l le c tu a l v is io n ,"  "developing 
the a b i l i t y  to understand facts and de ta ils  in l ig h t  o f  princip les and 
theories," "creating well-rounded indiv iduals with knowledge and In te r ­
ests 1n a wide varie ty o f  areas," and "introducing students to the 
foundations o f  our common cu ltu ra l heritage"? Clearly there can be no 
one model which can accomplish a l l  of th is ,  nor is  there l ik e ly  to be 
a model which Is a perfect f i t  1n, say, four out o f  f iv e  categories; 
rather, the point Is to Id e n t ify  those approaches which are part icu ­
la r ly  wel1-synchronized with the aims, goals, and log ica l features o f
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l ib e ra l education,to exclude any tha t are e n t ire ly  contradictory or 
inadequate,
Non-Indoctrinating
In each o f  the examined models o f  moral education a concerted 
e f fo r t  is made to avoid ( in  p r inc ip le  and practice) the inculcation 
or transm itta l o f substantive values.1 Whether through a focus on 
the process o f  acquiring and In te rna liz ing  moral values, on the 
analysis o f  societal and In te l le c tu a l values, on the p r inc ip les  of 
moral reasoning, or on the stages o f  moral development, each approach 
attempts to avoid the espousal o f any given set of substantive and 
personal moral values or positions. Obviously, a l l  wish to avoid 
any semblance o f  indoc tr ina t ion ; proponents o f  each model contend 
tha t th e ir  approach does provide fo r  free choice, voluntary coopera­
t ion  between teacher and student, and a strong emphasis on rational 
de libera tion . C erta in ly , i t  is  re la t iv e ly  simple to provide a para­
digm case o f  moral indoc tr ina t ion : a program of moral education which
presented only one set o f moral values as worthwhile and refused to 
reveal i t s  own underlying princ ip les and pedagogical philosophy; that 
held l i t t l e  or no respect fo r  students' r igh ts  and placed no emphasis 
on the w i l l in g  cooperation of the student in the learning process; 
and, that u t i l iz e d  pedagogical techniques tha t brought about change 
through manipulation o f  a f fe c t ive  and emotional t r a i t s  would cease to
^ y  "substantive" values is meant values which are concrete and 
specific as opposed to those which are abstract and procedural--  
having to do w ith rules of form. Examples are developed in the text.
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be considered educational. I t  would be indoctrination. For h is to r ­
ical examples one might examine Froebl's theories on education In 19th 
century Germany* Among other major goals, Froebl espouses: obedience 
to authority, reverence fo r  sp ir itua l accomplishments o f the past, and 
self-renundat1on (In Boyd and King, 1980, pp. 349-51). Or, one may 
refer to Napoleon's reign under which a l l  schools and colleges were 
required as the basis of Instruction "to swear an oath of loyalty to 
the emperor, to the imperial monarchy as the trustee fo r the well-being 
of the people, and to the Napoleonic dynasty as guardian of French unity 
and of a l l  the Ideas proclaimed in the constitu t ion" ( in  Boyd h King,
1980, p* 360),
Not one of these contemporary models d ire c t ly  involves the u nc r i t ­
ical Inculcation of substantive moral values; in other words, none 
teaches an e x p l ic i t  set o f  moral values drawn from a s ingle religious 
or Ideological base. However, a l l  models of moral education, even 
those focused on "process," "p r inc ip les ,"  or "stages" make some assump­
tions about the nature o f  humanity, e th ics, and current societal values.
A solid bulwark against any slippage into indoctrination must be a 
continuing willingness on the part of the educator (and as an in tr in s ic  
component of the educational program) to examine and pub lic ly  reveal 
such underlying assumptions and principles and to make clear goals and 
pedagogical practices. In th is  sense, there are variations between
o
See I.A, Snook's Indoctrination & Education (1972) and R. S, Peters' 
Ethics and Education (1970) fo r extended logical analyses of Indoctrination.
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the models. The normative ethics model and William Perry's cognit ive- 
developmental model have each set fo r th a  c lear range of goals and 
ob jectives i In In te l le c tu a l and Ethical Growth During the College 
Years, Perry cogently id e n t i f ie s  the model's philosophical and psycho- 
log ica l assumptions and l im ita t io n s .  In the normative ethics approach 
Rosen, Scriven, and others have ca re fu l ly  pointed out metaethical 
assumptions and make the c r i t i c a l  examination o f such philosophical 
premises an " o f f i c i a l "  component o f  the model.^ The w ho lis t ic  and 
humanities models are somewhat more d i f f i c u l t  to evaluate, in  large 
part because they are not so c le a r ly  se lf-de fined . In p r inc ip le ,  
there Is nothing that m itigates against the ongoing analysis and d is ­
closure o f  foundational assumptions and pedagogical practice in e ithe r 
model. In practice , however* there are certa in  aspects o f  each that 
could lead to indoctr ina tion . For example, the w ho lls t ic  approach, 
with I t s  obvious reg?rd fo r  the development o f  the "whole" person and 
concomitant willingness to b lu r d is t in c t io n s  between the formal c u r r ic ­
ulum and learning-teaching with the extracurriculum ai.d learning ex­
^He acknowledges his debt to Jean Piaget and the developmental 
approach to understanding cognitive change and c le a r ly  Iden t if ie s  his 
in te l le c tu a l base In "contextual pragmatism" and "re la t iv ism " {1970i 
pp. 201-203). Moreover, by the standards o f  his own scheme Perry 
himself does not (cannot) claim to have created an absolute standard 
fo r understanding and teaching moral development.
4
Indeed, In most normative ethics courses, the two questions 
i n i t i a l l y  posed are: "Why be moral?" and " Is  there such a thing as
m ora lity7M Not only is there no prelim inary commitment to a specif ic  
moral code, but there is no automatic assumption tha t m ora lity  I t s e l f  
is a viable or meaningful concept. Students are expected to make 
th is  judgment In d iv id u a lly .
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periences in  general, runs a higher r is k  o f relegating i t s  emphasis 
on the ra tiona l analysis o f moral values to a subordinate status. In 
a very practica l sense, is there time fo r the teachers and administra­
tors using a w h o lls t ic  approach to step back and c r i t i c a l l y  review 
the process o f moral education I tse lf?  In the example given in 
chapter 3, the fa c u lty  serving In the "competence d iv is io n  o f valuing" 
are meant to serve th is  func t ion ; in other applications, however, 1t 
may be a l l  too easy to leave theoretica l considerations behind in the 
over-arching e f f o r t  to control and shape a l l ,  or most* aspects o f 
individual growth and development, The humanities model also may 
be susceptible to Indoctr ina tion  to the extent that I t  s l ip s  back 
into a form o f Ins truction  th a t  existed In many sectarian colleges 
In the 19th century and f i r s t  h a lf  o f  the 20th century. I f  the human­
i t ie s  are thought to embrace " f i r s t  p r in c ip le s "5 In an absolute sense 
and to Inculcate students 1n Western cu ltu res ' "common heritage ," then 
intolerance and ethnocfintrism may fo llow  from th is form o f  in s tru c t io n . 
Or, 1f "v is ion" were to be defined so le ly  in terms of the male, Judeo- 
Chrlstlan t ra d i t io n  and students were taught neither the knowledge nor 
a b i l i t ie s  to move beyond to a wider d e f in i t io n  and v is ion  o f "humans" 
and "humanity," then th is may be r ig h t ly  condemned as an Ind irec t 
form of indoc tr ina t ion .
These examples o f po tentia l problems are re la t iv e ly  minor, how­
ever, in comparison with the values c la r i f ic a t io n  approach—which has
5F irs t p r in c ip le s ,  as defined by Robert Hutchins, re fers to meta­
physical ideals and moral and in te l le c tu a l guiding p r inc ip les .
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bee n vehemently c r i t ic iz e d  by many others fo r  covertly promoting con­
form ity (Stewart 1n Purpel A Ryan, 1976, p, 130; Smith, 1977, p. 8 ).
The advocates of values c la r i f ic a t io n  often claim to teach an e n t ire ly  
"neutral" valuing technique; yet they neglect to id e n t i fy  and defend 
th e ir  own underlying values and p r inc ip les . One must search the values 
c la r i f ic a t io n  l i te ra tu re  very c a re fu l ly ,  indeed, to id e n t i fy  th e ir  
assumptions about human nature or philosophical premises about the 
nature o f  moral values and reasoning. Tn the fa i lu re  to e f fe c t iv e ly  
and systematically deal w ith such theore tica l questions, th is  model 
unw itt ing ly inculcates a form of re la tiv ism . For example, the student 
who consistently and conscientiously c la r i f ie s  his own personal values 
(according to the scheme la id  out In chapter 3), observes his or her 
fellow students engaged 1n the same task, and notices the teacher 1n a 
role res tr ic ted  to nonjudgmental " f a c i l i t a t in g "  and "coord ina ting ,"  
may assume that moral dedslon-maklng is  solips1st1c and that in d iv id ­
ual values are in t r in s ic a l ly  worthwhile, not subject to c r i t i c a l  
evaluation by any external standards. I f  a student c la r i f ie s  h is /her 
values on " ly ing "  and assumes an egoist or hedonistic perspective 
(MI w i l l  l i e ,  or t e l l  the t ru th ,  when 1t w i l l  help me or give me 
pleasure"), there is l i t t l e  in th is  scheme that moves the student to 
e ithe r c r i t i c a l l y  evaluate and Judge other Individuals* value systems 
or h is /her own system. In short, no one can leg it im a te ly  t e l l  the 
student that he/she is  "wrongl". This may resu lt  in  Indoctrination 
because the ind iv idua l is  never required nor even encouraged to 
c r i t i c a l l y  understand or question the underlying assumptions of the 
approach to moral decision-making.
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Indoctrination may also occur when teachers use pedagogical tech­
niques that appeal exclusively to behavioral* a tt i tud lna l,  or affective 
aspects of human development and learning.6 In this sense also, the 
values c la r i f ic a t io n  model (and to a lesser extent the whollstic 
model) has potential drawbacks. With I ts  strong emphasis on group- 
oriented, personally-revealing peer a c t iv i t ie s  and on monitored, be­
havioral implementation, values c la r i f ic a t io n  iron ica lly  r isks the 
mutation of a supposedly "neutra l" and "ra tiona l"  c la r i f ica t io n  pro­
cess--! nto a therapeutic counseling technique or, at worst, in to  a 
s u p e rf ic ia l ,  pedagogical game. Again turning to the example on lying 
and deception, the teaching strategies largely involved forms of 
group disclosure, behavioral monitoring, and "feeling" statements.
In combination w ith a strong focus on the rational analysis of moral 
values and a fo r th r ig h t  theoretica l foundation, such methods might 
be useful and help keep co lleg ia te-leve l moral education from assum­
ing an a r id , In te llec tua llzed  approach; however, for reasons developed 
throughout th is  narra tive , the values c la r i f ic a t io n  model fa i ls  to 
provide an adequate model of moral Judgment and reasoning. Thus, i ts  
emphasis on a ffec t ive  elements tends to predominate and lead to 
possible indoctrination.
The w ho lls tic  model may also risk Indoctrination by u t i l iz in g  
pedagogical techniques that appeal to the nonratlonal dimensions of
6By "behavioral" is  meant actual actions and conduct. "A tt itude1
refers to  a combined manner of acting, fee ling and thinking that re­
veals one's overall mental d ispos it ion ; and "affective" Is the mental
dimension of fee lings and emotions.
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human development. In the sheer e ffo r t  to cover a l l  aspects o f 
"valu ing," in concert with no less than the "development o f  the whole 
person," the pedagogical methods, 1f not the principled in te n t ,  edge 
toward Indoctrination. Again* there is no lnqical component to th is  
model that necessarily promotes an exclusive focus on a ffec t ive  and 
emotional elements o f  growth. As pointed out In the description of 
th is  model, the attempt is to broaden the college educational enter­
prise and render 1t more pedagogical1y e ffec tive  through including 
such affective  elements, not by excluding reason and the development 
of ra tional a b i l i t ie s  and s k i l ls .  Yet the r is k  1s apparent--as pre­
viously i l lu s tra te d  in the example on ly ing. I f  a re la t iv e ly  small 
group o f  facu lty , student counselors, and administrators 1n a 
"competency d iv is ion" r ig id ly  structured a l l  a ffec t ive , behavioral, 
out-of-class a c t iv i t ie s  while leaving the fn-class, trad it io n a l 
academic course components uncoordinated and unintegrated, a form of 
indoctrination may occur. Or, a t  the very leas t, students may be be­
wildered by an education that overemphasizes the differences between 
"a ffec t ive " and "cognitive" while also presenting a c lear, un if ied  
approach to "valuing" in the a ffec tive  sphere and a more haphazard, 
m u lt i-d isc ip lina ry  approach in the cognitive or In te llec tua l domain.
A student may come to believe that there can be no In te l le c tu a l guide­
lines or In te llectua l process to help make decisions about deception 
and tru th  te l l in g .  His/her cynicism in th is  area may very well lead 
to an uncrit ica l absorption in and acceptance of the Im p l ic i t  values 
Imparted 1n extra- and noncurricular a c t iv i t ie s .
In summation, the values c la r i f ic a t io n  model o f moral education
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runs the greatest r is k  o f  indoctr ina tion . Although I ts  e x p l ic i t  claim 
1s fo r  a neutra l, unbiased process o f  valuing, as a matter o f  fa c t i t s  
goals and pedagogical methods (1n themselves) are heavily focused on 
the a ffe c t ive  dimension of learning and experientia l learning, and 
advocates o f th is  approach f a i l  to incorporate a clear and c r i t i c a l  
understanding of m ora lity  and moral reasoning as an Important com­
ponent. The w h o lls t ic  and humanities models o f  moral education are 
more d i f f i c u l t  to Id e n t i fy  as p o te n tia l ly  Indoctr ina ting . The bold 
attempt to educate and develop a l1 aspects o f  the ind iv idua l 1s so 
ambitious tha t i t  could lead to Indoctr ina tion . Also, Ins truc tion  
in the humanities runs th is  r is k  i f  the humanities are defined in 
a very narrow sense. Moreover, neither approach in s is ts  tha t students 
possess an In-depth c r i t i c a l  understanding o f  m ora lity  and moral 
decision-making. This stands in marked contrast to the normative 
ethics and cognitive-developmental models o f  moral education. Advo­
cates of both approaches require students to analyze metaethlcal 
assumptions and various patterns o f  moral reasoning; th e ir  goals are 
markedly c lear and e x p l ic i t  and also focused on In te l le c t  and ra tion ­
a l i t y  and away from a ffe c t ive  and behavioral aspects of human develop­
ment, The normative ethics and cognitive-developmental models have 
the c learest and strongest conceptual safeguards against Indoctrina­
t io n .
Non-Behavioral
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A major danger in any model of moral education is the tendency 
to create a l l  too specific objectives and to emphasize the creation of 
"good," "moral1' Individuals. This emphasis on specif ic* behavioral 
objectives and techniques rather than a reliance on e ither the more 
distanced, ultimate alms o f  libera l education or on the specif ic  
objectives focused on In te llectual s k i l ls  is closely linked to the 
r isk  of indoctrination, The efficaciousness of behavioral teaching 
and learning techniques is not in question, nor is th e ir  use among 
younger students or In curr icu la r areas outside of moral education 
and goals centered upon valuing. However, in college-level programs 
of moral education, In keeping with the overall aims and methods of 
a liberal arts education, behavioral goals and systematic teaching 
methods are Inappropriate fo r two major reasons: F i rs t ,  behavioral
goals, almost inevitably, are concrete manifestations of a specific 
moral value system, thus indoctrination 1s very l ik e ly .  Moreover, the 
likelihood of hypassing respect for students' autonomy and w i l l in g  
cooperation are heightened with behavioral objectives. Second, the 
primary liberal studies emphasis 1s on the in te l le c tu a l development 
o f the student. Behavioral approaches weaken or undermine tha t 
emphasis and tend to s h if t  focus away from mastery o f  knowledge and 
in te llectua l s k i l ls  to the achievement of specific types of behavior. 
In other words, most l ibera l education goals are In themselves non- 
behavioral (or at least not d ire c tly  measurable through behavior in 
an Immediate and obvious sense).
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A paradigm case of a behavioral approach Is described in B.F. 
Skinner's f ic t io n a l work, Halden I I . His Is a society 1n which such 
trad it iona l concepts as "freedom," "d ign ity" and "morality" are d is re ­
garded as empty verbiage and 1n which i t  is generally accepted that 
positive societal and individual goals and values are, in the overall 
scheme o f things, already well known and accepted. Behavioral goals 
would, obviously, d ire c t ly  focus on shaping, changing, or contro lling 
specific observable behaviors. Social and interpersonal s k i l ls  that 
reduce or eliminate such anti-soc ia l {and immoral) behaviors as th e f t ,  
greed, overambition, deception, hatred, and violence would be re in ­
forced, and* In l ik e  manner, positive forms of social behavior invo lv ­
ing benevolence, courtesy, care, and honesty would be rewarded. In 
addition, the entire  learning enviromnent would be designed in the 
manner considered most l ik e ly  to promote correct behavior patterns. 
This focus on specific behavioral goals and outcomes, from the advo­
cates' perspective, eliminates vagueness, lack o f sp e c if ic ity ,  and 
in a b i l i t y  to adequately evaluate learning outcomes. From the libe ra l 
education perspective, however, the exclusive or primary concentra­
t ion on behavioral change is both in te l le c tu a lly  shallow and e th ica lly  
suspect.
Of the five  contemporary models, only two have any type of 
e x p l ic i t  behavioral goals or teaching methods: The whollstic approach 
and the values c la r i f ic a t io n  models. I t  is important to note, how­
ever, that in at least two senses a l l  these models seek to change 
behavior (1f behavior is defined In broader terms than actual bodily 
conduct). At the very least teachers attempt, 1n th e ir  own way, to
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a1 ter verbal behavior by imparting language and concepts that allow 
fo r  an a r t ic u la te ,  consistent means o f developing and defending one's 
own moral values. And, as with many forms of education, the creators 
and p rac t it ione rs  o f these models a l l  wish to empower students to 
in i t ia te  and maintain the ir  own behavioral changes. I t  is  not, then, 
"behavioral change" per se that is  the major and d ire c t  goal, but 
rather the potentia l fo r the individual student to change him/her­
s e l f  as a resu lt  o f comprehensive In te llec tua l development {see the 
Hastings Center study. The Teaching o f Ethics 1n Higher Education,
1900, pp. 54 & 55). The values c la r i f ic a t io n  model, however, dwells 
fa r  more s p e c if ic a l ly  than th is  on d irec t behavioral change. In such 
exercises as "Values in Action," "S e n s it iv ity  Modules," and "Removing 
Barriers to Action," the model's f in a l  two goals o f "acting on one's 
be lie fs "  and "acting with a pattern, consistency and re p e t it io n "  are 
promoted; moreover, the pedagogical techniques themselves require a 
s ig n if ic a n t  amount o f d irec t behavioral p a rt ic ipa t io n . Thus, although 
th is  model's advocates eschew any au tho rita t ive  stance In any set of 
moral values (other than the seven-step process-of-valulng scheme}, 
they do encourage each student to a ffe c t some immediate behavioral 
change. Students In a "workshop" or "seminar" on ly in g  and deception 
w i l l  be requested ( i f  not required) to bring th e ir  behavior In l in e  
w ith  th e ir  pub lic ly  espoused values (whatever they may be). Students 
may be asked not only to verbalize th e ir  values but also act them out 
In role plays and share th e ir  plans to act in accordance with those 
values.
In the w ho lis t lc  model, as defined in the previous chapter, In
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none of the objectives are there overt proposals fo r  behavioral trans­
formation. Yet the underlying theory, by d e f in i t io n ,  requires a sys­
tematic in s t i tu t io n a l response, the use of many d if fe re n t too ls  fo r  
change, and the Integration o f  both cognitive and a ffective  dimensions 
o f growth. Also, there are co llege-level w ho lls t ic  models ( fo r  two 
paradigmatic examples: Marashl International University, Iowa, and 
Bob Jones University, South Carolina) which do place strong emphasis 
on behavioral change. The Hne between encouraging each Ind iv idua l 
student to Incorporate the behavioral and a f fe c t ive  components o f 
"valuing" and the creation o f  an in s t i tu t io n a l ethos which promotes 
conformity through attempting to shape and educate the "whole person" 
is neither firm  nor fast. Even w ith a re la t iv e ly  mild, nondoctrln- 
naire w ho lls tic  approach (such as tha t used by Alverno College), the 
r isk  of s lipp ing in to  a behavioral emphasis 1s apparent. I f  such an 
in s t i tu t io n  chooses to comprehensively measure student outcomes on 
a four-year scale—an approach that goes well beyond trad it iona l 
course-by-course grading—the tendency w i l l  he to create sp e c if ic  
objectives and behavioral teaching methods that promote very d ire c t ,  
overt, measurable s k i l ls  and competencies. While th is  may be a 
laudable approach fo r certain types o f  In te l le c tu a l and physical 
s k i l ls ,  i t  fa l ls  fa r short o f the l ib e ra l  arts notion of teaching 
"discerning moral judgment" and of imbuing persons with "moral v is io n ."  
Moreover, the tendency to measure behavioral outcomes stands In con­
trad ic tion  to the whole notion of l ib e ra l education as teaching 
" In i t ia t io n  Into a process, a development" (Wegener, 1978, p. 126).
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In sumnary, the normative e th ics , humanities and cognitive-devel­
opmental models o f  moral education do not Include d irec t behavioral 
goals or objectives. Although advocates o f  each recognize the Impor­
tance o f  teaching Improved s k i l l s  in verbal "behavior" (as opposed to 
actual conduct) and also recognize the s ignificance of long-term aims 
(such as empowering Indiv iduals to a ffe c t th e ir  own changes in conduct 
and I1 fe -s ty le )»  they do not a llow spec if ic  learning objectives— 
focused on a lte r ing  Ind iv idual behav1or--as part o f  th e ir  model. The 
proponents of a w ho lls t ic  approach or the values c la r i f ic a t io n  model, 
however* are neither d e f in i t iv e  nor clear on where the line  is drawn 
between a leg it im ate  focus on verbal or long-term behavioral alms and 
spec if ic  behavioral objectives in  the curriculum. The values c l a r i f i ­
cation model is  focused on behavioral change 1n an all-too-1mmediate 
sense, r is k in g  both indoctr ina tion  and in te l le c tu a l shallowness. The 
w ho lls t ic  model's strength 1s also i t s  weakness—in the sense that Its  
comprehensive focus on a l l  aspects o f  human development may be admir­
able at the level o f aims and long-term goals, but dangerous when 
translated Into spec if ic  c u r r ic u la r  objectives (especia lly when 
measured 1n terms o f  behavioral outcomes),
Liberal Education: The Defining C rite r ia
Contemporary Goals Before o u t l in in g  the contemporary goals of 
l ib e ra l education as the primary standard fo r  c r i t iq u in g  models of 
moral education, two additional logical features o f  " l ib e ra l  education'' 
need to be reviewed. These two closely related log ica l features may
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al so help evaluate programs o f  moral education. F irs t ,  l ibe ra l educa­
tion is neither p r im arily  nor d ire c t ly  focused on vocational or social 
ends. As pointed out in chapter 2, moral education in  an undergraduate 
setting must* fo r example, avoid the narrowness o f ethical training 
exclusively fo r good citizenship or the lim ited examination of moral 
issues in selected professions. Second* a program or course focused 
on morality must be f irm ly  connected with l ib e ra l education's in te l­
lectual objectives. This does not exclude a l l  forms of a ffective  
objectives or appHed-learning approaches since " in te l le c tu a l"  is  de­
fined quite broadly to mean giving good reasons, thinking ra tiona lly , 
comprehending specific facts and general pr inc ip les, and exercising 
sound moral judgment. I t  does, however* rule out educational models 
that place a primary or crucial emphasis on a ffec tive  growth, exper­
ien t ia l learning, behavioral change, or therapeutic counseling methods.
Does focusing on "tra in ing  fo r  specific ends or purposes" help 
discriminate between the models7 Potentia lly , yes. Do any o f  these 
specific approaches to college-level moral education actually empha­
size moral tra in ing  toward specific  or narrow goals? In short* the 
answer is  no. Although the normative ethics model has frequently been 
used as part o f the curriculum fo r  professional tra in ing  {"Ethics 1n 
Health and Medicine*" "Business Ethics," and "Morality and Law," for 
example}, neither Its  theoretical foundations nor Its  pedagogical 
methods preclude Its  use as a form o f general education In the liberal 
arts curriculum, H is to r ic a l ly ,  the humanities model has sometimes been 
promoted as a means of teaching responsible c itizenship* but the 
humanities-as-a-means-of-moral-education has ra re ly , i f  ever, had
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c it izensh ip  as an exclusive, or even primary, goal. As often as not, 
studies In the humanities have also been oriented toward the counter­
cu lture  and have encouraged value-laden c r i t ic is m  o f  existing social 
mores and norms. 7 In large port, the process-skill orientation o f a l l  
f iv e  models (1n combination with at leas t the in ten tion  to educate 
the Individual In the broadest sense possible) has helped to ensure 
the avoidance of such narrow and l im ite d  goals as " t ra in ing  good 
c it iz e n s ,"  "developing sensible consumers," and "producing honest 
p o l i t ic ia n s  or ethical doctors." The remaining c r i t i c a l  logical 
feature, a strong in te l le c tu a l o r ie n ta t io n ,  Is so c lose ly  reflected 
in the contemporary major goals o f l ib e ra l  education that there Is 
l i t t l e  need to dwell upon 1t  at th is  p o in t.
The goals of l ib e ra l  education, as outlined a t the conclusion 
o f chapter 2, do provide Important c r i t e r ia .  Clearly a l l  programs 
o f moral education need not d ire c t ly  match, one-for-one, a l l  of the 
major goals. However, the objectives and teaching methods of any 
potential undergraduate program should In d ire c t ly  re la te  to at least 
three or four of these goals; d ire c t ly  implement two or three; and 
not f a l l  into d irec t contradiction w ith  any of the f iv e  major goals. 
These are minimal c r i te r ia  and appropria te ly  so; i t  would be unreal­
i s t i c  to expect any single undergraduate program, d isc ip l in e , or 
course (no matter what I ts  major function) to accomplish a l l  f ive  goals:
7Counterculture Is defined as e ith e r  a sustained cr it ic ism  o f or 
a marked alternative to existing cu ltu re--peop le 's  shared rea lity  as 
expressed In word, image, myth, philosophy, moral s ty le  and education.
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to teach clear and e ffec tive  w r i t in g  and th ink ing ; develop depth in a 
specif ic  f ie ld  o f  knowledge; i n s t i l l  a c r i t i c a l  appreciation o f  how 
we learn and apply knowledge; teach s k i l ls  1n th inking about and under­
standing the moral realm; and develop s e n s it lv f ty  to and tolerance o f 
other cultures and time periods. These f iv e  are pos it ive , primary 
goals o f  the l ib e ra l education curriculum; they are not overarching 
co lleg ia te  aims, nor are they spec if ic  c u rr icu la r  objectives Intended 
fo r  some programs and courses and not fo r  others. These goals occupy 
a central ground between the l i te ra tu re  of aims (reviewed in the 
following section) and the cu rr icu la r  objectives proposed in each o f 
these models. When one asks I f  they are related or connected, we are 
asking i f  the model's objectives are both lo g ic a l ly  and p ra c t ic a l ly  
connected to one or several o f the f ive  goals. Do the models' objec­
t ives , and the teaching strategies that fo l low , help Implement the 
major goals of l ib e ra l education?
Clear Thinking and Writing An educated person must be able to 
th ink and w rite  c le a r ly  and e f fe c t iv e ly ,  One undergraduate model o f 
moral education places unequivocal, c r i t ic a l  emphasis on th is  goal; 
the normative e th ics model h igh ligh ts  the need to teach c lear, con­
cise w rit ing  and thinking s k i l ls .  The recognition and examination of 
concepts, o f prescrip tive  moral statements, and o f  p rinc ip les  and moral 
rules and the development o f  ana ly t ica l and log ica l s k i l l s  are stated 
objectives. Pedagogical practice emphasizes structured discussion and 
frequent w ritten  assignments; and c r i te r ia  fo r  evaluation center upon 
qua lity  o f  argumentation, mastery o f  theory, and a b i l i t y  to accurately
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express ideas and concepts in w r i t in g  and in speaking. The normative 
ethics model d ire c t ly  implements th is  major goal. The humanities 
model 1s neither as emphatic nor as d ire c t,  yet c lear writing and 
th inking are important and obvious elements of th is  approach as well.
In the humanities such objectives as "conserve and cu ltiva te  the 
greatest works o f  humanity" and "foster a c r i t i c a l  s p i r i t 1' draw immed­
ia te  a tten tion  to  clear conrnunication. The required reading o f 
c lassics and guided pondering on seminal concepts and principles helps 
teach c lear th ink ing  and w r it in g .  The development of a c r i t ic a l  
s p i r i t ,  one which does not accept matters a t  face value but rather 
searches fo r depth and symbolic meaning, also builds a student's a b i l ­
i t y  to th ink c le a r ly  and connunicate ideas e f fe c t ive ly .  Students who 
have systematically read* studied* and discussed such works as "Mac­
beth," Notes from the Underground, Native Son* and Animal Farm (to 
draw upon the example presented in  chapter 3) are then called upon to 
w r ite  c r i t i c a l  analyses and in te rp re ta tions . Such students are being 
r igorously  taught how to write and think fo r  themselves; they are being 
presented w ith paradigm cases o f  c lear and ins ig h tfu l thinking and 
w r it in g .  From the simple, fo r th r ig h t  prose o f  Orwell's essays to the 
deep philosophical characterizations of Dostoevski's novels, students 
are ca lled upon to read and c r i t iq u e  d if fe re n t ways of conrnuni eating 
ideas, facts* and values* and to then attempt th e ir  own coherent think­
ing and w r it in g .
The remaining three models o f  moral education are not so closely 
l inked w ith th is  l ib e ra l education goal. In a theoretical sense* at 
leas t, not one o f  these models--who!iStic, cognitive-developmental,
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values c la r i f ic a t io n —works against clear thinking on w rit ing . Vet 
the actual degree o f  emphasis on w rit ing  and comnunleating s k i l ls  f a l l s  
d is t in c t ly  short o f the f i r s t  two models, and the d e fin it ions  of what 
exactly constitutes "c lear thinking" are fa r  more divergent. The cog­
nitive-developmental approach to moral education, by d e f in it io n ,  
stresses in te lle c tu a l growth and movement through progressively more 
complex, more sophisticated stages of thinking. Clear thinking and 
w rit ing  are not, however. Immediate objectives In themselves; rather, 
they are seen as probable results from objectives centered on in d iv id ­
ual development--guided through the stages of growth. In other words, 
the teaching of clear thinking and e ffec tive  w rit ing  is one set o f 
means toward moving students to "contextual re la tiv ism" and "commit­
ment in  re la tiv ism . 11 The wholistlc  approach also stresses the 
student's personal development as paramount; the primary focus l ie s  
away from mastery of methods o f  inquiry or acquis ition of knowledge 
or facts and rests squarely on the who lis tic  growth o f  the Ind iv idual. 
The general objective fo r moral growth, " f a c i l i t y  fo r forming value 
Judgments w ith in  the decision-making process," again, does not d ire c t ly  
stress c lear th inking and w r it ing . (The s ix th  and f in a l outcome, 
"a r t ic u la t in g  and expounding upon one's value judgments a t an advanced 
le ve l,"  is  unrequired and only occasionally selected by humanities 
majors.) Yet, required w rit ing  and c r i t ic a l  thinking are perceived as 
means fo r  human growth and are frequently used In practice. Advocates 
o f  the values c la r i f ic a t io n  model have not proposed c lear thinking and 
w r it ing  as d ire c t objectives, despite th is  model's stress on "valuing" 
as a th ink ing s k i l l .  The d irec t,  e x p l ic i t  objectives stress "choosing,"
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"p r iz in g ,"  and "acting upon values"; the one specif ic  ob jective , 
"public a ff irm ation  o f  values , 11 which one might consider pertinent, 
is not a t a l l  c lear fn i t s e l f .  "Public a ff irm a tion " may mean a spoken 
announcement regarding one's be lie fs  about t ru th - te l  l in g ,  or taking 
specific  actions in  accordance w ith stated be lie fs .  Although there 
is nothing that a c tu a lly  m itigates against th is  important l ib e ra l 
education goal, i t  plays a less prominent ro le In the values c l a r i f i ­
cation approach. To a s ig n i f ic a n t ly  la rger degree, the teaching o f 
clear w r it ing  and th ink ing  Is , a t leas t, viewed as an e f fe c t ive  peda­
gogical method by the proponents o f  the w ho lis t ic  and cognitive- 
developmental models; and, as noted, the humanities model and most 
ce rta in ly  the normative ethics model o f  moral education d ire c t ly  em­
phasize c lear and e f fe c t ive  th ink ing  and communication as important 
educational objectives in  themselves.
Depth in a F ie ld  o f  Knowledge "An educated person should have 
achieved depth in some f ie ld  of knowledge." Of a l l  the l ib e ra l educa­
t ion  goals, th is  might be considered one o f  the least helpful fo r  d is ­
tinguishing between models o f  moral education, since I t  p r im arily  
refers to the role o f  the major or concentration. No contemporary 
American college or un ive rs ity  has chosen to o f fe r  an undergraduate 
academic major in  "m ora lity "  or "moral d is c ip l in e ,"  In only one o f 
the f ive  models can one discover a proposal fo r  e ith e r  a d is c ip l in a ry ,
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m u lt i-d is c ip l in a ry ,  or non-disc 1 pi inary major. Indeed, questions In ­
volving length and depth of study are largely  ignored. The emphasis 
has been a minimal one—on Introducing o r in teg ra ting  notions o f  moral 
reasoning and development within the curriculum, ra th e r  than expanding 
such Ideas Into a complete major or d is c ip l in e .  Nevertheless, because 
th is  goal encompasses the power o f cumulative focused learning as a 
means o f developing students' a b i l i t i e s  In reasoning and analysis* i t  
is  not Irre le va n t.  Is morality a f ie ld  o f knowledge o r a d isc ip line?
Or, even more bas ica lly , Is there such a thing as moral knowledge?
Can (or should) one specialize 1n "moral reasoning" as one unique 
In te l le c tu a l s k i l l?  These obviously are d i f f i c u l t  epfstemological 
quest Ions—wel 1 beyond the purview o f th is  thesis. Vet, a t  least in ­
d ire c t ly ,  each model does assume basic parameters* some Im p l ic i t  
answers to these questions (as is the case 1n th is  d is s e r ta t io n ) .  For 
example* i t  might make sense to achieve "depth" in m o ra l i ty  as a f ie ld  
of knowledge in ore model (for example, normative e th ic s )—but not 
w ith in  another ( fo r  example, values c la r i f ic a t io n ) .
The humanities model typ ica lly  does not emphasize e ither depth 
or cumulative knowledge in morality; in  th is  approach—whether the 
focus 1s on moral reasoning as a s k i l l  or on moral knowledge as a 
content area—moral education 1s subsumed under those t ra d it io n a l 
d isc ip lines and great works constitu ting  the arts and humanities.
From th is  perspective many lessons can be drawn from a systematic
Q
Although the p o s s ib i l i ty  of an independent, student-created major 
Is p a r t ic u la r ly  evident in the normative ethics or w h o l is t lc  models, i t  
1s only w ith in  the Humanities that one can Iden tify  an In te rd is c ip l in a ry  
major focused on moral judqment. See Mortimer Ad le r 's  Pa1de1a Proposal 
(1982).
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exposure to the c lassics, among them lessons In m orality  and moral 
decision-making; yet the notion o f  sustained, 1n-depth learning in 
m ora lity  I t s e l f  is  largely disregarded i f  not ac t ive ly  rejected. In 
a sense the typ ica l humanities' response to a continuing "narrow" 
examination o f moral ways-of-knowing or reasoning 1s to accuse such 
programs o f sanitized ra t io n a l i t y  and h is to r ic a l vacuity. In other 
words, i t  is  the ideas and methods inherent 1n re l ig io n ,  h is to ry , a r t  
and l i te ra tu re  which give shape and meaning to moral experience and 
moral knowing. One "concentrates" on a r t  or l i te ra tu re ,  or re l ig io n , 
while moral ways-of-knowing, judgment, and v is ion  are presumed, 
natural consequences of such sustained exposure.
Advocates o f  the w ho lis t lc  model o f  moral education are vague 
about m orality  as a potential dep th-f ie ld  o f  study. Although a l l  
students are ca lled upon to develop Incremental s k i l ls  in  "forming 
value judgments w ith in  the decision-making process," te l l in g ly ,  i t  Is 
only humanities majors who (sometimes) proceed to the three more ad­
vanced levels of "value decisIon-making." Once again, the notion of 
rea l,  cumulative knowledge In m ora lity  is la rge ly  neglected 1n the 
attempt to develop many d i f fe re n t  aspects o f  the Individual and to 
introduce the student to many varied areas o f  knowledge and personal 
development, The student who has been exposed to cu ltu ra l anthro­
pology seminars focused on societa l values and practices in  tru th -  
t e l l i n g  and deception; to student personnel workshops on the college's 
honor code p r inc ip les ; and to  an externship experience In an urban 
ghetto sponsored by the Religion Department, may not have in te l le c t ­
u a l ly  concentrated on an aspect o f  moral reasoning and knowledge so
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much as engaged In an ec lectic , trans-dlscipl Inary set o f learning 
experiences. I f  w ho lis tlc  learning can be regarded as m ulti-  or 
t ra n s -d isd p l inary learning, the values c la r i f ic a t io n  model o f  moral 
education 1s essentia lly non-d1sdplInary. I t  has l i t t l e  or no basis 
In the historically-developed disciplines o f  knowledge, and even Its 
most devout proponents do not claim Us status as an area of knowledge. 
Although the wide varie ty o f  c la r if ica tion  s k i l ls  and techniques may 
lead to a form o f interpersonal knowledge in  the sense that an Indiv­
idual may become more aware of his/her existing values, In general, 
however, th is  model fa i ls  to provide either the theoretical basis or 
conceptual depth necessary for sustained, in te llec tua l inquiry.
The normative-ethics model, on the other hand, is rooted In
ethics as a long-standing d isc ip line of philosophy. Earlier In this
thesis Paul Taylor was quoted, claiming that "moral growth occurs . * .
as the individual develops his capacity to reason about his moral be­
l i e f s . "  This applied philosophical approach to moral education defin­
i t i v e ly  emphasizes in-depth intellectual s k i l ls  focused on the moral 
dimension to l i f e .  In te llectual coherence and consistency, j u s t i f i ­
cation o f  moral rules and principles, development of a working vocabu­
la ry  1n moral reasoning, stimulation of the moral imagination are 
basic progranmatic objectives. Although, as with a ll these models, 
there seem to be no actual undergraduate concentrations or majors in 
normative ethics, the f lourishing of academic journals and centers fo r 
study centered on ethical issues and applied ethical reasoning are, 
in themselves, Indications of the poss ib il it ies  for sustained, 
c r i t ic a l  Inquiry, fo r an 1n-depth understanding in this area o f
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knowing. Moreover, the model In t r in s ic a l ly  encourages 1n-depth moral 
reasoning and a developed a b i l i t y  at moral judgment whether or not i t  
Is relegated to single course status, expanded to a more prolonged 
series of courses, or developed into an en tire  program. The cognitive- 
developmental approach,on the other hand, is  more ambiguous 1n th is  
regard. Although Increasing the "cognitive" complexity and soph is t i­
cation of the individual Is one of the key goals* in-depth learning 
in a single area of knowledge is  not a d ire c t  component o f  th is  model. 
With Its roots Implanted in a psychological understanding o f  human 
in te llec tua l growth* the cognitlve-developmentalists emphasize teach­
ing and learning methods which w i l l  move students away from "dualism" 
and toward "re la t iv ism ” and, eventually, "conr iitm ent- in -re la tiv ism ." 
Yet, there is nothing that precludes 1n-depth d isc ip l in a ry  (or in te r -  
disci pi inary) learning as one means of a tta in in g  those goals. Indeed* 
the actual models developed by Lee Knekelkamp et<al_. u t i l i z e  w e ll-  
known l i te ra ry  works (some classical works) and demand much verbal and 
written analysis from the students. Although content knowledge and 
in-depth s k i l ls  1n c r i t ic a l  reasoning may be o f  secondary importance 
in this overa ll scheme of Individual development, they are by no means 
irre levant. Instead, the ro le of 1n-depth knowledge and reasoning 
s k i l ls  are recast, placed in  the context o f  teaching toward the in ­
te llec tua l and ethical maturity o f the ind iv idua l student. In summa­
t ion , the values c la r i f ic a t io n  and w ho lis t lc  models provide neg lig ib le  
emphasis on In te llectual depth, on sustained c r i t i c a l  reasoning In one 
f ie ld  of knowledge. The cognitive-developmental and humanities 
approaches occupy a central ground, neither excluding such a form of
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moral learning nor d i r e c t ly  a ff irm ing i t .  The one contemporary model 
which very c le a r ly  provides a possible structure  fo r  in te l le c tu a l con­
centration is ,  then, the normative ethics approach.
C r i t ic a l  Appreciation of . . .  Knowledge and Understanding "An 
educated person should have a c r i t i c a l  appreciation o f the ways in 
which we gain and apply knowledge and understanding o f  the universe, 
o f  society, and o f  ourselves." Essentia lly , th is  educational goal 
emphasizes the need fo r ,  a t  the very leas t,  an "informed acquaintance" 
w ith each of the major ways-of-knowing. This is no detailed commit­
ment to a spec if ic  set o f  d isc ip lines  or to a spec if ic  way o f  s tru c tu r­
ing and organizing knowledge. Instead, the focus is ,  in a very general 
sense, on becoming aware o f  and having some experience in a wide 
va r ie ty  o f  ways-of-knowing and, ju s t  as important, on developing a 
c r i t i c a l  appreciation o f  those ways. In other words, fo r the l ib e ra l ly  
educated person the categories of knowledqe themselves, the ways that 
we humans "know" things are not fixed, immutable categories; they, 
too, are subject to analysis and rev is ion . Im p l ic i t  in  th is  goal, 
then, is the philosophical b e l ie f  that c r i t i c a l l y  understanding the 
methods and structures through which we analyze and understand our­
selves and the universe Is o f  fundamental importance.
In terms o f  Introducing students to many d if fe re n t  ways o f  know­
ing, one commonly thinks o f  the en tire  curriculum, not a s ingle course 
or one course o f  study, as the means to achieve d isc ip l in a ry  breadth 
o f  knowledge. Only with the humanities and w ho lls t ic  models is there 
any sustained e f fo r t  to provide exposure to a varie ty  o f  d isc ip lines
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—a l l  in  the attempt to morally educate. The various levels o f  "value 
decision making" in  the w h o lis t lc  approach require experience and 
s k i l ls  in interpersonal knowing (what Phil Tip Phenix re ferred to as 
"synnoetlcs," 1964); in psychology and sociology; in  the natural 
sciences and technology; and in c ross-cu ltu ra l and a r t i s t i c  forms o f 
understanding. Using th is  goal, however, i t  1s more useful to inquire 
i f  any o f  the models u t te r ly  fa l ls  to contr ibu te  to a c r i t i c a l  appreci­
ation o f the ways we gain and apply knowledge and understanding. Such 
a charge is very d i f f i c u l t ,  indeed, to  level a t e ith e r  the humanities 
or normative ethics models. Each model has in te l le c tu a l understanding 
as an important ob jec tive . The normative ethics model centers on the 
teaching o f c r i t i c a l  re f le c t iv e  m ora lity  and emphasizes ana ly t ic  
s k i l ls  and a metaethical understanding o f the moral dimension and 
moral language. The humanities model draws upon the d isc ip lines  o f 
h is to ry , re l ig io n ,  philosophy, l i t e r a tu r e ,  and the a rts  (and occasion­
a l ly ,  the social sciences) to teach s k i l l s  in moral judgment and to 
develop moral v is ion  and imagination. Knowledge o f and respect fo r  
the many, varied ways that human beings come to understand the world, 
themselves, and human experience is  an Important aspect o f th is  t r a ­
d it io n a l approach.
As already noted, the w ho lis t lc  model does expose a student to a 
wide va r ie ty  o f d is c ip l in e s , but i t  also introduces students to many 
other ways o f growing and developing th a t  are not exclusive ly focused 
on In te l le c t  and reason. In a p o s it ive  sense, th is  approach has help­
ed to s tre tch our notion o f human reason and to become fa r  more c r i t ­
ical o f a "purely" in te l le c tu a l ,  ra t iona lized  form o f  education; and.
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perhaps, 1t  has also helped teachers and students to become more aware 
o f  and sensitive to  the emotional and psychological basis o f  learning. 
The w ho lis t lc  approach to education is not, however, as d i re c t ly  and 
fo r th r ig h t ly  comnitted to a c r i t ic a l  appreciation o f  the ways we gain 
and apply knowledge as e ither the normative ethics o r  humanities 
models. In practice , one Is l e f t  with the impression that the 
w h o lis t lc  curriculum is designed so very broadly, with the Indiv idual 
student's growth and needs as the primary goal, tha t there 1s compara­
t iv e ly  less time and e f fo r t  fo r c r i t i c a l l y  examining the methods o f 
in te l le c tu a l understanding and the structures o f  knowledge. The same 
r is k  is apparent w ith the cognitive-developmental model* in  which the 
moral education o f  the individual is ,  f i r s t  and foremost, defined In 
the developmental terms of human needs and ind iv idua l growth patterns. 
Although a c r i t i c a l  fa m i l ia r i t y  with the t ra d it io n a l categories and 
d isc ip l in e s  o f  knowledge 1s only of secondary importance, th is  model, 
nevertheless, does emphasize cognitive patterns o f  growth and uses 
forms of c r i t i c a l  inqu iry  to move the student from simpler ways o f 
knowing and understanding to more complex patterns. Neither o f  these 
la t te r  two models, then. In any sense "u t te r ly  f a i l s "  to emphasize a 
c r i t i c a l  appreciation o f the ways we gain and apply knowledge.
The values c la r i f ic a t io n  model, however, f a l l s  fa r  short o f the 
other four models. With I ts  heavy reliance on such pedagogical tech­
niques as simulation games, ro le playing, and group sharing, l i t t l e  
emphasis is given to  serious in te l le c tu a l debate or to questioning o f 
substantive value positions or to the process o f  reasoning I t s e l f .
The focus on values as "the broad realm of human preference" seems to
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leave l i t t l e  time for the extended analysis o f moral values as d is t in c t  
and crucial to the human s itu a t io n . Moreover, this model*s ob jectives, 
centering as they do on "awareness," "sharing," ' 'c la r i f ic a t io n , "  and 
"Implementation," depart widely from the primary libera l education goal 
of c r i t ic a l  examination o f knowledge. Indeed, the model's proponents 
scrupulously avoid mention o f a d isc ip l in e d , structured approach to 
moral knowledge; rather, i t  would seem, values are "pre-ex is tent" and 
the only ro le o f  the "values educator" is  to prod each student into an 
awareness and c la r i f ic a t io n  o f h is /her ex is t ing  value system. I f  
c r i t i c a l ly  understanding the methods and structures with which we 
analyze and understand ourselves and the universe 1s also o f funda­
mental Importance, then the values c la r i f ic a t io n  approach to moral 
"awareness" and development is ,  again, c le a r ly  inadequate. This 
model's proponents show markedly l i t t l e  sense of the metaphysical 
and ethical assumptions o f th e ir  own educational methods as well as 
those o f academic d isc ip lines and other educational structures.
Cannot be Provincial "A crucia l difference between the edu­
cated and the uneducated is  the extent to which one's l i f e  experience 
Is viewed 1n wider contexts," This combination o f In te llec tua l matur­
i ty  and ethical Insight resu lt ing  1n an a tt i tu d e  of open-mindedness 
and tolerance is  another Important, intended outcome o f a l ib e ra l  
education. Courses, programs, and educational practices which help 
Implement th is  goal are contributing to the l ibe ra l arts en terprise. 
"Viewing l i f e  in  a wider context" and being fu l ly  aware o f "other 
cultures and other times" requires factual knowledge and an h is to r ica l
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and cu ltu ra l understanding o f  peoples and times d i f fe re n t  from one's 
own* but 1t  also ca lls  upon the a b i l i t y  (and w ill ingness) to step ou t­
side of one's s e l f ,  one's personal circumstances* to exercise imagina­
tion  and an extended sense o f  sympathy. Again, do these contemporary 
approaches to moral education contribu te  to th is  l ib e ra l  goal? Or*
In a negative sense, do any completely f a l l  to do so? In both the 
humanities and w ho lis t lc  models a d ire c t emphasis Is placed upon other 
cultures and other peoples, A c r i t i c a l  ob jective o f  the humanities 
model Is lhto teach v is io n ,"  and v is ion  1s defined as "seeing a lte rn a ­
tives, gaining perspective by obtaining standards o f  comparison from 
. . . past and present." Students read c lass ic  works and experience 
great a r t  from many d i f fe re n t  cu ltu res--a ll 1n the attempt to create 
more humane, more c iv i l iz e d  people. In the w ho lis t lc  model, two 
objectives subsumed under the general goal o f " a b i l i t y  to form value 
judgments in  the decision-making process" are: "understanding the
impact o f  indiv idual and group value choices upon the human conmunity" 
and "recognizing and empathizing w ith the values o f  d i f fe re n t  and 
diverse human groups." In the example developed in  chapter 3, 
students are exposed to an anthropological study of d i f fe re n t  c u l tu r ­
al a tt itudes and practices on various forms o f  deception and are also 
asked to survey a varie ty  o f  e thn ic , urban groups, suburbanites, and 
rural populations in  order to  develop a sense of divergent be lie fs  
and attitudes about ly in g . Through d i re c t ly  examining the values, 
cu ltu re , and h is to ry  of other peoples, both the w h o lis t lc  and the 
humanities models contribute to the development o f  a broader context 
fo r knowing and understanding ourselves, others* and the w orld -a t- la rge .
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The normative ethics and cognitive-developmental approaches to 
moral education are not as d ire c t ly  focued on the study of other cu l­
tures and times, yet In a d i f fe re n t sense both do contribute to the 
educational struggle against provincialism. Advocates o f  the norma­
t iv e  ethics model propose two cu rr icu la r  objectives which are very 
c le a r ly  connected: "s tim ula ting the moral imagination: and "tolera-
tion--find reduction--o f both ambiguity and disagreement 1n the moral 
realm," With i t s  focus on rules and c r i t i c a l  reasoning, this approach 
is  more "process-oriented" than e ither the humanities or wholistlc 
models, and i t  does not, in i t s e l f ,  dwell upon the h istorica l facts 
and cu ltu ra l a r t i fa c ts  o f  other countries or peoples. Nevertheless,
1n the attempt to  prod the moral imagination, to enable students to 
see tha t there is a moral point o f  view, and with the e f fo r t  to in ­
s t i l l  a sense o f  to le ra t io n  that must fo l low  from unanswered questions 
and inev itab ly  c o n f l ic t in g  values, the practit ioners of this model 
are Indeed contributing to the overall goals of l ibe ra l education.
In the same manner, the cognitive-developmental approach does not 
d i re c t ly  teach about the cu ltu re  and values of peoples and times other 
than our own, ye t i t  does emphasize c u rr ic u la r  objectives which bring 
about awareness and to le ra t io n  o f  d i f fe re n t  peoples and ways of l i f e .  
For example, the student operating with a d ua lis t ic  Inte llectual and 
eth ica l o r ien ta tion  1s - - in  a very planned sense—exposed to a d ivers ity  
o f  opinions and values, challenged to assume more responsib ility fo r 
h is /her learning, and supported by a c lea r ,  straightforward learning 
structu re . The inmediate objective 1s to guide the student on into 
the stages of m u l t ip l ic i t y  and re la tiv ism . Increased cognitive com-
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p le x ity ,  Improved a b i l i t y  to think abstractly* an increased degree of 
internally-guided behavior, and a much greater sense of context and 
interdependency 1n human relationships are among the characteris tics 
embodied in  th is continuing educational challenge to eventually move 
the student to the advanced stages of "re la tiv ism " and on to "comnit- 
ment in re la t iv ism ."  As these higher stages, or objectives, are de­
scribed by Perry, and others who have applied his theory, i t  is  clear 
that such an Individual could not, would not, be provincial or 
narrow in e ither his/her In te llectual or ethical decision-making.
This, again, leaves fo r f ina l consideration the values c la r i f ic a ­
tion model. Does th is  approach to moral education encourage students 
to view th e ir  l i f e ' s  experiences in  a wider context, to combat narrow­
minded provincial attitudes? This model's proponents wish to develop 
people who choose th e ir  values free ly  from among seriously considered 
a lte rnatives* who cherish and public ly a ff irm  th e ir  chosen values, and 
who consistently act upon the ir  choices. There is nothing tha t ex­
cludes the introduction o f  other cu ltures ' values and a tt itudes into 
the pool fo r  Mfree se lection ." Indeed, a t an elementary-level several 
values c la r i f ic a t io n  educators have developed h is to r ica l and social
s c ie n t i f ic  cu rr icu la r  materials which teach children about other re-
q
glons of the world in a bias-free manner. The major potential draw­
backs with th is  model l i e  in i ts  almost exclusive focus on the ind iv-
o
See Kirschenbaum's Advanced Values C la r i f ic a t io n  (1977) fo r 
examples.
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idual and 1n Its  unwillingness to accept or teach moral Judgment. In 
the example presented in the th ird  chapter the instructor and the 
students re fra in  from passing moral judgment on the expressed values 
of the class partic ipants. Values are freely chosen feelings that are 
ind iv idua lly  held* subjective* and not to be subjected to external or 
peer testing or evaluation. I f  a student has fre e ly  chosen deception 
and lying as continuing* viable values for her/himself, then (so long 
as those values are free ly  and thoughtfully chosen and cherished and 
publicly acted upon) others must openly accept th is .  Taken to I ts  
logical extreme, th is  approach to moral education may create "values 
solipsism," Individuals who remain provincial because they are asked 
only to choose and c la r i f y  th e ir  own values. Although there may be 
room in th is  model fo r free selection of values from many d if fe re n t 
cultura l and h is to rica l trad it ions , there does not seem to be a place 
for any sustained dialogue and debate. This serious question, there­
fore, can be posed: Without engaging in any serious In te llec tua l and 
ethical debate between various competing points o f view, can an In­
dividual evolve or grow Into a wider, more mature, and less provincial 
context fo r  moral knowing and understanding? And, 1s an individual 
authentically to lerant and open-minded 1f  he/she w i l l in g ly  accepts 
any form o f values in an in te llec tua l (and e th ica l)  nondiscrimlnatory 
manner? At the very least, these are reservations, pointing to funda­
mental weaknesses in th is  model's contribution 1n combating provincial 
thinking and values.
-164-
Understanding of Moral and Ethical Problems The contemporary 
goal, "An educated person 1s expected to have some understanding o f, 
and experience in  thinking about, moral and ethical problems," dwells 
upon the cognitive elements o f  moral education, on "Informed judgment," 
and on the a b i l i t y  to make "discriminating moral choices." Again, the 
normative ethics and the cognitive developmental models appear to be 
the most c learly  and straightforwardly committed to the ro le o f  
analytic and synthetic reason in moral education and to the general 
ro le of reason in  moral decision-making, Obviously, however, in a 
broad sense a l l  f ive  models propose to teach a deeper understanding 
o f moral problems and Improved a b i l i t ie s  1n moral decision making.
The very point o f  this thesis Is to distinguish between these models 
—beyond the sweeping and amorphous statements of alms. This f in a l 
goal, then, is ,  in this instance, an unhelpful c r i te r io n ;  unhelpful 
because i t  deals so very d ire c t ly  with moral education I t s e l f  and does 
not o ffer any detailed breakdown of objectives. This chapter now con­
cludes with a review of the l ib e ra l education trad it ion  as one fina l 
means fo r helping select an e ffective  and eth ica l model o f college- 
level moral education. This c r i te r io n  draws upon the general, h is to r­
ical analysis o f  the overarching aims and purposes of l ibe ra l educa­
t io n —as developed In chapter 2 .
Liberal Education: The Defining Tradition
Running through the entire  liberal arts trad it ion  has been a con­
cern for in te llectua l and eth ica l vision; a re jection o f a narrow, 
specialized or technical education; and a f irm  belie f In the need to
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develop the a b i l i t y  to understand d e ta i ls  and facts in  l ig h t  o f  p r in c i ­
ples and theories. In an ideal sense* the l ib e ra l  studies educator 
introduces the student to the ongoing concerns o f human culture and 
c iv i l iz a t io n *  engages the student in  the in te l le c tu a l examination o f 
our common heritage, and frees him/her from the fe t te rs  of Ignorance, 
prejudice, and societal conformity. Moreover, the search fo r t ru th  
and the creation of an e th ica l Ind iv idual have served as ultimate alms 
fo r l ib e ra l education 1n a manner un like  tha t embraced by the large 
modern un ive rs ity  (which has tended to emphasize the advancement o f 
knowledge, professionalism, and service to society) or the conrujnfty 
college (which has tended to emphasize social egalitarian ism , voca- 
tionalism, and d ire c t service to the community).
Besides th is  continuing concern fo r  the in teg ra tion  o f in te l le c t  
and e th ica l vision* there has been a strong focus on educating the 
whole person--as a person--and not so le ly  1n one, or more, o f  our many 
assumed or imposed ro les . These two alms o f  l ib e ra l  education, es­
pec ia lly , work together to give th is  form o f higher education a d is ­
t in c t ly  e th ica l context. The "fam ily  resemblance" o f  l ibe ra l educa­
t ion , in large part, l ie s  in th is  push to have ind iv idua ls  grapple with 
the eth ica l problems and meaning(s) o f  human existence. The l ib e ra l  
educator believes tha t u lt im a te ly  th is  is a personal, in d iv id u a l is t ic  
task and tha t i t  Is, in i t s e l f ,  a moral endeavor which helps create 
and nurture autonomous, fre e - th ink ing  Ind iv idua ls , To re -c ite  Murch- 
l a n d :
H is to r ic a l ly ,  l ib e ra l  education has addressed i t s e l f
to the task o f  determining and c la r i fy in g  human needs
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and values. I t  was from the beginning a per­
fec t ive  process, a shaping o f  human s e n s ib i l i ty  
toward desirable and ra t io n a l ly  ju s t i f ie d  patterns 
o f  action. I t  was quite f ra n k ly  an ethical enter­
prise. (1976, p. 22)
In the contemporary overview o f l ib e ra l  education, reference was 
made to the writ ings o f Paul Hirst and Charles Wegener; each o f  them 
describes l ib e ra l  education as an in i t ia t io n  into the process o f  
in te l le c tu a l  a c t iv i t y .  Essentially they both contend that l ib e ra l  
education must be concerned with the comprehensive development o f  the 
mind. This emphasis moves well beyond the acqu is it ion  o f factual 
knowledge to an understanding of experience from many perspectives, 
the a b i l i t y  to understand complex conceptual schemes, and a fa m i l ia r ­
i t y  w ith  the "arts and techniques o f d i f fe re n t  types o f reasoning and 
Judgment" (H irs t ,  1974, p. 47] —including moral reasoning. How, then, 
does each contemporary model of moral education f i t  in to  th is ,  the 
t ra d i t io n  o f Cardinal Newman and "The Yale Report," o f  A lfred North 
Whitehead, and of contemporary libe ra l studies educators and ph iloso­
phers?
The techniques and goals of the values c la r i f ic a t io n  model as well 
as those o f  the w ho lis t lc  model do po in t to certa in aspects o f human 
m ora lity  which, undoubtedly, are s ig n i f ic a n t .  However, th e ir  ro le  In 
the formal undergraduate curriculum should be neg lig ib le  when one con­
siders the h is to r ica l focus and mission o f  l ibera l education as b r ie f ly  
outlined above. This level and type o f  education is  grounded in  a 
view o f  the older student as autonomous and ra tiona l.  Actual moral
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behavior Is not taught in  such a se tting ; ra ther, a capacity fo r 
principled th inking and c r i t ic a l  moral analysis 1s developed as free 
as possible from the Influences of unacknowledged or dogmatic moral 
Instruction, Each Individual must be free to  question and choose his 
own substantive goals and values. A model fo r  moral education 1n the 
libe ra l arts curriculum should provide the indiv idual w ith the ra tion ­
a l ly  developed c r i te r ia  and in te l le c tu a l heritage necessary to under­
stand and analyze eth ica l action and p rinc ip les , to systematize and 
examine his own selected moral values, and to understand, and to some 
degree to le ra te , the ambiguity and differences that Inevitab ly arise 
w ithin his own schema as well as o thers '.
Neither the w ho lis t lc  nor the values c la r i f ic a t io n  approaches as 
models o f  college-level moral education accomplish th is .  There are 
very clear dangers of Indoctrination with values c la r i f ic a t io n  and 
fa r too much emphasis on behavioral change in  both models. U t i l iz in g  
the contemporary goals of l ib e ra l education as c r i t e r ia ,  the values 
c la r i f ic a t io n  model f a l l s  fa r short o f any acceptable standard. The 
wholistlc model is more ambiguous. Although the struggle against 
provincialism is an important ob jective and although the aim of the 
entire  model 1s, a f te r  a l l ,  education of the whole person, there 1s 
l i t t l e  d irec t emphasis on clear th ink ing and w r it in g  in moral decision­
making, on in-depth learning 1n morality as a legitim ate f ie ld  of 
study, or on a more c r i t i c a l ,  ana ly tic  appreciation of knowledge.
At f i r s t  glance, 1t may seem tha t the humanities model of moral 
education should f i t  quite well in to  the l ib e ra l education t ra d it io n ,  
and, indeed i t  is a fa r  more acceptable a lte rna tive  than e ith e r  o f the
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two aforementioned models. The humanities model so r ic h ly  draws 
upon the humanistic c lassics o f  (a t  least) Western c iv i l iz a t io n ,  and 
1t  does claim "the teaching o f  e th ica l v is ion" as one Important objec­
t ive ,  However* although th is  model does not dwell upon behavioral 
objectives or techniques, i t  does, oddly enough, r is k  indoctrination 
(a t least to a small degree). As indicated e a r l ie r ,  i f  the humanities 
or "human" were defined narrowly (perhaps so le ly  in  terms o f  white 
male, upper class, Judeo-Christian t ra d it io n )  then this may lead to 
a narrow, b lind form of incu lca tion . An un like ly  occurrence in 
practice perhaps* yet th is  essen tia lly  is one o f  the major 20th cen­
tury c r i t ic ism s  leveled a t  the e n t ire  l ib e ra l a r ts  tra d it io n .  In 
short, to the extent tha t l ib e ra l education (and especia lly  the human­
i t ie s )  has embraced "idealism" as I ts  philosophy, Western classics as 
I ts  primary learning resources, and the d idactic  lecture as i ts  peda­
gogical method, i t  has become In te l le c tu a l ly  and soc ia lly  e l i t i s t ,  
closed to innovation, and narrowly doctrinnaire. As pointed out 1n 
chapter 2 , the l ib e ra l  education philosophy has moved well beyond these 
c r i t ic is m s , ye t the humanlties-as-a-model-for moral education remains 
suspect on th is  account, Ati equally serious concern l ie s  with th is  
model's lack of focus on moral reasoning. In using the l ibe ra l edu­
cation ob jective  of "depth in a f ie ld  of knowledge," i t  became clear 
that the humanities form of moral education ty p ic a l ly  does not empha­
size depth or cumulative knowledge in m orality. Instead, moral educa­
t ion  is subsumed under the t ra d it io n a l d ls c ip l in e s , to p ic a l ly  oriented 
in te rd is c ip l in a ry  programs, or the classics o f  Western cu ltu re ; 
students are expected to become aware of the moral dimension and
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Implications ra ther than concentration on ethics i t s e l f  as a f i e ld  of 
knowledge and on m ora lity  as a framework fo r decision-making.
This leaves both the normative e th ics and cogn it ive  developmental 
models fo r  more extensive consideration. With th e i r  focus on U nk ing 
in te l le c tu a l and eth ica l growth, developing s k i l l s  In moral reasoning, 
and encouraging the making o f value commitments and decisions* these 
two models c lose ly  connect with the contemporary goals and the h is to r ­
ical t ra d i t io n  o f l ib e ra l  education, This does not exclude considera­
tion of a l l  aspects o f other models o f moral education. The humanities 
are "turned down" not in  themselves but rather as a spec if ic , con­
certed means o f  re -estab lish ing  the undergraduate cu rr icu la r  focus on 
moral development and reasoning. The values c la r i f ic a t io n  approach 
is soundly re jected as a comprehensive model; ye t in another con tex t— 
with a strong* eth ica l underpinning—some values c la r i f ic a t io n  tech­
niques may be e ffe c t ive  and worthwhile. In th is  sense, then, an In te ­
grated model may draw upon many d i f fe re n t  aspects o f  several e x is t in g  
modelS,
The f i f t h ,  f in a l chapter 1s p r im a r i ly  focused on the normative 
ethics and cognitive-developmental models o f moral education in  a 
libe ra l studies se tt ing . These two approaches are described In g rea t­
er d e ta i l ,  reasons fo r th e i r  in teg ra tion  are developed, pedagogical 
methods and resources which emerge from the synthesis are o u t l in e d , 
and a sumnary o f  th is  approach to se lecting  and developing an accept­
able co llege-leve l model o f moral education 1s o ffe red in the con­
clusion.
Chapter 5: An In tegra ted  Model o f Moral Education
Normative Ethics and Cognitive-Developmental
These two models have best met the minimal c r i te r ia  fo r  Inclusion 
as components o f a l ibe ra l education. Each has already been described 
and evaluated; th is  chapter, then* begihs with a more detailed over­
view o f each model's underlying theoretical base and re-expl1cat1on of 
the major objectives. The connection with the goals and Ideals of 
libe ra l education are Identif ied and analyzed and from th is  analysis 
the p o s s ib i l i ty  of integrating these two approaches to moral education 
emerges. I t  1s argued that the cognitive-developmental and normative 
ethics models are complementary; that, 1n combination, these two 
approaches most e ffec tive ly  contribute to the broader alms and goals 
of contemporary liberal education.
Again, in order to avoid a sense of absolute exc lus iv ity , i t  1s 
important to explain the context 1n which the humanities* wholistlc* 
and values c la r i f ic a t io n  approaches to moral education have been ex­
cluded from further consideration. Each o f these three has some 
d is t in c t iv e  weaknesses or shortcomings as models that provide connec­
tions with l ibe ra l education aims and purposes, supplement the curricu­
la r  goals o f libera l studies, and, in general, abide by the bask 
logical c r i te r ia  for l ibe ra l education. There may be aspects or 
components o f each approach to college-level moral education that are 
he lp fu l, pedagogically e ffec tive , and e th ic a l ly  appropriate within 
the framework o f an Integrated model o f moral education. For example,
-170-
— 171—
the focus on teaching moral v is ion and stimulating the moral imagina­
tion are important and worthwhile goals o f the humanities model; more­
over, the Immense wealth o f  l i te ra ry ,a n d  a r t is t ic  works could serve 
as powerful resources fo r  Ins truc tion  in morality.
The cognitive-developmental model, as has already been described, 
consists o f numerous positions or h ierarchical stages o f growth. The 
part icu la r scheme o f W illiam Perry has been selected since, unlike 
other developmental schemes, I t  is  focused on college education as 
the context fo r  understanding and encouraging Individual growth and 
change. There are, of course, other developmental theories which do 
parallel Perry's stage designations. Both Lawrence Kohl berg (1975, 
1981) and Jane Loevinger (1976) have created theories and concepts 
which come close to matching Perry's stages of "dualism," "m u lt i­
p l i c i t y , "  " re la t iv ism ,"  and "commitment In re la tiv ism ." Dualism 
serves as a description fo r  students who experience and understand 
the world 1n polar terms o f  "us and them," "r iq h t and wrong, 1 "good 
and bad." D ive rs ity  o f knowledge and values Is barely perceived, but 
i f  I t  is  experienced, such students a t t r ib u te  the d iv e rs ity  to con­
fusion or some a r t i f i c i a l  " te s t"  established by an au thority  f igure* 
This beginning stage fo r  many college freshmen is para lle led by 
Kohlberg's "punishment-obedience" and “ ins trum en ta l-re la t iv is t"  
orientations and by Loevlnger's "impulsive" and ’ se lf-p ro tec t ive "  
stages o f  ego development. Both " m u l t ip l ic i t y 1 and "re la t iv ism " have 
closely connected concepts as w e ll.  At the stage o f m u l t ip l ic i t y  a 
student begins to accept some d ive rs ity  and uncertainty as leg it im ate  
and may even decide tha t "anyone has a r ig h t  to his own opinion" and
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set th is  a tt itude over and against a perceived authority d ic ta ting  
" r ig h t and wrong" or "good and bad." Loevinger's "self-aware" and 
"conscientious" stages and Kohlberg's conventional levels of " in te r ­
personal concordance" and "law and order" at least p a r t ia l ly  match 
Perry's m u lt ip l ic i ty  stage. At the level of re lativ ism  students per­
ceive a l l  knowledge and values, including any au thority 's  (be he or 
she a moral or in te llec tua l "authority"} as r e la t iv is t lc  and dependent 
upon circumstance and context. Relativism sometimes results in the 
existentia l experience o f feeling lost and alone in a meaningless 
world, seemingly with no standards and no certa in ty. Loevinger's 
" ind iv idua lis t ic "  stage is equivalent, and to a lesser degree, 
Kohlberg's post-conventional stage o f "social contract, le g a l is t  
orientation" is equivalent (an individual who sees no certa in ty may 
need to create order and structure with his/her colleagues). This 
th ird  basic stage points to a strong personal awareness o f  the re la- 
t i v f t y  of others' opinions and values, the circumstantial nature of 
one's own existence and identity,and a movement away from concrete 
and specific rule-oriented thinking toward a more abstract, "higher 
principles" form o f reasoning. Moving the student toward a re la t iv ­
is t lc  concept o f h1m/herself and of the world o f  knowledge and values 
is an essential prerequisite toward the fina l position. In th is  sense, 
the ea r l ie r  stages, then, are not terminal (or te leo log ica l) goals, 
but rather Instrumental goals, pointing the way toward moral and in­
te llectua l commitment and maturity. In other words, "dualism," "m u lt i­
p l ic i ty "  and "re la tiv ism " (or the ir Loevinger/Kohlbergian equivalents) 
are not ends in themselves; rather, they serve as useful descriptors
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and intermediary ob jectives, providing the educator with a conceptual 
framework to both understand students and help move them beyond 
s im p lis t ic  and dogmatic ways-of-knowing and valuing.
Perry's f ina l and highest stage, "commitment in relativism," 
describes an ind iv idual who recognizes that despite the circumstantial 
nature o f id e n t i ty  and In te l le c t  and the sometimes overwhelming divers­
i t y  o f  moral values, he/she must be w il l in g  to accept responsib ility  
fo r  developing h is/her own personal commitments. In Perry's words,
"(an Indiv idual) experiences the affirmation o f  identity among multiple 
respo n s ib i l i t ies  and realizes commitment as his ongoing, unfolding 
a c t iv i t y  through which he expresses his l i f e  sty le" (1970, p. 10). 
Loevinger's "autonomous and integrated" level and Kohlberq's s ix th  
stage, the "universa l-e th ica l p r inc ip le  orientation," are also char­
acterized by advanced conceptual complexity, a strong a b i l i ty  to  to le r ­
ate, and even value, d ive rs ity  and ambiguity, and a breadth of objec­
t i v i t y  o f  understanding grounded in a strong sense of se lf. This 
f in a l position does, indeed, serve as a teleological aim, an end-goal. 
Although a l l  stages in such developmental schemes are more than mere 
psychologica lly-descrip tive terms, I t  is especially clear that the 
highest or f ina l stages are normative; that "commitment In relativism" 
is  a statement o f  value, o f  intended educational outcome.
Perry's own discussion on the philosophical context and assump­
tions o f  his scheme 1s in s tru c t io n a l;  he does not at all deny tha t the
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h1 ghest developmental stages embody spec if ic  values; 1
We would argue, for example, tha t the f in a l structures 
of our scheme express an optimally congruent and re­
sponsible address to the present state o f  man's pre­
dicament. These are statements o f  opinion. Even 
with the strength of convictions, they remain opinions 
and the ir  e x p l ic i t  statement may relieve them o f sus­
picion of pretension of the absolute. (1970, p, 45)
Although he does not attempt to develop an extended philosophical ju s t ­
i f ic a t io n  for these higher stages as educational ob jectives, Perry is  
careful to stipu la te  th a t ,  despite these im p lic i t  values, on another 
level the scheme is quite objective and ins is ts  on ind iv idual choice. 
The structural generalizations o f  the scheme do not allow fo r approval 
or disapproval o f individual actions nor o f  specific values. Perry 
points out that
a student a t  an advanced position o f  develop­
ment in our scheme might coirmit himself to  a fa i th  in 
a re lig ion  which Includes a fa ith  in an absolute order 
manifest in human a ffa irs  in Natural Law. Even i f  we 
ourselves disagreed at concrete levels, we would s t i l l  
be free to honor his values, since, in our context, he
^Th1s is an honest admission, which helps open the door for p h i lo ­
sophical analysis and a comparison with s im ila r psychological schemes 
which measure many o f  the same characteris tics but u t i l i z e  a d if fe re n t 
conceptual framework to do so. In th is  chapter the comparisons with 
(Cohlberg and Loevinger's schemes helped establish th is  point.
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has elected them In a world which he has learned to 
consider from another point o f  view, as r e la t iv is t ic .
I f  he continues to respect the legitimacy o f re la t lv ­
ls t ic  valuing 1n others and also others' fa iths  in 
other absolutes, his Commitment to an absolute repre­
sents, for us, not a fa i lu re  o f logic . . .  but a 
considered and courageous acceptance of an unavoid­
able stress. (1970, p. 202)
Indeed, the im p l ic i t  values 1n Perry's scheme arise out of a specific 
ethical and epistemological view o f the world—of humanity’ s understand­
ing o f knowledge and experience as r e la t iv is t ic .  Obviously, Perry is 
very much aware o f and concerned with the ind iv idua l's  understanding of 
relativ ism in many forms. I t  is his contention that fo r  the college 
student, especially, confrontation with pluralism in values, l i f e  
styles, and ways-of-knowing is a nearly inescapable experience in the 
20th century--present in the classroom and out o f i t .  fie points to 
cu ltura l d ive rs ity  as a deliberate policy o f l ibera l arts colleges as 
also contributing to the development o f r e la t iv is t ic  knowing (1970, 
p. 6 }. However, Perry crit iques education which then fa i ls  to lead 
the student to grapple with this existent d ive rs ity  and to make per­
sonal choices:
Modern p lu ra l is t ic  education, with a l l  i ts  pros and 
cons In every subject, is c r i t ic iz e d  for not teach­
ing commitment* Indeed fo r leading students away from 
i t .  What we have been saying from our understanding 
o f our records is that: ( 1) without a clear view of
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pluralism, comnltment as we define I t  Is Impossible; 
and (?) commitment can be provided fo r  and given 
recognition, but i t  can never be brought about o r 
forced. ( 1970, p. 37)
The links with the tra d it io n a l aims and goals o f  l ib e ra l education be­
come more e x p l ic i t  as Perry id e n t i f ie s  d is t in c t iv e  features o f an edu­
cated person, including the a b i l i t y  to th ink re la t iv e ly  and con tin ­
gently and the a b i l i t y  to think about thinking I t s e l f  {1970, p. 37). 
he contends that in contrast to the anti - In te l le c tu a l , the 
" l ibe ra lly  educated man . . .  is  one who has learned to th ink  about 
even his own thoughts, to examine the way he orders his data and the 
assumptions he Is making, and to compare these w ith  other thoughts 
that other men might have” {1970, p. 39).
Dualism and m u l t ip l ic i t y  are, then, untenable positions fo r  a 
l ib e r a l ly  educated person, and according to Perry, the d if fu s e  re la ­
tiv ism o f position f iv e  is  impossible to maintain fo r  a long period o f
2
time. An individual t r u ly  Iranersed in th is  way-of-knowing must move 
toward e ithe r comnitment 1n some form or toward the detached and de- 
s truc t lve  a lienation o f  "escape. 1 Although Perry claims tha t the 
educator cannot and should not e x p l i c i t l y  "bring about1 or force
2
The overt im p lica tion  is th a t  I t  is  psychologically Impossible,
but the ta c i t  Implication is tha t i t  is e th ic a l ly  lacking,
^Perry defines "escape" as the exp lo ita t ion  o f  the opportun ity
fo r detachment offered by the s truc tu res  of pos it ions four and f ive
to deny re spons ib il i ty  through passive or opportun is tic  a l ie n a t io n
(1970, p. 9).
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conmltment, he also contends th a t th is  developmental c r is is  (the move 
forward toward commitment o r re tre a t in to  simpler modes o f knowing and 
be liev ing) Imposes " a profound re s p o n s ib ility  on the educator, a 
re s p o n s ib ility  which 1s no longer a separable moral task lik e  "b u ild ­
ing character" which was once somehow 'tacked on' to regular teaching" 
(1970, p, 212), Thus, the development o f personal id e n tity  and mean­
ing becomes in tertw ined w ith  the accumulation o f knowledge and p ractice  
in  in te lle c tu a l s k i l ls .  This pedagogical push toward conrnitment-making 
c a lls  fo r  "an act o f fa ith ,  the a ffirm a tio n  o f personal choices,
a fte r  the long and s tre ss fu l period o f detachment* doubt* and awareness 
o f a lte rn a tive s . Enduring commitments to  moral pos itions, p o lit ic a l 
Ideologies* l i f e  and career goals, and interpersonal values may be 
achieved during the college years* but more o ften  than not, c ry s ta l­
l iz a t io n  o f commitments does not occur u n t i l  well in to  one's twenties 
or th ir t ie s "  (Goldberger, Marwlne* & Paskus, n .d ,, p, 3 ). Perry be­
lieves tha t th is  1s also an act o f courage:
since each step in  the development presents 
a challenge to a person's previous assumptions and 
requires tha t he redefine and extend his responsi­
b i l i t i e s  in  the midst o f increased complexity and 
uncerta in ty , his growth does indeed Involve h is 
courage. In short* the development resembles what 
used to be ca lled an adventure o f the s p ir i t .
(1970, p. 44)
Drawing from th is  more deta iled review o f the philosophical prem­
ises o f th is  cognitive-developmental model, these spec ific  educational
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goals emerge;
-  moving the student away from d u a lis t ic  and m u lt ip l is t lc  forms o f 
knowing In to  a fu l l  recognition o f re la tiv ism  In a p lu ra l is t ic  
universe.
-  developing the student's a b i l i t y  to o rien t hWherself in a r e la t iv ls t lc  
world through persona! cornuitment.
-  developing the student’s a b i l i t y  to think re la t iv e ly  and contingently 
and to c r i t ic a l ly  re fle c t on h is /he r own inodes o f reasoning and 
Judgment.
-  promoting Ind iv id u a l, and personal, meaning-making, free  from e ithe r 
s im p lis t ic  adoption o f or automatic rebe llion  against an a u th o rity 's  
power, and grounded 1n c r i t ic a l awareness o f many leg itim a te  ways of 
making meaning.
- encouraging the In te llec tua l r is k -ta k in g  and the courage necessary 
to progress to the highest stage in the scheme.
The educational goals and philosophical premises o f the normative 
e th ics  model are more d irec t and in  l i t t l e  need o f exp lica tion  beyond 
th a t offered In the th ird  chapter. Two of th is  model's goals--"recog- 
n iz ing  e th ica l Issues" and "developing ana ly tica l s k il ls " - -a re  s tra ig h t­
forward and re la tiv e ly  non-controverslal since they dwell upon t ra d i­
tio n a l ra tion a l s k i l ls .  "HI k i t in g  a sense o f moral o b lig a tio n ,"  
"s tim u la ting  the moral Imagination," and "to le ra ting --and  reducing-- 
moral disagreement and ambiguity" are somewhat more problematic since 
each moves beyond a narrow, an a ly tic  d e fin it io n  o f reason, "S tim ula t­
ing the moral imagination" is not un like a humanities ob jective  fo r  
moral education, perhaps an ob jec tive  subsumed under "developing moral
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v is io n ," This goal does, Indeed, serve as an antidote  to a narrowly 
analytic focus on moral reasoning; I t  acknowledges tha t imagination Is  
also part o f human in te l le c t ,  and serves to re in fo rce  the notion th a t 
there can be a "moral point o f view" (d is t in c t  and d if fe re n t from le ­
ga l, psychological* o r re lig ious  points-of-v1ew, fo r  example). Pro­
viding case studies and spec ific  examples o f moral dUennas helps 
stimulate the personal fee lings , emotions* and Imagination necessary 
(although not fu l ly  s u ff ic ie n t)  fo r moral reasoning and discourse. In  
the Hastings Center volume, The Teaching o f Ethics 1n Higher Education 
(1980, pp. 80-81), the cu rricu la r ob jectives o f "Introducing students 
to a broad range o f contemporary moral problems facing society and the 
ind iv idua l" and providing students w ith  "the opportunity to wrestle 
w ith the problems o f  applied eth ics, personal or p ro fessiona l," 
d ire c tly  contribute  to  a more v iv id  sense o f moral imagination and a 
heightened awareness o f a moral point o f view,
"E lic it in g  a sense o f moral o b lig a tio n " arises out o f the basic 
question, "Why ought I to be moral?" and fo llows w ith each in d iv id u a l's  
structured attempt to  answer that question, Daniel Callahan believes 
tha t In an ethics course the re la tionsh ip  between reasoning, human 
w i l l ,  and re su lting  action must be examined, "To e l i c i t  a sense o f 
moral o b lig a tio n ," according to Callahan, " is  only to h ig h lig h t w ith  
students an in te rna l requirement o f e th ica l th ink ing : tha t I t  c a lls
us to act in  the l ig h t  o f what we perceive to be r ig h t and good"
(1980, p. 66). Since th is  model assumes In te lle c tu a l freedom and per­
sonal re sp o n s ib ility  as the basis fo r  moral action and b e lie f, there 
is  no attempt to impose or enforce an a tt itu d e  o f "moral o b lig a tio n ,"
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Rather, the focus is  on the pedagogical use o f re fle c tiv e  reading, 
group discussion, and case-study analyses as a means fo r  helping each 
Ind iv idua l student recognize the possib le , personal im plications of 
accepting the in te lle c tu a l notion th a t there 1s a moral "domain" and 
that one can choose to develop and understand one's own moral obliga­
tio n . Such a task 1s c lo se ly  re lated to  another sub-objective, "help­
ing students formulate th e ir  own personal and moral ideals" {Hastings 
Center, 19B0, p. 00). The crucia l aspect Is tha t the instructor 
and course m ateria ls and partic ipan ts  provide the structu re  and tools 
fo r  the ind iv idua l student to take on th is  task (1f  he/she chooses 
to do so). Of a l l  the normative e th ic s ' goals, th is  t ru ly  is the 
least a n a ly tic , the one goal which plays a ta c i t  ro le  1n a course or 
program and does not serve as a basis fo r  student evaluation. How­
ever, although no student is  a c tua lly  evaluated on the nature or 
degree o f th e ir  "sense o f moral o b lig a tio n ,"  th is  goal helps establish 
a special tone fo r  the normative eth ics course. I t  Is in  one sense 
a statement o f fa ith  (not uncommon to most d isc ip lin e s  and instructors) 
tha t 1n the long run, beyond the college experience and graduation, 
ind iv idua ls  w i l l  recognize the necessity o f a moral point o f view and 
o f personal re s p o n s ib ility  to bring th e ir  l i f e  sty les and actions in 
accord w ith  th e ir  most deeply fe l t  and examined moral values and 
b e lie fs .
The remaining normative ethics goal, " to le ra tin g —and reducing-- 
moral disagreement and am biguity," a rises in part out o f the recogni­
tio n  o f s ig n if ic a n t e x is tin g  d iffe rences, both th e o re tic a lly  and 
p ra c t ic a lly , in  a p lu ra l is t ic  society and In an increasingly In ter-
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connected and Interdependent world. In sho rt, there are many d iffe re n t 
kinds o f people w ith  many d iffe re n t tra d itio n s  and l i f e  h is to rie s , and 
there are also many competing and c o n flic t in g  moral values and ways of 
ju s t ify in g  and a rr iv in g  a t those values. Neither moral discourse and 
reasoning as d a ily  practices nor "e th ics" as the in te lle c tu a l examina­
tio n  o f moral values and reasoning rest on the same type o f firm  In ­
te lle c tu a l foundation tha t provides high degrees of exactness* certa in ­
ty ,  and p re d ic ta b ility ,  as in the natural sciences or mathematics. 
Nevertheless, the normative ethics model rests  on the fundamental (and 
ph ilosoph ica lly  defensible) position tha t m orality is  not to ta lly  
r e la t iv is t ic  or sub jective , nor is its  language empty or meaningless. 
The various contribu tors to th is  approach (Bok, Callahan, Murchland, 
Rosen) ph ilosoph ica lly  a ffirm  tha t there are common denominators, 
shared experiences and vocabulary, that a llow  fo r progress toward 
greater ce rta in ty  and systemization in moral reasoning and b e lie f. In 
th is  view, we cannot, should not, remain sa tis fie d  w ith ex is ting  ambi­
gu ity  and misunderstanding 1n moral dialogue and judgment.
Rosen proposes a c lose ly related goal tha t has to do w ith the re­
duction o f ambiguity and disagreement: "providing a general means fo r
each person to a rr iv e  at ju s t i f ie d  moral judgments" (in  Callahan & Bok, 
1980, p, 68), When an In s tru c to r o ffers c r i t ic a l  descriptions o f com­
peting eth ical theories and normative models fo r moral decision-making, 
he/she Is asking students to  recognize th a t (as a matter o f p ra c tica l­
i t y }  they are continuously engaged 1n moral reason 1ng--whether or not 
they in te lle c tu a lly  adhere to any specific  ethical position . Students 
also come to recognize the c r i t ic a l  d is tin c tio n  between "p lu ra lism ,"
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a social phenomenon tha t can lead to to le ra tio n  o f d iffe rences, and 
"e th ica l re la tiv is m ,"  the b e lie f that a l l  moral values have equal 
leg itim acy. Although an Ind iv idua l student may a rr iv e  a t an in te lle c ­
tu a lly  defensible position o f e th ica l re la tiv is m , i t  obviously 1s not 
the assumption o f the normative ethics model {and, an In s tru c to r 
u t i l iz in g  th is  model w i l l  push and challenge a student to in te lle c ­
tu a lly  J u s tify  and defend h is /he r p o s itio n }. In summary, these goals 
o f the normative e th ics model, un like  those delineated 1n the cogn itive - 
developmental scheme, are more focused on s k i l ls  in  moral reasoning, 
and they d ire c t ly  flow from the established d is c ip lin e  o f e th ics .
Vet, the cognitive-developmental scheme does espouse "increased 
cogn itive  complexity" as an ob jective , and the s im ila r it ie s  between 
"commitment in the face o f re la tiv ism " and " e l ic i t in g  a sense o f moral 
o b lig a tio n " and "overcoming ambiguity and reducing disagreement" are 
s tr ik in g .  Also, both the normative e th ics  and cognitive-developmental 
models do much to stre tch our tra d it io n a l notions o f in te lle c t  and 
the ro le  o f reason in human values and moral decision-making. This 
analysis now turns to  an examination o f these and other s im ila r it ie s  
and the ways in  which these two models complement each other and in 
combination meet the broader aims and goals o f  lib e ra l education.
Connections w ith L iberal Education^: P o s s ib il it ie s  fo r  In tegra tion
The cognitive-developmental approach to  co llege-leve l moral edu­
cation provides the lib e ra l educator w ith  a set o f ob jectives tha t 
personally apply to the in d iv id u a l's  a b i l i t y  to grow In te lle c tu a lly
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and e th ic a lly *  while the normative ethics model provides a somewhat 
more impersonal set o f ob jectives tha t revolve around reasoning s k i l ls  
grounded 1n e th ics as a subdlscip lIne o f philosophy. The developmental 
approach tends to  emphasize the ongoing process o f moral education, 
w h ile  adherents to the normative ethics model pay more a tte n tio n  to a t 
le a s t some measurable* ob jec tive  accomplishments ( fo r  example* under­
standing e th ica l concepts* developed s k il ls  1n moral reasoning* an 
in te lle c tu a l awareness o f a moral d im ension). Each model complements 
the other 1n a powerful manner tha t conceptually f i t s  In to  the broad 
mission of l ib e ra l education and very e ffe c t iv e ly  contribu tes to the 
goal o f  Ind iv idua l e th ica l development. S p e c if ic a lly , 1n what ways 
do these models strengthen each other, and why does th e ir  In teg ra tion  
match the lib e ra l a rts  Ideal so well?
In the previous chapter, connections were drawn between the 
l ib e ra l education goal o f developing broadly educated Ind iv idua ls  who 
are not provincia l (through th e ir  ignorance o f other cu ltu res  and 
tim es). Or, In a more p o s itive  sense* such Ind iv idua ls  view th e ir  
Id e n tity  and l i f e  experiences in  a wide context. This goal moves 
well beyond a factua l fa m il ia r ity  with times, cu ltu res* and peoples 
other than one's own to embrace the e th ica l ob jective  o f  tolerance 
and respect. These a ttitu d es  fo llow  from an education th a t teaches 
an awareness and understanding o f social and cu ltu ra l p lu ra lism  and 
e th ica l re la tiv ism . Indeed, th is  Important goal of the 1979 Harvard 
core curriculum best I l lu s tra te s  the s im ila r it ie s  and p o s s ib il it ie s  
fo r  connecting the cognitive-developmental and normative e th ics  models.
-1 8 4 -
In one model, the educator insists th a t the student move from dual 1 Stic 
and m u lti pi 1 Stic forms o f knowing In to  a f u l l  recognition o f re la tiv ism  
1n a p lu ra l is t ic  world. Tolerance* respect fo r  d ifferences* and a b i l­
i t y  to cope with ambiguity ard uncerta in ty  are Im p lic it  objectives 
b u ilt  In to  the advanced-level ab ll I t y  to make commitments 1n the face 
o f re la tiv ism . The normative e th ics model has two e x p l ic i t  ob jectives 
which also pa ra lle l the acquis ition o f a broad* to le ra n t view: the
"s tim u la tion  o f the moral Imagination" and the "to le ra tio n --a n d  reduc­
tio n —o f disagreement and am biguity." In combination* these objec­
tives (w ith  the appropriate pedagogical methods) help teach In d iv id ­
uals to overcame p rov inc ia l and dogmatic ways-of-fcnawing and va lu ing .
The l ib e ra lly  educated person 1s also d istingu ished by the a b i l­
i t y  to develop and combine ethical and In te lle c tu a l v is io n * and the 
w illingness and a b i l i t y  to struggle w ith  the fundamental questions o f 
existence and meaning.^ Again* both models o f moral education, 
d ire c tly  and In d ire c t ly ,  propose ob jectives th a t center on developing 
these ch a ra c te ris tics . The cognitive-developmental scheme In s is ts  
that the student make sense and meaning out of his/her personal existence 
and promotes the in te lle c tu a l risk  taking and courage necessary to do 
so. The stim ulation o f a moral p o in t o f view and the e l ic i t in g  o f a 
sense o f moral o b lig a tio n  are norm atlve-ethlcs ob jectives that po in t
^These are the perennial "undergraduate" questions that a rise  in  
d if fe re n t ways In d if fe re n t  times and cu ltu res* e .g .,  "Why should 1 
th ink/question?"; "Who am I?"; "What can I know fo r  sure?"; "What ought 
I to do?"; HTo who or what may 1 g ive myself u ltim a te ly  and complete­
ly? "; and "What does human l i f e ,  and my l i f e ,  mean?"
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toward the Ind iv idua l formulation of moral beliefs and patterns o f 
reasoning.
One o f the c learest and least controversial goals o f lib e ra l edu­
cation 1s the development o f rational and analytic thought. Therefore* 
such moral education objectives as thinking carefu lly and rigorously 
about e th ica l issues, developing an eth ical perspective (in  the same 
sense one can develop a le g a lis t ic ,  psychological, or h is to rica l per­
spective) and learning how to ra tio n a lly  evaluate and ju s t ify  moral 
positions are frequently c ite d . The normative ethics objectives of 
learning how to recognize e th ica l Issues and developing re la tive  and 
contingent th inking as well as the a b i l i ty  to c r i t ic a l ly  re fle c t on 
one's own models o f reasoning and judcpnent are a ll closely related.
Undoubtedly, the most grandiose and controversial aim o f lib e ra l 
education is  the development o f an ethical individual. The trans­
la tio n  o f th is  long term "mission" In to  particu la r curricu lar objec­
tives  has been and continues to be troublesome, not with those 
objectives centered on acquiring rational s k i l ls ,  but with those 
focused on " lib e ra l"  a ttitudes and qua lities  o f mlnd—and ce rta in ly  
w ith goals th a t focus on behavioral change in any sense. As outlined 
e a r l ie r ,  objectives requ iring specific  behavioral a lteration raise 
the very serious concern o f indoctrina tion ,^ and two contemporary 
models of moral education have been rejected 1n large part because
^Also see "Doubtful Goals In the Teaching o f Ethics" by Daniel 
Ca1lahan{1n Callahan t  Bok, 19fl0, pp. 69-72).
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they dwell fa r too d ire c tly  on behavioral change (values c la r if ic a t io n  
and w h o lls t ic ) . Yet, without some behavioral dimension the moral edu­
cator In a lib e ra l education te x t runs the risk  o f teaching abstract 
s k il ls  1n the analysis o f princip les and moral language w ithout ever 
encouraging students to personally adopt a moral stance or to con­
s is te n tly  act upon th e ir  values and b e lie fs . Again, both o f these 
selected models attempt to come to grips with th is  dilemma. In Perry's 
scheme, the student 1s encouraged to adopt reasoned, to le ran t commit­
ments (a lapse Into re la tiv ism , or lower, is viewed as " re tre a t"  or 
"escape"). In the normative ethics model the " e l ic i t in g  o f a sense 
o f moral ob liga tion" c a lls  fo r an in te lle c tu a l examination o f the 
links  between reason, w i l l ,  and action . Moral ob lig a tion  does, 
eventually, require the w ill power (equivalent to Perry's "courage") 
and the concrete action necessary to f u l f i l l  the b e lie f ;  and, th is  
p ractica l connection can be examined and encouraged through class 
discussion and re fle c tio n . In th is  way both models Introduce objec­
tives tha t avoid the naive and dangerous tendency to In s is t on the 
d ire c t tra in in g  o f moral character and behavior.
Thus fa r ,  s im ila r it ie s  between the normative e th ics and cognitive- 
developmental models and the aims and goals o f lib e ra l education have 
been discussed. Each model consciously avoids behavioral ob jectives, 
yet ne ither e n tire ly  re jects some focus on personal, moral decis ion­
making and an examination o f the lin ks  between thought and ac tion ; 
both models focus on In te lle c tu a l s k i l ls  and processes and scrupulous­
ly  avoid the Inculcation of sp e c ific , substantive b e lie fs ; and both
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seek to  in tegra te  and develop e th ica l and In te lle c tu a l growth. What, 
then, are th e ir  differences? Or, more accurate ly, 1n what ways are 
the normative e th ics and cogn itive  developmental models complementary? 
And how does th e ir  In teg ra tion  con tribu te  to a lib e ra l education? The 
answer to the in i t ia l  question 1s d ire c t and simple: The cogn itive - 
developmental approach is  grounded in  psychological research and as a 
form o f moral education i ts  ob jectives and pedagogical methods are 
rooted In a developmental understanding o f human change and growth.
The normative e th ics model, however, has a much more tra d it io n a l set 
o f educational assumptions, and I ts  objectives tend to center on 
reasoning s k i l ls .  The Ind iv idua l personal ro le  in  making meaning 
and assuming re s p o n s ib ility  fo r  making cornnitments is  in teg ra l to the 
cognitive-developmental approach, but also recognized Is the common 
"developmental path" which a l l  students fo llo w . The normative eth ics 
model emphasizes the ind iv idua l ro le  in  se lecting and analyzing moral 
values and ways o f evaluating various forms o f moral reasoning, yet 
th is  model, too, emphasizes a common denominator: our acquired, in ­
te lle c tu a l too ls fo r  developing a discerning moral judgment. In 
o ther words, one approach focuses on the comron developmental pro­
gression o f combined in te lle c tu a l and e th ica l growth, while the other 
centers upon cofmonly-held, well-developed and defined philosophical 
language and methods* Anfmportant ideal fo r  the advocates o f the norma­
tiv e  eth ics model 1s the development o f moral p rin c ip les  and values 
tha t are w idely accepted, p u b lic ly  v e r if ia b le ,  and ra tio n a lly  de­
fe n s ib le . An important ideal fo r  the cogn itive  developmental moral 
educator 1s the development o f persons who can move beyond the e a r lie r
stages o f knowing and valu ing to  the advanced stage o f moral and In te l­
lectual commitment making. Although each model uses a very d if fe re n t 
vocabulary and draws upon d if fe re n t aspects o f our Western In te lle c tu a l 
trad itions and d is c ip lin e s , both abso lu te ly In s is t  on the c r i t i c a l ,  
metaphysical assumption tha t every Ind iv id ua l is  free  to choose h is /he r 
own moral values and decision-making s ty le .  These two approaches to 
moral education do provide very d if fe re n t educational frameworks; ye t 
advocates o f both models a ff irm  the e sse n tia l, autonomous ro le  th a t 
the Individual student plays in  h is /h e r personal moral development.
Why and how, then, do the combined ob jec tives  o f  the cogn itive  
developmental and normative e th ics  models meet the ove ra ll aims o f  
lib e ra l education? An answer to th is  question arises through an exam­
ination o f the Ideal o f  l ib e ra l education as f i r s t  conceived by the 
classical Greeks, and then re lnv igora ted  In the w ritin g s  o f A. N. 
Whitehead and most recen tly  In w r it in g s  from Botste ln  (1979a; 1979b), 
Murchland{1976; 197$* and Thomas Hearn (1975). As ou tlined  1n the 
second chapter, the c la ss ica l Greeks embraced arete as the u ltim ate  
educational aim: excellence, defined as l iv in g  one's l i f e  w e ll. Edu­
cation, in  th is  context, was found ne ithe r in  the accumulation o f 
factual knowledge nor in  the "mechanics" o f class attendance (nor, 
fo r modern tim es, 1n the awarding o f grades and degrees); ra the r, the 
authentic educational experience Involved a continu ing  w illingness to 
search fo r meaning; a search demanding fre e  choice, courage, and 
coranttment ( fa m ilia r  concepts to  the proponents o f e ith e r  a c o g n itive - 
developmental or normative e th ics  approach to  moral education). More­
over, the Greek conception o f reason was a broad one, embracing both 
theo re tica l and p rac tica l in te llig e n c e , abstract knowledge and sp e c ific  
fa c t,  as well as a n a ly tic  and synthetic reasoning. These emphases on 
the In d iv id u a l's  search fo r  meaning, the process o f acquiring and 
e ffe c t iv e ly  using knowledge, and on hitman In te lle c t  as something fa r  
more than Im partia l log ica l method o r  analysis have, once again, 
come to the fo re fro n t o f l ib e ra l education philosophy. The co g n itive - 
developmental model, especia lly  as presented by U1111am Perry, begins 
by emphasizing the "1ndiv1dual-as-1earner," concrete and expe rien tia l 
aspects o f learn ing , and the development o f humane a ttitu d es  and 
q u a lit ie s  o f In te l le c t .  The normative approach begins by dwelling 
upon theore tica l and abstract learn ing , knowledge as the c r i t ic a l  as­
pect o f education, and the development o f broadly ra tiona l In te lle c tu a l 
a b i l i t ie s .  Yet, ne ither model is  so dogmatic as to e n tire ly  exclude 
other important aspects o f moral education. Together, they work to  
meet the challenge to move beyond teaching about e th ica l theory or 
moral reasoning to  also teaching students why m ora lity  and e th ica l 
decision-making are a cruc ia l part o f l i f e  and teaching how an In d iv ­
idual can make the in te lle c tu a l conuHtment necessary to act e th ic a lly .
Pedagogical and C u rricu la r Im plicat ions
Teaching Methods The In te lle c tu a l cement that binds together 
these two models o f  moral education consists o f,  a t le a s t, four major, 
shared epistemologlcal and e th ica l assumptions; f i r s t ,  ne ither factual 
knowledge nor moral values Is considered absolute in nature; second.
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recognltlon o f human free w il l  and respect fo r  the autonomy o f the 
Ind iv idua l are 1n themselves primary moral Im peratives; th ird ,  e ffec ­
t iv e  teaching and learning cannot be e n tire ly  a b s trac t, th e o re tica l, 
and Impersonal; and, fourth , some learning is  (and probably should be) 
ta c it  and, at le a s t In the short term , unobservable and unmeasurable. 
With these conmon assumptions and th e ir  equally e ffe c tiv e  match w ith 
the tra d itio n s  and contemporary goals of lib e ra l education, the norma­
tiv e  eth ics and cognitive developmental models are not simply patched 
together; ra ther, they are, in a sense, an In te rlo ck in g  p a ir—d if fe r ­
ent enough to complement and, in  combination, to strengthen each other 
and ye t s im ila r enough to e ffe c t iv e ly  in tegra te . This should become 
espec ia lly  clear in even th is  re la t iv e ly  b r ie f review of the p ractica l 
c u rr ic u la r  Implications o f a combined integrated model. What, then, 
are the appropriate e ffec tive  teaching methods, learning resources, 
forms o f evaluation, and q u a lif ic a tio n s  c r ite r ia  fo r  Instructors using 
th is  approach to  college-level moral education? And, In what way w i l l ,  
o r can, th is  model f i t  in to  ex is tin g  cu rricu la r structures?
The range o f appropriate teaching methods 1s quite  large. Beyond 
the more tra d itio n a l lectu re , readings, structured discussions, and 
w r itte n  assignments—case study ana lys is , group debates, and some 
lim ite d  forms o f role ploying, and even selected values c la r if ic a t io n  
exercises^ can be considered e ffe c tiv e  means o f achieving both sets o f
®When used as one possible teaching component o f th is  synthesis 
model, these exercises occur 1n an e n tire ly  d if fe re n t  context. Tn the 
values c la r if ic a t io n  model, in d iv id ua l " c la r if ic a t io n "  is an end in 
and o f i t s e l f .
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objectlves. C learly excluded would be pedagogical exercises exclu­
sive ly focused on the tra in in g  o f sp e c ific  behaviors or the manipula­
tion of emotion. The teaching methods o f th is  combined model would 
not In themselves be ra d ic a lly  new or d iffe ren t*, yet the sheer range 
o f p o s s ib ilit ie s  is  expanded widely. Although d idactic  lec tu re  In  
combination w ith required c r i t ic a l reading and w ritin g  may be adequate 
to meet such objectives as "developing a student's a n a ly tic  and lo g ica l 
s k i l ls "  o r In "encouraging a student to c r i t ic a l ly  re f le c t  on his own 
mode o f reasoning and judgment," i t  seems un like ly  tha t such ob jectives 
as " e lic it in g  a sense o f moral ob lig a tio n " o r "encouraging the in te l­
lectual r isk -ta k in g  and courage necessary to progress to the highest 
developmental stage" can be successfully met w ith the more tra d it io n a l 
teaching methods. As 1n many humanities classes {espec ia lly  in  studies 
o f music and a r t } ,  there 1s an appeal to the im agination, to elements 
o f  human In te lle c t  that are not s t r ic t ly  lo g ic a l. For example, even 
1n a classroom se ttin g , experiencing and understanding a r t  often in ­
volves special visual or audio presentations, self-exam ination o f 
emotional response, p a rtic ip a tio n  1n the a r t  form {espec ia lly  w ith  
modern a r t ) ,  and, perhaps, creative  generation o f one's own work o f 
a r t .  In s im ila r manner, an e ffe c tive  course In moral education must 
be w ill in g  to use many d if fe re n t pedagogical techniques in  order to  
stre tch beyond a purely a na ly tica l understanding o f m o ra lity  and moral 
decision-making. This s tre tch in g , however, does not extend beyond the 
e th ica l and eplstemo logical guidelines o f lib e ra l education, c le a r ly  
p roh ib iting  the use o f pedagogical techniques that appeal exc lus ive ly  
to behavioral o r other non in te llec tua l dimensions o f human development.
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In a sense, then, i t  is  a firm , c le a r grasp o f the defined goals of 
lib e ra l education and the specified  objectives o f th is  synthesis model 
o f moral education th a t allow a program and an In s tru c to r greater 
pedagogical freedom. I f  the goals are c lear (and th is , o f course, is 
espec ia lly  unusual 1n co llege-leve l moral education), then there exists 
a so lid  basis fo r  se lecting  the teaching methods th a t most e ffe c tive ly  
bring about, o r gradually help implement, those goals and objectives.
The re la t iv e ly  unusual aspect o f th is  model's teaching methods, 
then, l ie s  not so much In the methods themselves nor even 1n the wide 
range o f  p o s s ib il i t ie s ,  as In the basis fo r  se lecting  and applying 
them. Drawing upon cognitive-developmental theory, an ins truc to r 
designs a course o f study tha t takes Into account h is/her knowledge of 
students1 responses to varying degrees o f course structure  as well as 
student sources o f in te lle c tu a l support and challenge, views on 
a u th o rity  and sources o f knowledge, and need fo r  personalism (a warm, 
encouraging atmosphere). As pointed out e a r l ie r  in  th is  chapter (as 
well as in chapter 3 ), Ind iv idua l students stand along varying steps 
in  co g n itive -e th ica l development, and an in s tru c to r  can teach students 
more e ffe c t iv e ly  I f  he/she has some understanding o f an ind iv idua l's  
age, class standing, and developmental stage o f growth. The mechanics 
(and very probably the p o lit ic s )  o f  implementing such a scheme could 
be very awkward, Indeed. Are students tested and then divided Into 
separate classes or groups on the basis o f th e ir  "developmental test 
scores"? Although some form o f developmental stage evaluation w ill be a 
necessary pedagogical component o f th is  model, I t  need not translate 
Into a system o f "developmental track ing" fo r  moral education. I t
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could instead, fo r  example, lead to  a ra d ica lly  designed class w ith 
designated weeks o f lec tu re  and structured discussion Intended for 
a ll those enrolled; while other weeks would consist o f individualized 
learning a c t iv it ie s  appropriate to a pa rticu la r in d iv id u a l's  develop­
mental stage. Perhaps a l l  students would be required to w rite  a 
learning contract 1n conjunction w ith  the course ins truc to r; and, 
although there would be wide va ria tion  in the types o f learning 
a c t iv it ie s ,  the course objectives and actual "quantity" o f material 
to be completed would be equivalent.
For example, students Id e n tifie d  as operating on dual 1 Stic 
assumptions about the nature o f knowledge and learning (generally 
freshmen and beginning college students) would need high levels of 
structure and guidance, frequent personal reassurance, c lea rly  defined 
means o f  evaluation, and, in general, in te lle c tu a l challenges tha t 
match th e ir  a b l l i t ie s  and developmental stage. Therefore, "d u a lls tic "  
students would have many more structured classes to  attend, a greater 
emphasis on the re la tiv e ly  mechanical aspects o f learning and memor­
izing d e fin itio n s  and theories, and many more concrete learning 
a c t iv it ie s .  N atura lly , since one major objective is  to move such 
students up th is  hierarchy of developmental positions, more challeng­
ing educational methods and resources w il l  be Introduced as the class 
progresses. Challenge, to these students, Is presented In the form 
o f increased d iv e rs ity  o f content, an Increasing emphasis on the 
student taking re sp o n s ib ility  fo r h is /he r own learn ing, and the use 
of teacher-led dialogue and discussion. The In s tru c to r would begin
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to Introduce m u ltip le  Ideas, theories , and perspectives and move 
beyond the stra ightforw ard presentation o f facts and vocabulary.
Teaching methods, then, would evolve with students a t d if fe re n t 
developmental leve ls . Students a t a m u ltlp H s tic  pos ition  no longer 
believe tha t they must accept a teacher's (or a u th o rity ’ s) knowledge. 
Certainty and right/w rong, b lack/w hite  categories o f  knowledge and 
m ora lity  s t i l l  e x is t, but s1de-by-side w ith , as y e t, undiscovered 
knowledge and moral values. Such students w i l l  believe tha t every­
one has a r ig h t to th e ir  own opinion In those areas tha t are unknown 
or uncerta in. Pedagogical methods th a t challenge students at th is  
position include continuing withdrawal o f the teacher as au tho rity  
figu re  and provider o f knowledge, an emphasis on providing models o f 
r e la t iv is t ic  reasoning, and continuing Increase In the d iv e rs ity  o f 
viewpoints presented, in the d iv e rs ity  o f in -c lass Ins truc tiona l 
methods, and in the level o f abstract th ink ing .
R e la t iv is t ic  students view s tru c tu re  as a springboard, ra the r 
than a l im i t ,  to Inqu iry and personal growth. For the r e la t iv is t ic  
student, development Involves recognition o f the need fo r conmftment 
and the a b i l i t y  to make such commitments 1n the face o f uncerta in ty 
and m u lt ip l ic ity .  Only a very low degree o f such teacher-provided 
structures as lectures, s y lla b i,  and required attendance Is necessary. 
The in s truc tio n a l process should challenge these students w ith models 
o f Ind iv idua ls  who have managed to make informed, reasoned moral 
commitments. Also, a c t iv it ie s  which require in te lle c tu a l decision­
making—which ask the student to "choose among competing eth ica l
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theories" (Rosen & Caplan, 1980, p. 68)--need to be promoted* The 
need for concrete examples, specific applications, and experientia l 
learning as means fo r Inspiring interest and maintaining motivation 
(necessary a t dua lls tic  and mult1pT1st1c stages) is very low for " re la ­
t iv is t ic "  students* In essence, teaching methods are arrived at through 
an understanding and determination of the individual student's position 
o f functioning, followed by an arousal of genuine cognitive  c o n flic t 
and disagreement through exposure to modes ot thought tha t are a step 
beyond the individual student's stage o f developmental growth*
Learning Resources The college teacher using th is  approach to 
moral education has a fa i r ly  well-defined and growing set o f resources 
to draw upon. Of the two combined models, i t  1s the normative ethics 
approach that provides the bulk of college level texts and other mater­
ia ls  sp e c ifica lly  focused on teaching concepts and theories in ethics 
as well as on s k il ls  in moral decision making, while the cognitive- 
developmental approach in I ts e l f  has had T it t le  to o ffe r in  terms of 
texts, essays, film s, or Journals, Its  " lite ra tu re "  Is oriented for 
the p rac titio n e r, the teacher who wishes to Incorporate th is  theory 
in to  his/her teaching.
In part, the challenge fo r all undergraduate teachers o f ethics 
is  discovering a sensible balance of the theoretical and abstract, as 
exemplified by Western cu ltu re 's  most in s ig h tfu l and c r i t ic a l  thinking 
about m ora lity , with the concrete and spec ific * as exemplified by the 
use of the contemporary case studies and Individualized moral decision­
making readings and exercises. The lite ra tu re  o f the former Is , o f
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course, well defined (a t leas t w ith in  the Western t r a d it io n ) ,  inc lud ­
ing the re levant c lass ica l w ritings  o f P la to , A r is to t le ,  Epicurus, 
Epictetus, and St. Augustine; the essays and books by Renaissance and 
Enlightenment philosophers ranging from Montaigne, Descartes, and 
Spinoza to Hume, Hegel and Kant; and the doctrines o f various twentieth 
century schools o f philosophical thought inc lud ing loq ica l pos itiv ism , 
s truc tu ra lism , pragmatism, and e x is te n tia lism . The l i te ra tu re  of 
normative e th ics is  o f current vintage, fa r  more focused on the con­
temporary and r e a l- l i fe  Im plications o f e th ica l theory and providing 
numerous texts and anthologies to the teacher of e th ics . Such academic 
journa ls as Teaching Philosophy and Philosophy in Context o ffe r  a continu­
ing series o f reviews o f ava ilab le  texts in  th is  area. In add ition , 
pub lica tions o f the Hastings Center o ffe r  comprehensive l is t in g s  of 
ava ilab le  resources, p rim a rily  readings. Moreover, as mentioned pre­
v ious ly , several other major academic research centers focused on 
value and e th ica l concerns o f society have been formed in  the past 
two decades* Their pub lica tions and research and teacher tra in in g  
seminars o ffe r  another* a t least in d ire c t, resource.
In the search fo r e ffe c tiv e  learning resources, the a rts  and 
humanities, in  general--as well as the humanities model o f moral edu­
ca tion , s p e c if ic a lly —also have obvious p o te n tia l. The c lass ics  of 
world l i te ra tu re *  drama, a r t ,  and f ilm  o ften  have powerful moral 
content. N igh t, a sem i-fic tio n a l l i te r a r y  work on the holocaust by 
E lie  Wiesel, fo r example, may not be a d ire c t  moral analysis o f the
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Naz1 death camps or o f German society, nor, In I ts e lf ,  f s 1t Intended 
to promote the e th ica l and In te llec tua l growth of the Individual. Vet, 
1t can have a profound moral Influence on the reader, evoking emotions 
tha t generate In te res t In moral reasoning and lending re a l- l i fe  shape 
to an otherwise abstract set o f theories and circumstances. In the 
examples developed previously on the humanities approach to moral edu­
ca tion , such l i te ra ry  works as 1984, Native Son, and On Lies. Secrets, 
and Silence are recoirmended fo r  the ir portrayal of deep moral con­
v ic tio n s  on the part o f the author and the fic tiona l protagonists 
a lik e . The p o s s ib ility  o f moving beyond the written word and Incor­
porating such film s w ith high moral Impact as Peter G lenvilie 's  
“ Becket" (1964); Stanley Kramer's "Judgment of Nuremberg" (1961); or
more recently John Badham's ’’Whose Life Is I t  Anyway?" (1981) may not 
be qu ite  matched by s im ila r p o s s ib ilit ie s  with classical o r modernistic 
paintings o r works o f music simply because a rt and music tend to be 
less d id a c tic , fa r less d ire c t In the ir moral significance fo r human 
thought and behavior. Nevertheless, w ithin the structured context o f 
a course designed w ith a combined normative ethics and a cognitive- 
developmental basis, an in s truc to r would feel free to transcend d is ­
c ip lin a ry  bounds and use resources from the arts and humanities. In
p a rtic u la r , l i te ra ry  and a r t is t ic  works could help stim ulate and 
broaden the moral Imagination, helping students recognize that there 
is  an e th ica l dimension to l i f e ,  that value choices are constantly 
being made. Their use could also provide examples o f Individual and 
personal meaning-making, portrayals of individuals who have learned
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to function in a p lu ra lis t ic  and r e la t iv is t ic  world through making 
personal commitments.
The teacher is  often considered the key "resource," As in many 
undergraduate cu rricu la r areas, the In s truc to r serves as a personal 
role model as well as a professional educator s k ille d  1n h is /he r 
d isc ip lin e  or subject,7 For students a t d u a lls t lc  or m u lt lp H s tlc  
levels o f development especia lly , th is  personal aspect o f the fa cu lty  
member as a role model is  important. Perry points out tha t educators 
must be open and v is ib le  in th e ir  own th ink ing , doubts, and sty les o f 
commitment and that they must recognize and, 1n some manner, reward 
students1 e ffo rts  to make meaning, take r is k s , and eventually e xh ib it 
courage in  commitment (1970, p. 213). Teachers become Important as 
role models in the process o f in te lle c tu a l and e th ica l development, 
not  in the character-development sense o f e xh ib itin g  sp e c ific  correct 
behaviors. One minimal c r ite r io n , then, In the se lection o f teachers 
Is tha t they are sensitive  to the personal sub tle tie s  o f teacher- 
student exchanges and are w ill in g  to appropriate ly and honestly por­
tray th e ir  own individual e ffo rts  a t e th ica l reasoning, a t formulating 
moral commitments and making value choices. C lea rly , the attempt to 
serve e ith e r as an absolute moral au tho rity  or as an exemplary "moral" 
person would stand In contrad iction to the Ideals o f lib e ra l education
7At the very least teachers serve as ro le  models 1n the sense 
that they continuously portray the ethics o f th e ir  own career and 
d isc ip lin e  through th e ir  classroom manner and s ty le .
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as well as to those o f both the cognitive-developmental and normative 
eth ics models o f  moral education. On the o ther hand, absolutely no 
attempt to become personally engaged w ith  the subject m ateria l—no 
e f fo r t  to show students tha t he/she (the In s tru c to r) also 1s involved 
in  the life lo n g  process o f making value decisions, coping with moral 
am biguity, and reevaluating self-adopted e th ica l p rinc ip les  may lead 
to an a r id , removed teaching s ty le  and learn ing environment—the a n t i­
thesis o f an atmosphere designed to encourage personal meaning-making, 
e th ica l and In te lle c tu a l r1sk-tak1ng, and development o f the moral 
Imagination,
Enthusiasm, a high degree o f In te re s t fo r  students and the sub­
je c t m atter, e ffe c tiv e  teaching s k i l ls  are among the relevant c r i te r ia  
fo r teachers o f most subjects a t most le ve ls ; there remains, however, 
the question o f academic background and creden tia ls . Must a ll under­
graduate teachers of moral education using the combined normative 
ethlcs-cognltlve-developm ental approach possess a doctorate In p h i l­
osophy o r, perhaps, in  theological eth ics? Is a master's degree In 
developmental counseling a necessity? D e fin it iv e  answers to such 
questions are well outside the scope o f th is  thesis; ra the r, several 
considerations and possible d irec tions  fo llo w .
For reasons outlined 1n greater d e ta il 1n The Teaching o f Ethics 
1n Higher Education study (1980), primary emphasis is  placed on 
advanced graduate work 1n e th ics . F a m ilia r ity  w ith the language, 
concepts, and methodology o f the d is c ip lin e  1s Important fo r both 
p o li t ic a l and pedagogical reasons. P o l i t ic a l ly ,  such courses o r pro­
grams o f study may be found unacceptable 1f they are taught e n t ire ly
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by Ind iv idua ls  w ithout advanced graduate tra in in g  1n philosophy, par­
t ic u la r ly  e th ics , PedagoglcaTly, i t  would be very d i f f i c u l t  fo r the 
prospective teacher (although c e r ta in ly  not impossible) to  imnerse 
h im /herself in  a thorough and necessary understanding o f ethical con­
cepts and analysis and the h is to ry  o f e th ica l thought w ithout the 
structured format and support o f a u n iv e rs ity  graduate program. The 
ins truc to r o f a combined e th ics approach would a lso need a th e o re ti­
cal background and p ra c tica l tra in ing  1n the cognitive-developmental 
approach to  understanding students1 in te lle c tu a l and e th ica l growth. 
Workshops, summer classes, conferences Imparting a theo re tica l under­
standing as well as a pedagogical grasp o f the p a rt ic u la r  classroom 
and student-teacher dynamics are l ik e ly  means o f In s tru c tio n . Since, 
a fte r a l l ,  the primary ro le  Is tha t o f  "college teacher," using the 
theory and s k i l ls  o f developmental counseling—and not "developmental 
counselor" teaching in the area of e th ic s —minimal emphasis is placed 
on sustained graduate tra in in g  1n c l in ic a l psychology o r counseling.
In short, the  qua lifie d  teacher o f th is  combination model should be 
lib e ra lly  educated, possess extensive graduate-level education 1n 
ethics, and have undergone practica l tra in in g  In the cogn itive - 
developmental approach to  college teaching and student advising.
Evaluation On what basis are students to  be evaluated 1n a 
co llege-leve l course or program o f study jo in t ly  focused on moral 
theory and student development? Again, drawing upon the philosophical 
c r ite r ia  fa r  lib e ra l education (as defined in chapter 2 ), certa in  
evaluation c r ite r ia  are c le a r ly  excluded. Students would obviously
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not be evaluated on the basis o f e ithe r th e ir  behavior o r on actual 
content o f th e ir  personal moral p rinc ip les  and b e lie fs . This is 
apparent since the proposed model o f moral education so d e f in it iv e ly  
excludes behavioral goals as well as goals centered on the incu lca­
tio n  o r manipulation o f substantive, personal moral values. There are, 
however, o Lrher ob jectives which—although they are an important and 
leg itim a te  part o f th is  Integrated model—are not eas ily  evaluated.
Such goals as movement from dualism to the higher stages o f moral 
development, w illingness to make personal conrni tments, s k i l ls  in  In ­
te lle c tu a l and e th ica l r is k -ta k in g , and possessing an a tt itu d e  o f 
moral o b lig a tio n  are not only d i f f i c u l t  to evaluate but are—1n an 
academic sense fo r  ind iv idua l students—m orally Inappropriate to eval­
uate. The ob jectives themselves are ce rta in ly  not ta c i t  nor are many 
o f the pedagogical techniques and learning resources intended to  bring 
about such changes (as has been discussed 1n previous sec tions}. Vet, 
these are the less tra d it io n a l objectives tha t embody some a ffe c tiv e  
and a tt itu d ln a l elements th a t no s ing le  course o f study can r e a l is t ic ­
a l ly  hope to change in  a re la tiv e ly  b r ie f  period o f time. These objec­
tives  espec ia lly  can force the in s tru c to r to pay heed to  the hidden* 
Immeasurable aspects o f college education and to the long-term e ffec ts  
of col lege study as well as push the student to rea lize  the Important 
ro le  o f s e lf-e va lu a tio n , A student may pose such questions as: "Apart
from completing ind iv idua l courses and receiving ce rta in  grades, what 
does my col lege-learn ing  experience, in i t s  e n tire ty , mean to me?"
"Am 1 taking the greatest advantage o f th is  course to grow and develop?" 
"How can I use th is  knowledge and these s k i l ls  la te r  in l i f e ? 1’ "What
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do these new concepts and theories mean to me personally?" "Am I mak­
ing important connections between th is  new-found theory, my personal 
values and p rinc ip les , and irty l i f e  experiences?" "W ill Jt or how 
w il l  I*  act upon th is  knowledge?” The po in t is  tha t these are ques­
tions tha t should not be academically evaluated by Ins tructo rs  in  an 
Integrated moral education program; ra th e r, a learning environment 
should be created 1n which students themselves become capable o f 
posing such questions and dealing w ith  them in  a meaningful and sus­
tained manner. Therefore, although no student 1s evaluated and 
assigned an academic grade fo r  a "w illingness  to make a strong person­
al coflmitment to ce rta in  values*" " a b i l i t y  to to le ra te  moral am biguity," 
or fo r "exhib iting courage and r is k -ta k in g  1n pursu it o f moral know­
ledge," fo r example* these are leg itim a te  and c r i t ic a l  ob jectives; and 
the Instructo r operating w ith in  th is  approach to moral education can 
a c tive ly  help Ind ividuals understand these goals and work toward them.
The remaining ob jectives of th is  model. Including " a b i l i ty  to 
th ink re la tiv e ly  and con tingen tly ," " c r i t i c a l ly  re fle c tin g  on one's 
own mode o f reasoning arid judgment," "recognizing and iden tify in g  
e th ica l Issues," and "achieving in te lle c tu a l depth, coherence* and 
consistency in  the analysis o f e th ica l p ropos itions ," f a l l  well w ith in  
the moral tra d itio n a l realm o f a n a ly tic  reason. Such coirmonplace 
learning a c t iv it ie s  and resources as c r i t i c a l ly  reading and discussing 
c lassic works In e th ics* p a rtic ip a tin g  1n debates and case study 
analyses* w riting  short essays and longer research papers, and taking 
te s ts —both "objective" tes ts  focused on one's depth* breadth, and
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accuracy o f factual knowledge and essay examinations which also tes t 
In tegrative  and synthetic in te lle c tu a l s k i l ls —may a l l  serve as le g i t i ­
mate and e th ica l means fo r  evaluating students' progress.
In summation, then, there are three d iffe re n t types o f goals and 
objectives, each with various forms o f evaluation. There are behavior­
al objectives and goals which center on changing the In d iv id u a l's  
moral values and b e lie fs . These have been excluded from the s ta r t  as 
have the learning resources and the methods o f evaluation which would 
fo llow . There are leg itim a te  objectives which spring from an expanded 
notion o f reason, a greater s e n s it iv ity  to the long-term e th ica l mis­
sion o f the lib e ra l a r ts ,  and a c le a re r commitment to  the c u rr ic u la r  
goals o f lib e ra l education. Success In achieving o r  working toward 
such goals may be at le a s t p a r t ia lly  measured through using psycho­
logical tests o f moral reasoning and long-term socia l s c ie n t if ic  sur­
veys o f ind iv idua l moral growth and development. Such Instrumentation 
Is used not to  evaluate the degree o f ind iv idua l academic progress, 
but rather to evaluate the overall e ffectiveness o f the course o f 
study and provide Inform ation to the Ins tructo rs  and other responsible 
academic o f f ic ia ls  on where and how to make revisions to the program 
or course. In some Instances, students may have access to such evalu­
ation inform ation to aid them in self-assessment. F in a lly , there are 
the more tra d it io n a l forms o f academic evaluation: tes ts , papers,
debates, and discussion. These serve as the only appropriate means 
o f measuring Individual achievement and a b i l i t y  1n a co llege -leve l 
program o f study In moral education. Those ob jectives o f moral 
education which are c le a r ly  centered on ana ly tic  reasoning as well
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as the more cogn itive  aspects o f such objectives as "developing an 
expanded sense o f moral imagination" o r " a b i l i ty  to make connections 
between e th ica l theory and concepts, one's own moral perceptions and 
p rin c ip le s , and actual actions and l i fe s ty le "  can be leg itim ate ly 
evaluated. In sh o rt, these are the c r i t ic a l  deciding questions; Is 
th is  an evaluation o f students' in te lle c tu a l e ffo rts , a b il i t ie s ,  and 
achievements? I f  so, I t  is  pedagogically appropriate and ethical in 
a lib e ra l a rts  context. Is th is  an evaluation o f students' ethical 
character* w il l  power, moral a ttitu d e s , self-1dent1ty, or personal 
development? Tf so, 1t Is c le a r ly  unethical and an inappropriate 
basis fo r student evaluation in  a lib e ra l a rts  cu rricu la r setting.
C urricu la r Placement This thesis has been an argument for why; 
goals focused on e th ica l development should be an Important component 
o f a lib e ra l a r ts , undergraduate curriculum . From that discussion 
arose a spec ific  model o f moral education describing goals, pedagogi­
cal methods, learning resources, and evaluation. Although there may 
be a tendency to assume that th is  e n ta ils  developing a new and d if fe r ­
ent type o f s tructured, semester or two-semester long course, th is  
may not necessarily be the most e ffe c tive  method of introducing the 
goals o f e th ica l development to the curriculum or fo r reinvlgorating 
the overa ll e th ica l mission o f the lib e ra l arts college.
Exactly how and where should a "course" o r "program o f study" 
emphasizing the goals and methods o f th is  Integrated model o f moral 
education be "placed" In a college curriculum? There are numerous 
and o ften  problematic questions tha t fo llow : Should these goals and
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pedagogical strategies be formulated into a single course, o r series 
o f courses? o r, should they be Integrated In to existing courses 1n 
the curriculum? Should th is  integrated approach to moral education 
be considered In te rd isc ip lin a ry  study? or, come under the rubric  and 
control of either philosophy or psychology, or both departments? Should 
there be a major or minor In Integrated moral education? Should a ll 
undergraduate students be required— In some manner--to study moral 
decision-making and ethics in  th is  proposed context? Should th is  
approach be incorporated into the degree requirements o f each available 
major or should I t  be considered e ither a general education e lective  or 
requirement? In some Instances these are p o lit ic a l and contextual 
questions and the exact "answers" w ill depend upon the ind iv idua l per­
sona lities  and circumstances of the college in  which the questions are 
raised. Nevertheless, there are some general preferences based upon 
both philosophical and pragmatic considerations.
According to the Hastlng's Center study o f existing applied ethics 
courses, many are issue-oriented, in te rd is c ip lin a ry , and team-taught, 
while most fa l l  under one o f the following categories: "Science,
Technology* and E th ics," "Pre-professional Ethics" or "Ethics In Non­
ethics Humanities and Social Science courses" (1980). In th is  thesis, 
however, there has been a broader consideration of the e th ica l mission 
of lib e ra l education and the appropriate objectives fo r moral education 
w ith in  the lib e ra l studies curriculum. The Integrated model is  ob­
viously not ju s t another normative or applied ethics class; Its  
acceptance would represent an In s titu tio n a l comnitment to p a r t ia lly  
f u l f i l l i n g  the e th ica l mission o f the college through a ffirm ing
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appropriate cu rr ic u la r goals and teaching methods. I t  undoubtedly 
is  u n re a lis tic  to expect any single semester-1ength course to meet 
these broader lib e ra l education goals. Moreover, a case e a s ily  could 
be made tha t because moral concerns and questions are pervasive— 
occurring, fo r  example* in science and technology* business, communica­
tio n s , as well as 1n the methodologies and research practices o f a l l  
the d is c ip lin e s  themselves —that the e th ica lly -o r ie n te d  goals o f 
lib e ra l education should be spread throughout the e n tire  curriculum . 
Despite these considerations, a very strong argument can be made fo r  
the development o f a concentrated course format. F irs t ,  i t  Is un­
l ik e ly  tha t many in s truc to rs  1n many d iffe re n t d isc ip lin e s  would 
choose to develop competence and expertise in  th is  area. Second, the 
cruc ia l personal and developmental aspects o f th is  integrated approach 
could eas ily  be lo s t in  currlculums that are s t i l l —by and la r g e -  
id e n tif ie d  and divided on a d is c ip lin a ry  and top ica l basis. T h ird— 
whether an accurate perception or not--many college facu lty  believe 
tha t no serious subject can be taught "pervasive ly" o r "across the 
curriculum " (Hastings Center* 19B0, p. 74). And fourth* to  d ire c t ly  
c ite  The Teaching of Ethics in  Higher Education.
th e  d iffu s io n  o f  ad hoc e th ica l analyses among 
a wide v a rie ty  o f courses deprives students o f the 
opportunity to focus system atically on e th ica l 
problems fo r  th e ir  own sake, and also o f a context 
fo r  g iving them a coherent means o f developing 
broader views on the nature of e th ic s .(1980, p. 75)
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Perhaps i t  would be possible to essen tia lly  do both: create at le a s t
one course exc lus ive ly  focused on e th ica l and moral judgment goals 
while a lso designating certa in  courses as "e th ics in te n s iv e ,"  ju s t  as 
some colleges now id e n tify  "w ritin g  intensive" courses. Such courses 
would re ly  upon the facu lty  member's expertise in h is /h e r own d is c i­
p line coupled with a commitment to Ide n tify in g  and teaching e th ica l 
issues and some degree of fa m il ia r ity  with and a pp lica tio n  o f the 
cognitive-developmental approach to education.
Although th is  approach c e rta in ly  allows fo r  e th ic a l analyses and 
the id e n t if ic a t io n  o f moral issues w ith in  any major. I t  seems f a i r l y  
c lea r th a t th is  Integrated model is not a major In i t s e l f . (Although 
I t  may serve as a component o f a student's chosen area of sp e c ia liza ­
tio n .)  This model o f moral education 1s ce rta in ly  not a new d is c ip lin e ,  
nor Is I t  founded on a spec ific  subject area (environmental studies 
or East Asian studies, for example) o r a career area (education o r 
business management, fo r example). I f  implemented I t  would help f u l ­
f i l l  the undergraduate conmitment to a general or l ib e ra l education.
As fo r  a d is c ip lin a ry  or In te rd is c ip lin a ry  designation, th is  again 
may la rg e ly  depend on specific  circumstances. A strong philosophy 
department w ith  a broad-based coirmitment to humanistic learning (as 
opposed to  the ana ly tic  school o f philosophy or any p a rtic u la r  school 
o f thought) may serve as a secure and Invigorating d is c ip lin a ry  home.
On the o the r hand, I f  a college has a well-defined l ih e ra l education 
program w ith  committed facu lty  from many d is c ip lin e s , an In te rd is c i­
p lina ry  status may be preferable. Again, there has been no attempt 
in th is  chapter to design a spe c ific  program o f study; instead, the
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ob jec tive  has been to draw out a t leas t the major c u rr ic u la r  and 
pedagogical im p lica tions and challenges tha t would fo llo w  from a 
serious comnitment to th is  model o f moral education.
Co ndusion
Underlying th is  proposal fo r a sp e c ific *  reasonable model o f 
co llege -leve l moral education fs the c r i t ic a l  assertion tha t there 
is  a moral dimension to human l i f e  and community and tha t society is  
rep le te  w ith  many obvious moral quandaries* e th ica l challenges, and 
value-based c o n f l ic ts .  Whether they are the almost overwhelming 
global issues o f imminent nuclear destruction , ju s t economic d is t r i ­
bution o f wealth, o r rac ia l and sexual equa lity  or the more personal, 
in d iv id u a lis t ic  issues of s e lf - id e n t ity *  re lig io u s  fa ith , and tru th -  
te l l in g —a l l  involve a degree o f moral choice, o f moral r is k  and 
commitment. Is the examination o f such issues as moral problems 1n 
a structured co llege-learn ing  environment e th ic a lly  appropriate? Is 
I t  pedagogically possible? The advocates o f lib e ra l education have* 
over the centuries* stressed the important ro le  that co llege education 
can and should play in  preparing ind iv idua ls  to meet such challenges. 
The overarching mission o f creating people who w il l  " l iv e  th e ir  live s  
w e ll, "  who w il l  become fre e -th in k in g  ind iv idua ls  capable o f both 
e th ica l commitment and In te lle c tu a l v is io n * is  c e r ta in ly  as lo f ty  an 
ideal today as ever. R e la tive ly  few American educators (Sidney Hook, 
aside) seem to re je c t the id e a l, a t leas t as an abstract societa l aim. 
However, i t  has been in s t itu t io n s  committed to lib e ra l education tha t
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have taken these m ission statements most seriously and translated 
them in to  such contemporary cun 1 u la r goals as: "an educated person
1s expected to have some understanding o f and experience in th in k in g  
about moral arvd e th ica l problems" and "(the educated person) cannot 
be p ro v in c ia l in the sense o f being ignorant o f other cu ltures and 
other tim es"—with the farmer goal centerfng on the development o f an 
Informed judgment and the a b i l i t y  to make d iscrim inating moral choices 
and the la t t e r  on the need to develop a to le ra n t, open-minded a tt itu d e  
or perspective . The tra n s la tio n , 1n turn, o f these c u rr ic u la r goals 
in to  s p e c if ic  ob jectives and learning methods has been even more 
d i f f i c u l t  and more con trove rs ia l. This "tra n s la tio n " has been the 
task o f th is  th e s is .
Besides the h is to r ic  commitment o f lib e ra l education to the 
e th ica l development o f the individual and the very existence o f a 
seemingly overwhelming number o f moral challenges—whether w ith in  
soc ie ty  o r the s e lf- - th e re  is a th ird ,  perhaps major, reason to more 
c le a r ly  and e x p l ic i t ly  emphasize the goals and objectives o f moral 
education: to  undermine the notion tha t education i t s e l f  can be
va lu e -fre e , imparting to ta l ly  objective knowledge and s k i l ls .  A sus­
tained encounter w ith  moral reason1ng--with the proposed in tegrated 
model or moral education—would help divest students and fa c u lty  
a lik e  o f the  dry* technique-oriented, s k il l  approach to teaching 
and le a rn ing . A stronger comnltment to the goals of moral develop­
ment would help students understand both the strengths and l im its  
o f o b je c t iv i ty  and a n a ly tic  reason and help them become sens itive  
to the underlying value assumptions In learning s k i l ls  and d is c ip lin a ry
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methodologies, in the selection and arrangement of factua l knowledge, 
in the dynamics o f Interpersonal and professional re la tionsh ips , and 
In the structure o f ind iv idua l courses and the curriculum as a whole.
In chapter 1 a ra tiona le  was presented fo r analyzing the educa­
tiona l goals o f moral development and fo r  proposing a specific  
phllosophically-defensib le model o f moral education. A b r ie f  review 
o f these reasons is  also 1n order. There is  a desperate need to 
c la r i fy  concepts or a t least to use language cons is ten tly , As pointed 
out, "morals," "values," and "ethics'* themselves, the central concepts 
in th is  study, are often used interchangeably, and each possesses mis­
leading popular connotations. In th is  thesis integrated model o f 
moral education has a spec ific  and consistent meaning. "Education" 
Implies ins truc tion  and learning occurring w ith in  a structu red , goal- 
oriented context, "Moral" is  used as opposed to "e th ics " 1n that 
th is  approach moves well beyond the tra d it io n a l philosophical examina­
tion  o f ethical theories and patterns of reasoning. Also, “moral" is  
emphasized ra ther than "value" to avoid the connotation o f a s k i l l -  
oriented, experientia l model and to emphasize the philosophical 
meaning of moral, values as distinguished from aesthe tic , customary, 
or t r iv ia l  values. "In teg ra ted ," in th is  thesis, re fe rs  to  the 
conceptual Integration or connection o f two ex is ting  models o f moral 
education and also implies an in tegra tion  o f fact and value, character 
and knowledge, and conscience and in te lle c t ;  while an educational 
"model" moves beyond an exp lica tion  of underlying assumptions and 
goals and objectives to also Id e n tify  the teaching methods, learning
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resources, methods o f evaluation* and cu rricu la r f i t  tha t lo g ic a lly  
o r p ra c t ic a lly  fo llow s . I t  was a lso pointed out tha t the p ro life ra ­
tio n  o f social s c ie n t if ic  research on ind iv idua l moral development 
holds both promise and danger: promise In the sense tha t the new
knowledge could help in  creating an e ffe c tive  approach to teaching 
moral education, danger In the sense tha t the theories and data 
co llected  could be c r i t ic a l ly  and naively accepted as worthwhile 
educational goals and ob jectives. The integrated model Is an attempt 
to sensibly draw upon a t least some o f the psychological research, to 
recognize the scope and lim ita tio n s  o f a cu rricu la r approach to moral 
development, and ye t s t i l l  develop a reasoned, philosophical case for 
the proposed model's goals and ob jec tives . F in a lly * an important 
ra tion a le  Is tha t the absence o f any firm  philosophical grounding fo r 
a course or program on co llege -leve l moral Ins truc tion  would Inevitab ly 
lead e ith e r to such a program's early  demise or to i t s  manipulation 
and d is to r t io n . The clear connection with the aims and goals of 
lib e ra l education 1s intended to insure th a t neither fa te  be fa lls  
the integrated model o f moral education.
To re turn to one o f the centra l assumptions o f th is  thesis: 
broad mission statements regarding moral character and development of 
the student can be transla ted in to  leg itim a te  and meaningful cu rricu ­
la r  goals and ob jectives. This thes is  has been an e th ica l and h is to r i­
cal ju s t i f ic a t io n  o f co llege-leve l moral education and a spec ific  
I l lu s t ra t io n  of how mission statements and broad curriculum goal 
statements focused on m ora lity  can* Indeed, be translated in to  
sp e c ific  learning ob jectives in a structured learning se ttin g . I f  one
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accepts such sweeping statements as those Ide n tified  by Bowen 1n his 
1977 study o f more than one-thousand college goal statements* then 
colleges are u ltim a te ly  aiming to create Individuals w ith  In te llec tua l 
tolerance and In te g r ity , wisdom, human sympathy and moral s e n s it iv ity  
and courage—and fo r a society tha t is  moving toward human equality, 
freedom and autonomy and a general "Improvement In the motives, 
values, aspirations, a ttitudes and behavior o f members o f the general 
population" (1977, p, 55-59). I t  is  recognized that these ultimate 
Ideals serve as "guides," as d is tan t "beacons on a journey" (to  again 
c ite  Karl Jaspers). The Idea ls, the long-term aims, find  expression 
a t various levels o f abstraction  and concreteness and In many d if fe r ­
ent structures—other than curriculum and structured learning. In 
th is  thesis these ultim ate alms take some specific  shape, they become 
Instrumental objectives w ith in  the college curriculum. Educational 
alms involving "m o ra lity ," "e th ica l character," and "moral develop­
ment" are re s tr ic te d  ne ither to  a high level o f abstraction nor to 
the extracurricu la r aspects o f college education.
The question "At a college or un ivers ity* what should be our 
educational goals 1n the realm o f morality?" was also posed as was the 
closely related question: "What cu rricu la r or Ins tructiona l model Is
most lo g ic a lly  consistent and e th ic a lly  acceptable w ith the mission and 
philosophy of lib e ra l education?" I t  was argued that the goals of 
moral education do not need to  be linked to a specific  ideology or 
re lig ious fa ith ,  that m ora lity  1s an overarching concern o f the human 
community, A moral point o f view Is a broadly humane perspective tha t
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views human value considerations as important. Moreover, the 
philosophy and goals o f the lib e ra l education t ra d it io n —f i r s t  de­
scribed and analyzed and then a c tu a lly  used to evaluate various 
models fo r  co llege -leve l moral education—serve as a healthy guard 
against e ith e r becoming enmeshed In the moral values and p r in c i­
ples o f a p a rtic u la r group or becoming over-enamored w ith  a "content- 
fre e ” technique or s k i l ls  approach to valuing,
"What should be the more sp e c ific  goals and ob jectives o f moral 
education?” To answer th is  question, five  e x is tin g  models o f moral 
education were id e n tif ie d  and described in some d e ta i l ;  these models 
were c r it iq u e d  and evaluated by using the philosophy and goals o f 
l ib e ra l education as the c r i te r ia .  Thus* th is  thesis 1st in  I t s e l f ,  
a form o f normative analysis* presenting a case* arguing fo r  a 
systematic view o f the p rinc ip les  by which colleges ought to con­
s tru c t a program o f moral education and then ra t io n a lly  defending 
a s p e c if ic , proposed model o f moral education. The integrated model 
o f moral education* a combination o f the ob jectives o f the cogn itive - 
developmental and normative e th ics models and a blending o f teaching 
methods* learning resources, and evaluation methods, most adequately 
meets the lo g ica l and e th ica l c r i te r ia  fo r l ib e ra l education. 
C erta in ly  e th ics courses cannot try  to teach 
p a rtic u la r  moral behaviors; tha t would be in ­
do c trin a tion * but 1f the movement to teach 
e th ics is  serious about developing not only the 
capacity to think e th ic a lly  but also the com­
mitment to  ac t e th ic a lly ,  then i t  w i l l  have to
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fin d  ways to f i r e  the w il l  as well as the In ­
te lle c t*  to  engage the heart as deeply as the 
mind, and to put w i l l ,  In te l le c t ,  and fee ling 
to the te s t o f behavior. (Llckona In Callahan 
A Bok* 1980* p. 132)
The unique aspect o f the In tegrated model I ts e l f  l ie s  In i ts  
success 1n p a r t ia l ly  bridging the gap described by Llckona and in  Its  
e x p lic it  assertion tha t the teaching of^ ethics and m ora lity  (not 
simply about ethics and m ora lity ) is  ne ither an appeal fo r  the a ffec ­
tiv e  or emotional education o f co llege students nor a s t r ic t  l im ita ­
tio n  to moral reasonfng as a form o f analysis or moral know!edge as 
a new d isc ip lin e , but rather an e f fo r t  to seek a broader understanding 
o f human reason, o f in te lle c tu a l growth. The ana lytic  goals o f the 
normative ethics model focus on moral reasoning and knowledge; the 
In tegrative and synthetic goals o f the cognitive-developmental model 
focus on moral character and development. Together they form an 
e ffe c tive  approach to co llege -leve l moral education that t ru ly  meets 
the alms and standards o f lib e ra l education. Indeed* many supposed 
opposites--a ffaction  and cogn ition , theory and practice, fa c t and 
value, cu rricu la r spec ia liza tion  and In tegra tion , absolutism and 
re la tiv ism * and in te l le c t  and conscience—are reunited in th is  pro­
posed model. In p a rtic u la r the d is tin c tio n s  between e th ica l absolut­
ism and re la tiv ism  as well as between in te lle c t  and moral conscience 
are examined and eventually reconnected by the student Instructed 
in the integrated model.
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Th1s proposed approach rests on the arguments tha t Indoctrina ­
tio n  1s not a log ica l in e v ita b il i ty  fn moral education, that moral 
phenomena and p rinc ip les  are ra tiona l and can be In te lle c tu a lly  d is ­
cussed and tested, and that a strong, well-defined concept o f lib e ra l 
education can help develop c lea r goals and objectives fn moral educa­
tio n . However, the scope o f the thesis is  lim ite d ; fo r  a number o f 
reasons, no claim can be made tha t any one c u rr ic u la r  model can 
e n tire ly  achieve the important e th ica l aims and goals o f lib e ra l 
education—whether fn actual p ractice  or in a theo re tica l sense. 
F irs t ,  there are moral learning experiences external to the c u rr ic u ­
lum as well as outside the e n tire  college environment. Second, a t 
least some o f the goals o f the integrated model are both Instrumental 
and long term. Such a goal as "developing the student's a b i l i t y  to 
o rien t h im self 1n a r e la t lv is t fc  world through personal comnltment" 
cannot be d e f in it iv e ly  achieved w ith in  four years--nor, probably, 
should i t  be. And, th ird , th is  model Is one reasonable approach to 
moral education in keeping w ith  the tra d it io n s , aims and c u rr ic u la r  
goals o f lib e ra l education. I t  1s proposed as p la u s ib le , e th ic a lly  
acceptable, and lo g ic a lly  connected to the ideals o f lib e ra l educa­
t io n —but not an absolute guideline in i t s e l f .
In c los ing , college students can be le g itim a te ly  taught to re­
f le c t  on moral ro le s , to use moral reasoning, to be comnltteci to ana­
lyzing and se lecting  moral values and l i f e  s ty les  and to act 1n 
accordance w ith  th e ir  convictions. The connections between passion 
and in te lle c t  and between moral theory, personal conscience* and con­
crete action can be made leg itim ate  and e ffe c tive  components o f a
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co llege-leve l lib e ra l studies curriculum .
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Abstract
LIBERAL EDUCATION AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT: AN INTEGRATED MODEL
OF MORAL EDUCATION
Roderic Lewis Owen, Ed.D.
The College o f W illiam  and Mary in V irg in ia , A p r il 1985 
Chairman: Professor W illiam  F, Loslto
Two central questions are ra ised; At a college level,what should 
be our educational goals and methods in the realm o f moral development? 
and, what c u rr ic u la r  or In s tru c tio n a l model 1s most lo g ic a lly  consis­
ten t and e th ic a lly  acceptable w ith  the mission and philosophy o f l ib e r ­
al education? The major purpose o f th is  study is  to answer these 
questions and develop one reasonable, c le a r ly  defined model o f co llege- 
le v e l moral education. The prov is ion  o f a framework o f c lear d e f in i­
t io n s  and c a re fu lly  delineated conceptual boundaries Is a necessary 
f i r s t  step.
A number o f reasons fo r  sustained philosophical analysis o f a l te r ­
na tive  goals and methods o f moral education are developed: reducing
semantic confusion, understanding how to use the growing body o f  socia l 
s c ie n t i f ic  research on moral development. Id e n tify in g  the dangers in ­
herent in  moral education w ith o u t clear gu idelines and goals, under­
mining the b e lie f th a t education can be va lue -free , and reasserting 
the Important ro le  tha t the philosophy o f l ib e ra l education can play 
1n determining c u rr ic u la r  goals and methods.
This study 1s a philosophical inqu iry  consisting o f analysis and 
c la r i f ic a t io n  o f concepts. More s p e c if ic a lly , i t  1s a normative In ­
q u iry  In to  the various goals o f  moral education, leading to  a proposal 
fo r  one J u s t if ia b le  model o f  co llege -leve l education. This normative 
study rests on the ph ilosophica l assumption th a t value statements car 
be ra t io n a lly  understood and debated and is  guided by an awareness o f 
the major find ings in social s c ie n t i f ic  research on moral development 
and education, an understanding o f  the h is to ry  and philosophy o f 
l ib e r a l education, and fa m i l ia r i ty  with the conceptual analysis o f 
educational term inology.
In order to answer the ce n tra l questions 1t is argued tha t the 
ideal o f lib e ra l education ( i t s  Inherent lo g ica l and e th ica l c r i te r ia  
as w e ll as a developed set o f  e x p l ic i t  c u rr ic u la r  goals) can help 
determine leg itim a te  c u r r ic u la r  goals and methods tha t are focused 
on moral development. An extended d e fin it io n  o f  lib e ra l education is  
developed through reference to w idely accepted h is to r ic a l statements 
and examination o f contemporary p rin c ip le s  and goals.
Five contemporary models o f undergraduate moral education are 
next id e n tif ie d  and described in  d e ta i l : values c la r if ic a t io n ,
w h o lis tlc , humanities, normative e th ics , and cognitive-developmental. 
The sp e c ific  c r ite r ia  fo r  lib e ra l education are then c r i t ic a l ly  
app lied , evaluating the respective strengths and weaknesses o f each 
model. I t  1s argued th a t the normative e th ics and cognitive-develop­
mental models are most closely connected w ith  the h is to r ic a l alms and 
contemporary goals o f lib e ra l education.
The study concludes with a de ta iled  analysis o f the two selected 
models. Reasons fo r  th e ir  In teg ra tion  are developed, pedagogical 
methods and resources which emerge from th e ir  combination are ou tlin ed , 
and a summary o f th is  approach to se lecting and developing an accept­
able model o f co llege-leve l moral education is  o ffe red . In c los ing , 
i t  is  stated that college students can le g itim a te ly  be taught to 
re f le c t on moral ro les and use moral reasoning, to be conmltted to 
analyzing and se lecting moral values and l i fe s ty le s ,  and to  act 1n 
accordance with th e ir  convictions.
